This book provides a systematic overview of transmission network investment in liberalized power markets. Recent government policies to increase the share of intermittent renewable power generation and other technological innovations present new theoretical as well as practical challenges for transmission investments. Written by experts with a background in both economics and engineering, the book examines the economic and technical fundamentals of regulated and merchant transmission investment, and includes case studies of transmission investment in a number of countries. The book is divided into four parts: Part 1 introduces the basic economics and engineering of transmission network investment, while Part 2 discusses merchant investment in the transmission network. Part 3 then examines transmission investment coordination and smart grids, and lastly, Part 4 describes practical experiences of transmission network investment in power market in various countries.

Bridges the knowledge gap between engineering and economics in a complex and evolving deregulated electricity industry, enabling readers to understand, operate, plan and design a modern power system With an accessible and progressive style written in straight-forward language, this book covers everything an engineer or economist needs to know to understand, operate within, plan and design an effective liberalized electricity industry, thus serving as both a useful teaching text and a valuable reference. The book focuses on principles and theory which are independent of any one market design. It outlines where the theory is not implemented in practice, perhaps due to other over-riding concerns. The book covers the basic modelling of electricity markets, including the impact of uncertainty (an integral part of generation investment decisions and transmission cost-benefit analysis). It draws out the parallels to the Nordpool market (an important point of reference for Europe). Written from the perspective of the policy-maker, the first part provides the introductory background knowledge required. This includes an understanding of basic economics concepts such as supply and demand, monopoly, market power and marginal cost. The second part of the book asks how a set of generation, load, and transmission resources should be efficiently operated, and the third part focuses on the generation investment decision. Part 4 addresses the question of the management of risk and Part 5 discusses the question of market power. Any power system must be operated at all times in a manner which can accommodate the next potential contingency. This demands responses by generators and loads on a very short timeframe. Part 6 of the book addresses the question of dispatch in the very short run, introducing the distinction between preventive and corrective actions and why preventive actions are sometimes required. The seventh part deals with pricing issues that arise under a regionally-priced market, such as the Australian NEM. This section introduces the notion of regions and interconnectors and how to formulate constraints for the correct pricing outcomes (the issue of "constraint orientation"). Part 8 addresses the fundamental and difficult issue of efficient transmission investment, and finally Part 9 covers issues that arise in the retail market. Bridges the gap between engineering and economics in electricity, covering both the economics and engineering knowledge needed to accurately understand, plan and develop the electricity market Comprehensive coverage of all the key topics in the economics of electricity markets Covers the latest research and policy issues as well as description of the fundamental concepts and principles that can be applied across all markets globally Numerous worked examples and end-of-chapter problems Companion website holding solutions to problems set out in the book, also the relevant simulation (GAMS) codes

Whilst financial rights have appeared as a successful ingredient in North-American power markets, they have their shortcomings both theoretically and in practice. Financial Transmission Rights: Analysis, Experiences and Prospects present a systematic and comprehensive overview of financial transmission rights (FTRS). Following a general introduction to FTRs, including chapters to explain transmission pricing and the general properties of FTRS, experts in the field provide discussions on wide scope of topics. These include: Varying perspectives on FTRS: from electrical engineers to economists, Different mathematical formulations of FTRS Financial Hedging using FTRS, and Alternative solutions to FTRs The detail, expertise and range of content makes Financial Transmission Rights: Analysis, Experiences and Prospect an essential resource for electricity market specialists both at academic and professional levels. “This is THE BOOK we were all expecting to address all key ‘Financial Transmission Rights’ issues. It is comprehensive and reader friendly. You can pick at will in its menu: more or less theory, a bit of maths or none, empirical review of real cases or numerical simulations of many feasible options. Big names rally there to delight you like: Hogan , Oren, Perez-Arriaga, Smeers, Hobbs and... Rosellón. More than a must read: a light house, a map and a survival kit.” Jean – Michel Glachant, Director Florence School, Holder Loyola de Palacio Chair, Chief-editor Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy. "In the last two decades, economists have developed a better understanding of the impact of financial rights on risk management, market power and network expansion in electricity markets, while power systems have experimented with such rights. Striking a good balance between academics and practitioners, always at the frontier of the field, written by the best experts, this volume is essential reading for all those- power systems’ managers and users, regulators, students and researchers- who want to understand the new electricity environment and predict its evolution." Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Industrial Economics (IDEI) Further comments inside.

In this paper we propose an equilibrium model in order to analyze the impact of electricity market design on generation and transmission expansion in liberalized electricity markets. In a multi-level structure, our framework takes into account that generation investment and operation is decided by private investors, while network expansion and redispatch is decided by a regulated transmission system operator - as well as the different objectives of firms (profit maximization) and the regulator (welfare maximization). In order to illustrate the possibilities to quantify long term economic effects with our framework, we calibrate our model for the German electricity market. We consider various moderate adjustments of the market design: (i) the division of the market area into two price zones, (ii) the efficient curtailment of renewable production and (iii) a cost-benefit-driven balance between network expansion and network management measures. We then analyze the impact of these market designs on generation and transmission investment in case those design elements are anticipated upon network development planning. The resulting investment and production decisions are compared to a benchmark that reflects the current German electricity market design and to an overall optimal first-best benchmark. Our results reveal that price zones do have a significant impact on locational choice of generators and result in a reduced need for network expansion, but lead to only moderate annual welfare gains of approximately 0.9% of annual total system costs. Anticipation of optimal curtailment of renewables and a cost-benefit-driven use of redispatch operations upon network expansion planning, however, implies a welfare gain of over 4.9% of annual total system costs per year as compared to the existing market design, which equals 85% of the maximal possible welfare gain of the first-best benchmark.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of investment problems pertaining to electric energy infrastructure, including both generation and transmission facilities. The analysis encompasses decision-making tools for expansion planning, reinforcement, and the selection and timing of investment options. In this regard, the book provides an up-to-date description of analytical tools to address challenging investment questions such as: How can we expand and/or reinforce our aging electricity transmission infrastructure? How can we expand the transmission network of a given region to integrate significant amounts of renewable generation? How can we expand generation facilities to achieve a low-carbon electricity production system? How can we expand the generation system while ensuring appropriate levels of flexibility to accommodate both demand-related and production-related uncertainties? How can we choose among alternative production facilities? What is the right time to invest in a given production or transmission facility? Written in a tutorial style and modular format, the book includes a wealth of illustrative examples to facilitate comprehension. It is intended for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in the fields of electric energy systems, operations research, management science, and economics. Practitioners in the electric energy sector will also benefit from the concepts and techniques presented here.

In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.

In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.