This paper outlines the main characteristics and the development of the centrally planned economic sysetm in Romania before the beginnings of the transition to a market eonomy it then presents the design, objectives, and implementation of the reform program.

Given the political, financial, social, and economic conditions inherited from Communist rule, Romania's new government concluded that a shock therapy approach to reform would create unmanageable chaos and enduring instability. Though committed to economic liberalization, decisionmakers espoused a gradualist approach to economic reform. The government pursued its objectives by implementing policies it considered functionally operational. Although Romania experienced the macro dislocations and downturns that are common in transitional economies in the region, the country sustained shallower recessions, lower inflationary spirals, and shorter production losses than many reforming economies. This study analyzes how, against calculated probabilities and within a relatively short time period, Romania has stabilized and assembled all the basic ingredients for a successful transformation from a centralized system to a market-driven economy. The lessons derivable from Romania's relatively successful experiment with systemic transformation could be beneficial to reform architects in all newly liberalized economies in Eastern Europe. The conclusions of this study reinforce the view that it is imperative to examine and foster the existing preconditions, including political, institutional, and financial components, before subjecting an economy to extensive and intensive shocks that could be judiciously mitigated or circumvented. Unlike other newly liberalized economies in Eastern Europe, where the once disgraced Communists have returned to power, sympathy for a centralized system has been steadily and swiftly declining in Romania. The primary factor in Romania's success, the author claims, is its circumspect approach to reform.

This volume examines corruption and provides tools and that can be utilized to combat it and encourage development. Using Romania as a case study, the authors argue that corruption can be reduced via institutional reforms and effective civic education. Describing various causes and types of corruption, the authors explore the causes and influences that result in corruption and the current political and bureaucratic practices that inhibit social, political or economic reform. The nations of Europe, including Romania, have different civil traditions varying in their intensity, cultural heritage, scope of activity, religious or non-religious affiliation, among other factors. Western Europe has experienced over a century of modern government involvement crowding out the efforts of traditional civil society, while Romania, along with the other Eastern nations of the former Soviet bloc, experienced almost a half-century of systematic efforts by communist regimes to eradicate and control all spheres of voluntary, nongovernmental civil life. Moreover, the inexperience and immaturity of Romanian society in the early transition period after communism, particularly its so-called “entrepreneurial class,” have discredited and abused the concept of civil society, utilizing it solely for tax benefits and selfish purposes. Having had to learn the hard way about some of the key aspects of public administration often taken for granted in other countries more experienced in democratic participation, Romania has most recently made significant progress toward overcoming corruption and implementing reforms and policies that will allow it to participate more fully in the global arena.

Which political and institutional factors trigger reforms that enable the poor to benefit from the process of economic growth? How can the incentives of policy makers be influenced in order to achieve such a dynamic? These are the questions this study seeks to address by examining the transition process in post-communist countries. The author argues that political competition within an accepted and respected institutional environment has been a driving force in shaping the direction and success of transition reforms. Evidence shows that in countries with a sufficient degree of political competition, citizens responded to economic crises by calling for economic liberalization. Economic liberalization removed existing distortions, increased economic efficiency and raised public welfare. This activated a dynamic, self-enforcing reform process that also strengthened the political and economic power of the poor. In the absence of political competition, such a process failed to emerge, thereby contributing to the persistence of poverty. Based on these findings, there is good reason to postulate that some level of political competition is essential for transition reforms to improve economic efficiency and public welfare in a sustainable manner.

Considers the phenomenon of the high inflation processes of the 1970s and 1980s as exemplified by Argentina, Brazil and Israel. The author examines common characteristics of such processes and their possible cures, focusing on the Israeli experience of the political economy of stabilization.

The wave of neoliberal economic reforms in the developing world since the 1980s has been regarded as the result of both severe economic crises and policy pressures from global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Using comparative evidence from the initiation and implementation of IMF programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe, From Economic Crisis to Reform shows that economic crises do not necessarily persuade governments to adopt IMF-style economic policies. Instead, ideology, interests, and institutions, at both the international and domestic levels, mediate responses to such crises. Grigore Pop-Eleches explains that the IMF's response to economic crises reflects the changing priorities of large IMF member countries. He argues that the IMF gives greater attention and favorable treatment to economic crises when they occur in economically or politically important countries. The book also shows how during the neoliberal consensus of the 1990s, economic crises triggered IMF-style reforms from governments across the ideological spectrum and how these reforms were broadly compatible with democratic politics. By contrast, during the Latin American debt crisis, the contentious politics of IMF programs reflected the ideological rivalries of the Cold War. Economic crises triggered ideologically divergent domestic policy responses and democracy was often at odds with economic adjustment. The author demonstrates that an economic crisis triggers neoliberal economic reforms only when the government and the IMF agree about the roots and severity of the crisis.