Gail Fine presents the first full-length study of Meno's Paradox, a challenge to the possibility of inquiry that was first formulated in Plato's Meno. She compares the responses of Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Sextus to the paradox, and considers a series of key questions concerning the nature of knowledge and inquiry.

Gail Fine presents an original interpretation of a compelling puzzle in ancient philosophy. Meno's Paradox, which is first formulated in Plato's Meno, challenges the very possibility of inquiry. Plato replies with the theory of recollection, according to which we all had prenatal knowledge of some range of things, and what we call inquiry involves recollecting what we previously knew; he also illustrates this with his famous cross-examination of an untutored slave about a geometry problem, whose solution the slave is able to discover through inquiry. Hence, contrary to the paradox, inquiry is possible after all. Plato is not the only philosopher to grapple with Meno's Paradox: so too do Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Sextus. How do their various replies compare with one another, and with Plato's? How good are any of their replies? In a fascinating fragment preserved in Damascius' Commentary on the Phaedo, Plutarch briefly considers these questions (though for obvious chronological reasons he doesn't discuss Sextus). But Fine's book is the first full-length systematic treatment of the paradox and responses to it. Among the topics discussed are the nature of knowledge; how knowledge differs from mere true belief; the nature of inquiry; varieties of innatism; concepts and meaning; the scope and limits of experience. The Possibility of Inquiry will be of interest to anyone interested in ancient epistemology, in ancient philosophy, or in epistemology.

In a new approach to philosophical anthropology, Bruno Latour offers answers to questions raised in We Have Never Been Modern: If not modern, what have we been, and what values should we inherit? An Inquiry into Modes of Existence offers a new basis for diplomatic encounters with other societies at a time of ecological crisis.

This book is an inquiry into particular matters concerning the nature, normativity, and aftermath of evil action. It combines philosophical conceptual analysis with empirical studies in psychology and discussions of historical events to provide an innovative analysis of evil action. The book considers unresolved questions belonging to metaethical, normative, and practical characteristics of evil action. It begins by asking whether Kant’s historical account of evil is still relevant for contemporary thinkers. Then it addresses features of evil action that distinguish it from mundane wrongdoing, thereby placing it as a proper category of philosophical inquiry. Next, the author inquires into how evil acts affect moral relationships and challenge Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. He then draws conceptual and empirical connections between evil acts such as genocide, torture, and slavery and collective agency, and asks why evil acts are often collective acts. Finally, the author questions both the possibility and propriety of forgiveness and vengeance in the aftermath of evil and discusses how individuals ought to cope with the pervasiveness of evil in human interaction. Evil Matters: A Philosophical Inquiry will be of interest to advanced students and researchers in philosophy working on the concept of evil, moral responsibility, collective agency, vengeance, and forgiveness.

An inquiry into the limits of the possible. Our problems on Jupiter, Mercury, Venus - conquering Time - transport in the future - overcoming gravity - communications across space - benevolent electronic brains. The range of this enthralling book is immense: from the re-making of the human mind to the vast reaches of the universe. Newly revised, even the remarkable events of the last decade have affected few of the exciting speculations by Arthur C. Clarke - a scientist whose expert and wide knowledge is matched only by his brilliant imagination.

Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

Two of the most brilliant German thinkers of the twentieth century were Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann. Jaspers, the philosopher, and Bultmann, the theologian, were both influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the rise of the existentialist movement. Late in their careers they interacted on the subject of Bultmann's attempt to divest Christianity of its mythical components and make sense of it in more modern terms. This work is a compilation of articles by Jaspers and Bultmann that formed a running debate originally published in various scholarly journals. The first half of the book is Jaspers' lengthy and critical analysis of Bultmann's interpretation of Christianity, in which Jaspers essentially rejects the premise that Christianity or any other religion can or should be understood without its mythical framework. Jaspers charges that Bultmann has radically misunderstood the nature of myth and that myth is an irreplaceable form of symbolic communication. In the second part, Bultmann defends his approach, suggesting that Jaspers has not really understood his intent or meaning. Contemporary people today, schooled in the scientific tradition, are likely to reject the biblical texts because of their miraculous claims and supernatural content. Bultmann insists that the scholarly, scientific study of the Bible is a legitimate way to reveal its true message, apart from all the supernatural trappings. Finally, in response, Jaspers accepts some of Bultmann's clarifications but takes him to task on the subject of justification by faith, which he feels Bultmann defines too narrowly and too exclusively. This stimulating work by two penetrating minds will give anyone interested in perennial philosophical and theological questions much to ponder.