This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the presumption of innocence from both a practical and theoretical point of view. Throughout the book a framework for the presumption of innocence is developed. The book approaches the right to presumption of innocence from an international human rights perspective using specific examples drawn from international criminal law. The result is a framework for understanding the right that is grounded in human rights law. This framework can then be applied across different national and international systems. When applied, it can help determine when the presumption of innocence is being infringed upon, eroded, violated, and ensure that the presumption of innocence is protected. The book is an essential resource for students, academics and practitioners working in the areas of human rights, criminal law, international criminal law, and evidence. The themes also have a more general application to national jurisdictions and legal theory.

The presumption of innocence is universally recognized as a fundamental human right and a core principle in the administration of criminal justice. Nonetheless, statutes creating criminal offences regularly depart from the presumption of innocence by requiring defendants to prove specific matters in order to avoid conviction. Legislatures and courts seek to justify this departure by asserting that the reversal of the burden of proof is necessary to meet the community interest in prosecuting serious crime and maintaining workable criminal sanctions. This book investigates the supposed justifications for limitation of the presumption of innocence. It does so through a comprehensive analysis of the history, rationale and scope of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that the values underlying the presumption of innocence are of such fundamental importance to individual liberty that they cannot be sacrificed on the altar of community interest. In particular, it is argued that a test of 'proportionality', which seeks to weigh individual rights against the community interest, is inappropriate in the context of the presumption of innocence and that courts ought instead to focus on whether an impugned measure threatens the values which the presumption is designed to protect. The book undertakes a complete and systematic review of the United Kingdom and Strasbourg authority on the presumption of innocence. It also draws upon extensive references to comparative material, both judicial and academic, from the United States, Canada and South Africa.

The idea of human rights as fundamental rights of every person is certainly one of the most powerful ideas of our modern age. Since the American and French revolutions, human rights have been the strongest link between law and democracy. They have played a crucial role when defining notions of constitutionalism and the rule of law. While some human rights have been made famous in national mottos such as the French libertU+fffde, U+fffdegalitU+fffde et fraternitU+fffde, other human rights have not attracted such attention. Generally, substantive human rights have been discussed and appreciated more than procedural human rights. Yet, without an effective and well-balanced set of procedural rights, the substantive rights and freedoms of almost any person or business would not enjoy effective protection before the courts of law. Based on the wish to reopen an international comparative discussion on fundamental notions of civil procedure, this book offers a number of insights into procedural human rights from different jurisdictions and different points of view. While some previous studies focused on Northern Europe, many of the authors in this book come from Southern and Eastern Europe, areas where a common understanding of procedural human rights may be an even more pressing necessity.

This is an in-depth analysis of the complex and challenging field of international prosecution and human rights. It explains the role and operation of the International Criminal Court, and explores the various challenges confronting it.

This book explains the historical significance and introduction of the presumption of innocence into common law legal systems. It explains that the presumption should be seen as reflecting notions of moral comfort around judgment of others. Specifically, when one is asked to make a judgment about the guilt or otherwise of a person accused of wrongdoing, the default position should be to do nothing. This reflects the very serious consequences of what we do when we decide someone is guilty of wrongdoing and is not a step to be taken lightly. Traditionally, decision makers have only taken it when they are morally comfortable with that decision. It then documents how legislators in a range of common law jurisdictions have undermined the presumption of innocence, through measures such as reverse onus provisions, allowing or requiring inferences to be made against an accused, redefining offenses and defenses in novel ways to minimize the burden on the prosecutor, and by dressing proceedings as civil when they are in substance criminal. Courts have too easily acceded to such measures, in the process permitting accused persons to be convicted although there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt, and where they are not guilty of sufficiently blameworthy conduct to attract criminal sanction. It finds that the courts must be prepared to re-assert the prime importance of the presumption of innocence, only permitting criminal sanctions to be imposed where they are morally certain that the accused did that of which they have been accused, and morally comfortable that the conduct being addressed is worthy of the kind of criminal sanction which prosecutors seek to impose. Courts must be morally comfortable about the finding of guilt, and the imposition of the criminal penalty in a given case. They have lost sight of this moral underpinning to criminal law process and substance, and it must be regained.

The United Nations has established a right to the truth to be enjoyed by victims of gross violations of human rights. The origins of the right stem from the need to provide victims and relatives of the missing with a right to know what happened. It encompasses the verification and full public disclosure of the facts associated with the crimes from which they or their relatives suffered. The importance of the right to the truth is based on the belief that, by disclosing the truth, the suffering of victims is alleviated. This book analyses the emergence of this right, as a response to an understanding of the needs of victims, through to its development and application in two particular legal contexts: international human rights law and international criminal justice. The book examines in detail the application of the right through the case law and jurisprudence of international tribunals in the human rights and also the criminal justice context, as well as looking at its place in transitional justice. The theoretical foundations of the right to the truth are considered as well as the various objectives appropriate for different truth-seeking mechanisms. The book then goes on to discuss to what extent it can be understood, constructed and applied as a hard, legally enforceable right with correlating duties on various people and institutions including state agencies, prosecutors and judges.

At a time when human rights are coming under increasing pressure, in-depth knowledge and understanding of their foundations, conceptual underpinnings and current practice remain crucial. The second edition of Walter Kalin and Jorg Kunzli's authoritative book provides a concise but comprehensive legal analysis of international human rights protection at the global and regional levels. It shows that human rights are real rights creating legal entitlements for those who are protected by them and imposing legal obligations on those bound by them. Based, in particular, on a wide-ranging analysis of international case-law, the book focuses on the sources and scope of application of human rights and a discussion of their substantive guarantees. Further chapters describe the different mechanisms to monitor the implementation of human rights obligations, ranging from the regional human rights courts in Africa, the Americas and Europe and the UN treaty bodies to the international criminal tribunals, the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council. The book is based on an understanding of human rights as legal concepts that address basic human needs and vulnerabilities, and highlights the indivisibility of civil and political rights on the one and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand. It also highlights the convergence of international human rights and international humanitarian law and the interlinkages with international criminal law as well as general international law, in particular the law of state responsibility.