Unlike other books that focus on the nuts-and-bolts of the negotiation process, this text’s conceptual approach draws on psychology, economics, and law to provide students with an in-depth understanding of the cognitive and interpersonal underpinnings of negotiation. A total of 21 original negotiation simulations and exercises, with private information for each party, are provided to adopters outside of the text, enable students to apply the lessons of each chapter in context-rich environments in a variety of transactional and litigation settings. New to the 4th Edition: Significant revisions to Chapter 10 (“Gender and Culture”), incorporating the significant amount of scholarship on gender differences in negotiation that has been published in the last decade. Significant revisions to Chapter 14 (“Deceit”), reflecting the burgeoning literature in the field of behavioral ethics. Minor updates and revisions to other chapters. Minor updates to existing simulations and additional new simulations. Professors and students will benefit from: Rigorous, social science-based approach to understanding negotiation as a fundamental process of human interaction. Modular organization, so instructors can choose to assign the chapters in a different order than presented, to better suit their conception of the course without creating undue confusion on the part of students. Each chapter of the book exposes students to challenging theoretical concepts through a combination of narrative material, excerpts of published books and articles, and note material that further explains and builds on points made in the narrative and excerpted sections. The “Discussion Questions and Problems” that end each chapter provide an opportunity for students to explore and apply the reading material in a class discussion format.

Introduction: The significance of strategic assessment -- Explaining variation in strategic assessment -- Egypt in the mid-1960s -- Egypt in the 1970s -- Britain and Germany and the First World War -- Pakistan and Turkey in the late 1990s -- U.S. postconflict planning for the 2003 Iraq War -- Conclusion: Findings and implications.

This volume focuses on the processes by which rulers and states have framed strategy from the fifth century BC to the present.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

Based on research from an array of American, Arab, British, French, German, and Israeli sources, this book provides a nuclear history of the world's most explosive region. Most significantly, it gives an exposition of Israel's acquisition and political use, or nonuse, of nuclear weapons as a central factor of its foreign policy in the 1960-1991 period. In stressing the factor of nuclear weapons, the author highlights an often-neglected aspect of Israeli security policy. This is the first interpretation of the historical development of nuclear doctrine in the Middle East that assesses the strategic implications of opacity—Israel's use of suggestion, rather than open acknowledgment, that it possesses nuclear weapons. Aronson discusses the strategic thinking of Israel, the Arab countries, the U.S., the former Soviet Union, and other countries and connects Israeli strategies for war, peace, territories, and the political economy with the use of nuclear deterrence. The author approaches the development of Israeli doctrines on nuclear weapons and defense in general within a large matrix that includes the United States; Israeli perceptions of Arab history, culture, and psychology; and Israeli perceptions of Israel's own history, culture, and psychology. He also deals with Arab perceptions of Israel's nuclear program and with Arab and Iranian incentives to go nuclear. In addition, he discusses at length the importance of nuclear factors in the conduct of the Persian Gulf War and examines the implications of the decline of the former Soviet Union for arms control and peace in the Middle East.