Die in diesem Band versammelten Essays erörtern die Frage nach der Möglichkeit des Verstehens menschlichen Handelns ohne den Rückbezug auf moralische Werte und Normen. Obwohl die Autoren sich dieser Frage auf ganz unterschiedliche, manchmal divergierende, Weisen nähern, verbindet sie alle die Annahme, es sei nicht wünschenswert oder sogar inkohärent, das menschliche Handeln grundsätzlich unabhängig von moralischen Werten zu betrachten. Die Herausgeber haben sich um eine für Philosophen und Gesellschaftswissenschaftler gleichermaßen attraktive Beitragssammlung bemüht. Die Verknüpfung philosophischer und soziologischer Perspektiven könnte zur Klärung gegenseitiger Missverständnisse beitragen, die aufgrund eines mangelhaften Dialogs zwischen der philosophischen und soziologischen Handlungstheorie erwachsen sind. In diesem Band enthalten sind Essays von Terry Pinkard, Sebastian Rödl, Dieter Schönecker, Ana Marta González, John Levi Martin, Alejandro N. García Martínez, Sophie Djigo, Teresa Enríquez und Evgenia Mylonaki. The essays in this volume address the question of whether we can understand human action without reference to moral norms or values. Although the authors approach this question in different and sometimes even incompatible ways, they are united in thinking that it is undesirable or even incoherent to treat human agency as if it were conceptually independent of value questions. The editors have attempted to invite contributions that would be interesting to both philosophers and social theorists. The conjunction of philosophic and sociological perspectives might help to overcome some of the mutual misunderstandings that have been fostered by a lack of dialogue between the philosophic and sociological action theory. The volume includes essays by Terry Pinkard, Sebastian Rödl, Dieter Schönecker, Ana Marta González, John Levi Martin, Alejandro N. García Martínez, Sophie Djigo, Teresa Enríquez, and Evgenia Mylonaki.

Philosophers across many traditions have long theorized about the relationship between prudence and morality. Few clear answers have emerged, however, in large part because of the inherently speculative nature of traditional philosophical methods. This book aims to forge a bold new path forward, outlining a theory of prudence and morality that unifies a wide variety of findings in neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing. The author summarizes the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, showing how human moral and prudential cognition and motivation are known to involve over a dozen brain regions and capacities. He then outlines a detailed philosophical theory of prudence and morality based on neuroscience and lived human experience. The result demonstrates how this theory coheres with and explains the behavioral neuroscience, showing how each brain region and capacity interact to give rise to prudential and moral behavior. Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory will be of interest to philosophers and psychologists working in moral psychology, neuroethics, and decision theory. Chapter 3 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

This book presents a broad and new theory of theory formation in ethics. There are many existing theories, and more could be generated, but most thinkers of theory formation have a narrow view of what a theory of ethics should be like. They favor certain kinds of grand theories that generate various ethical rules and principles. In fact these grand theories allegedly do so much work that they give the appearance of being super-theories (or strong theories). Many theory creators think that it is possible to create strong theories, and that they themselves have created such a theory. Anti-theorists scoff at these claims. In effect, then, the argument between the two sides is not one of theory versus anti-theory but of grand or strong theory versus anti-grand or strong theory. Nick Fotion argues that once a broader view of theory is accepted, it is easier to see that there really is no serious conflict between theorists and anti-theorists. In principle, both sides, if they overcome their addiction to thinking in terms of grand, strong theory formation, can accept a role for theories in ethics. Theories in ethics can be either grand or local in nature. Provided theory creators and users don't expect theories to performs all kinds of impossible tasks (e.g., to deal with all of our ethical problems and be so fully justified that only one theory can be accepted as being correct) it is easier to accept them. It is also easier to accept the idea that a theorist might very well appeal to more than one theory to help him or her deal with whatever ethical issues bother.

This collection contains Warren Quinn's most important contributions to moral philosophy and has been edited for publication by Philippa Foot.

Ethics is a part of philosophy that is concerned with living well and choosing the right course of action. The choice of the course of action is based on moral reasoning and there is no single moral theory on which we can base the choices that we make. The application of moral standards in life is also the concern of Ethics: Theory and Practice, which deals with moral theories in Indian and Western philosophical traditions as well as the debates that centre around their application. The book has ten chapters—the first chapter presents what morality and moral reasoning is; the second chapter is a critical survey of some popular concepts of Indian ethics; the third chapter surveys Western moral theories and the remaining seven chapters cover a variety of contemporary moral issues that are controversial as well as inescapable. They deal with issues like capital punishment, civil disobedience, euthanasia, and women’s rights.

Julian Wuerth offers a radically new interpretation of major themes in Kant's philosophy. He explores Kant's ontology of the mind, his transcendental idealism, his account of the mind's powers, and his theory of action, and goes on to develop an original, moral realist account of Kant's ethics.