This book delivers an in-depth analysis of the US-DPRK Peace Treaty which will be concluded as a final result of the Korean Peninsula peace process that is currently ongoing. Since North Korea launched its nuclear weapons development program in the early 1990s, the Korean peninsula has become a critical point of global politics along with the Sino-American (G2) hegemonic competition. The US-DPRK Peace Treaty is the key to the denuclearization and de jure peace on the peninsula as well as Northeast Asia. Different from the comprehensive peace treaty between the four parties (US, China, and the two Koreas) already proposed for the past few years, the book suggests a ‘bilateral’ approach to the agreement between the US and the DPRK, which will trigger the peace as a system considering the US’s practices in this regard after 1783. Such a challenging and provocative method provides deeper understanding of the legal and political circumstances for the expected US-DPRK Peace Treaty. The book will navigate scholars, practitioners, and students towards terminating the 1953 Armistice, establishing nuclear peace as well as a rapprochement between the two countries. In practice, it will be a useful guideline for the conflicting parties in the various parts of the globe to adopt peace treaties in the twenty-first century.

Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a series that provides primary source documents and expert commentary on various topics relating to the worldwide effort to combat terrorism, as well as efforts by the United States and other nations to protect their national security interests. Volume 145, The North Korean Threat, examines the strategies adopted by the United States, China, and the international community in response to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. The volume includes a selection of documents chosen to illustrate developments in this area from 2010 through 2016, with commentary from series editor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. The documents in this volume include 2016 UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, Congressional Research Service reports covering various aspects of the U.S. response to North Korea's nuclear program, a U.S. Department of Defense report prepared for Congress on military and security developments related to North Korea, and a detailed description of the U.S. sanctions program against North Korea from the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

North Korea has presented one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the official name for North Korea), although contact at a lower level has ebbed and flowed over the years. Negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program have occupied the past three U.S. administrations, even as some analysts anticipated a collapse of the isolated authoritarian regime. North Korea has been the recipient of over $1 billion in U.S. aid (though none since 2009) and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions.

"Korean War Armistice Agreement" contains an agreement that brought a stop to the hostility and disagreement of the Korean War. This is an armistice signed on 27 July, 1953 and designed to ensure a complete cessation of hostilities, and all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

The ordeal of negotiating with North Koreans during the Cold War has left the impression of a crazy and bizarre diplomacy, of negotiators who insult and provoke their Western counterparts while fabricating crises and fomenting discord. As "Negotiating on the Edge" reveals, however, there is not only a method to this madness but also an ongoing shift toward a less provocative negotiating style.Drawing on interviews with an eminent cast of U.S. officials and marshalling extensive research on North Korea past and present, Scott Snyder traces the historical and cultural roots of North Korea's negotiating behavior and exposes the full range of tactics in its diplomatic arsenal. He explains why North Koreans behave as they do, and he argues that there is, in fact, an internal logic to what often seems to be outrageous conduct.Finally, Snyder explores how economic desperation and the end of the Cold War have forced North Korea to modify its negotiating style and objectives. Focusing on the U.S. negotiating experience with North Korea in the 1990s, Snyder also deals comparatively with recent South Korean and multilateral attempts to engage Pyongyang."