This volume describes how technological and geo-political trends are rapidly transforming maritime affairs. A mix of original and previously published material, this volume describes how the 21st-century great power competition is changing the face of naval operations in general, and U.S. Navy operations in the Western Pacific in particular. The rise of an assertive China and its new anti-access and area-denial capabilities threaten the aircraft carrier-based maritime dominance of the U.S. Navy. Military and political trends in the Western Pacific and beyond suggest that the world is encountering a pivotal moment when existing weapons, tactics, and operations might be rendered obsolete by techno-strategic change. This volume considers these developments from three perspectives by describing: (1) the techno-strategic setting; (2) the institutional constraints that impede the ability of the U.S. Navy to respond to these changes; and (3) a new approach to naval force planning and strategy to cope with these developments. The volume culminates in a discussion of sophisticated strategies and operational concepts that position the U.S. Navy and its maritime allies and partners to prevail in today’s techno-strategic churn. This book will be of much interest to students of naval policy, strategic studies, Asia-Pacific politics, and International Relations.

World events in recent years have led observers, particularly since late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment in recent years has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. The shift to renewed great power competition has become a major factor in the debate over future U.S. defense spending levels, and has led to new or renewed emphasis on the following in discussions of U.S. defense strategy, plans, and programs: * grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs; * nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;* new U.S. military service operational concepts;* U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;* capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., largescale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia; * maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons;* speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy;* mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia;* minimizing reliance in U.S. military systems on components and materials from Russia and China; and* capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.

This nation‘s Cold War and Global War on Terror defense structures need an update. U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century provides such a framework for the changed world we live in, offering a detailed roadmap that shows how the United States can field a war-winning fleet that can also compete aggressively in peacetime against dangerous competitors unlike any the nation has faced before. Brent Sadler presents a compelling new strategy and organizing approach that he calls naval statecraft, which acknowledges the centrality and importance of the maritime domain. While similar in scale and scope to Cold War containment strategies against the Soviets, naval statecraft is much more. It must be to challenge China‘s involvement in global supply chains, which gives that country significant financial heft and influence around the world. Unlike what existed during of the Cold War, however, Sadler provides a unique vision for competing with China and Russia. Rather than simply calling for better coordinated U.S. diplomacy, military operations, and economic statecraft, Sadler argues for integrating the levers of national power coherently and in a sustainable way. This is no small feat, and his approach is informed by a long career rich in working with various agencies of government, foreign militaries (including hostile ones), and our allies. It is an approach imminently appropriate to our times but comes with a realization that the nation is not ready for the competition it faces from China and Russia. The book is a valuable contribution to the national debate over how best to respond to China‘s rise and Russia‘s antagonisms.

"A superb book.…Mearsheimer has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the behavior of great powers."—Barry R. Posen, The National Interest The updated edition of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? In clear, eloquent prose, John Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable.

In an era of great power competition, the role of alliances in managing escalation of conflict has acquired renewed importance. Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate means for deterrence and controlling escalation, and are central to US alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, allies themselves need to better prepare for managing escalation in an increasingly challenging geostrategic and technological environment for the US and its allies. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This book brings together leading experts from Europe, Northeast Asia, the United States and Australia to focus on these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence and potential escalation pathways in America’s 21st century alliances. ‘Nuclear weapons play an important role in deterrence and preventing military conflict between great powers, while also posing an existential threat to humanity. It is vital that we have a nuanced understanding of this important challenge, so that such weapons are never used. This book offers many important perspectives and makes a significant contribution to the overall debate about these powerful weapons.’ — The Hon Julie Bishop, Chancellor, The Australian National University, Former Foreign Minister of Australia ‘This timely book identifies a wide range of challenges US alliances both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic face as they seek to ensure the value of US extended deterrence, particular the US nuclear umbrella, against China and Russia. This unique collection of chapters written by experts in US allies in both regions presents widely varying security perceptions and priorities. To understand such differences is the key to globally strengthen the US alliance systems, which are a significant advantage Washington enjoys over the two competitors.’ — Yukio Satoh, former President of The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) ‘This is a timely and thoughtful collection of essays that should serve to jumpstart public discussion and debate—the absence of which is widely noted and much bemoaned. Each contributor examines an aspect of the complicated, multifaceted nuclear debate by discussing the range of dilemmas from deterrence to disarmament. The various views set out here are more relevant than ever as Russia, China and the United States flex their nuclear muscles in new and sometimes dangerous ways. This book should be read by anyone interested in the preventing the use of nuclear weapons and understanding complexities of alliances in an increasingly dangerous world.’ — Madelyn Creedon, former Principal Deputy Administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs