Combining approaches and insights from cultural, social and military history this study traces the evolution and decline of the Spanish officer corps and general staff during the Eighty Years War in connection with contemporary trends such as modernization and aristocratization.

The Eighty Years War (1567-1659) has been the subject of important monographs but the high command of the Army of Flanders, which played a decisive role in the making of Spanish strategy and was in charge of its tactics, has eluded detailed scrutiny. This work, the first study of an early modern officer corps, examines the culture, class structure, and combat effectiveness of the largest army of its day. Combining approaches and insights from social, cultural and military history, it traces the evolution of the leading cadres of the legendary tercios in relation to major trends such as aristocratization and military modernization while revising recent perspectives on Spain’s war against the Dutch and the French in the Low Countries.

The period between the late 16th and the early 18th centuries was one of tremendous, and ultimately decisive, shifts in the balance of political, military and economic power in both Europe and the wider world. In these essays Jonathan Israel argues that Spain's efforts to maintain her hegemony continued, for a number of reasons, to be centred on the Low Countries. This had as much to do with her attempts to check the rise of France and manipulate the affairs of Germany as it had with her long war with the Dutch, Spain's overwhelming dominance in the 1580s seemed unassailable, yet by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 its greatness had been eclipsed, leaving supremacy to Britain, France and, in commercial terms, the Dutch.

Impoverished and exhausted after fifty years of incessant warfare, the great Spanish Empire at the turn of the sixteenth century negotiated treaties with its three most powerful enemies: England, France, and the Netherlands. This intriguing book examines the strategies that led King Philip III to extend the laurel branch to his foes. Paul Allen argues that, contrary to widespread belief, the king's gestures of peace were in fact part of a grand strategy to enable Spain to regain military and economic strength while its opponents were falsely lulled away from their military pursuits. From the outset, Allen contends, Philip and his advisers intended the Pax Hispanica to continue only until Spain was able to resume its battles--and defeat its enemies. Drawing on primary sources from the four countries involved, the book begins with a discussion of how Spanish foreign policy was formulated and implemented to achieve political and religious aims. The author investigates the development of Philip's "peace" strategy, the Twelve Years' Truce, and the decision to end the truce and engage in war with the Dutch, and then with the English and French. Renewed warfare was no failure of peace policy, Allen shows, but a conscious decision to pursue a consistent strategy. Nevertheless the negotiation for peace did represent a new diplomatic method with significant implications for both the future of the Spanish Empire and the practices of European diplomacy.

This volume probes the meaning and significance of military 'professionalism'; considers whether it required the waning of the chivalric ethos or merely resulted in it; and assesses the influence of both value systems on the rise of Western states.