The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of seeking improvements in the way it goes about buying new weapon systems. In the past two decades alone, DoD has mounted two distinct movements that each carried the title "Acquisition Reform" (AR).' In the 1980s, reform efforts focused on reducing "waste, fraud, and abuse" in the system. In the 1990s, the emphasis shifted toward trying to make the acquisition process more responsive, effective, and efficient i.e., "faster, better, cheaper." Initiatives launched in the 1990s to support the latter goals included legislative changes to allow for more streamlined procurements, reductions in internal paperwork and required reviews, greater use of commercial practices, and expanded attempts to use the private sector to do more of the jobs traditionally done by government. DoD also sought ways to make it easier and more attractive for companies that previously had never worked for the DoD to begin pursuing military contracts; this was seen as a way to allow the military to tap into the expanded creativity and innovative prowess in developing and applying new technology that had come to the fore in the private sector, particularly in the 1990s.

Center of Military History Publication 51-3-1. By J. Ronald Fox, et al. Discusses reform initiatives from 1960 to the present and concludes with prescriptions for future changes to the acquisition culture of the services, DoD, and industry.

The Department of Defense (DOD) acquires goods and services from contractors, federal arsenals, and shipyards to support military operations. Acquisition is a broad term that applies to more than just the purchase of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor. This book provides an overview of the process by which the Department of Defense acquires weapon systems and discusses recent major efforts by Congress and DOD to improve the performance of the acquisition system. It also discusses the DOD's use of contractors to support military and the Nun-McCurdy Act.

Defense acquisition reform initiatives have been Department of Defense perennials over the past fifty years. Yet reforming the acquisition process remains a high priority each time a new administration comes into office. Many notable studies of defense acquisition with recommendations for changes have been published, and each has reached the same general findings with similar recommendations. However, despite the defense community's intent to reform the acquisition process, the difficulty of the problem and the associated politics, combined with organizational dynamics that are resistant to change, have led to only minor improvements. The problems of schedule slippages, cost growth, and shortfalls in technical performance on defense acquisition programs have remained much the same throughout this period. The importance of the Department of Defense's huge acquisition projects over the years cannot be overstressed. The United States has often turned to cutting-edge technological solutions to solve strategic and operational challenges. To highlight the importance of acquisition issues, the Department of Defense began a project in 2001 to write a history of defense acquisition from the end of World War II to the start of the twenty-first century. The U.S. Army Center of Military History served as the executive agent for that project until funding was effectively withdrawn in 2009. Two volumes of that history are nearing publication, which will take the story up to 1969. To capitalize on essential information on defense acquisition reform initiatives from the three unpublished draft volumes covering the period from 1969 to 2000, the Center decided to publish extracts from those volumes, with additional analysis by J. Ronald Fox, a subject matter expert on acquisition and an adviser to the project. Much of chapter two of this acquisition reform study was written by Walton S. Moody and David G. Allen for their draft Volume III (1969-1980) of the Defense Acquisition History Project and then edited, analyzed, and augmented by Fox. Similarly, most of chapter three was taken from Thomas C. Lassman's draft chapters three and five of his Volume IV (1981-1990), and much of chapter four was written by Philip L. Shiman as chapter eight of his Volume V (1991-2000) of the Defense Acquisition History Project. Fox was able to take their chapters, provide additional analysis and insights, and consolidate and edit them with his own work to prepare this important volume focusing on defense acquisition reform. This volume is the result of all of their research and writing efforts and their collective insights into an incredibly complex system. Professor Fox's Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009: An Elusive Goal, provides valuable historical analysis of the numerous attempts over the past fifty years to reform the defense acquisition process for major weapons systems. It identifies important long-term trends, insights, and observations that provide perspective and context to assist current defense decision makers, acquisition officials, and the acquisition schoolhouse. It is an important work on an important subject that continues to defy solution.

In the Department of Defense, 63 distinct acquisition reform (AR) initiatives were undertaken from 1989 to 2002. By looking at what the AR movement "was" in the 1990s (by describing the initiatives launched under its name) and by letting acquisition personnel describe in their own words how their work was affected by those initiatives, the authors seek to shed light on what the AR movement has and has not accomplished in terms of changing the way the acquisition process works.