This book presents an overview of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) resource allocation issue, considering the period from 1948 to 1980. It describes the major characteristics of the DoD resource allocation process and discusses the potential impact of various shocks on the allocation system.

World War II exposed weaknesses in the management of defense resources, leading the United Kingdom in 1946 and the United States in 1947 to centralize their defense organizations. Although each organization has evolved differently, both share the problem of interservice rivalry over resource allocation to competing service missions and weapons systems. Michael Hobkirk, a Ministry of Defense Under Secretary, now retired, argues that this intramural rivalry obstructs coherent defense planning. His examination of the bureaucratic politics of resource allocation in the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defense points up the strengths and weaknesses of both structures. Combining the best features of each system, he proposes a hypothetical, 'ideal' defense organization. Such an organization would include a powerful central staff; a planning, programming, budgeting system with functional categories for specific service tasks; a long-term budget system for future planning; and--most important--a permanent cadre of civilian staff at the highest level. In an era of ever more constrained resources and changing strategic requirements, the need for maximum benefit from resources expended remains self-evident. This study should help defense planners, students of organizational theory, and those who would better understand the defense policies of our allies.

This paper examines the current state of the Army's funding in relation to its needs as well as in relation to its historical proportion of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. DoD has traditionally allocated the Army approximately a quarter of the overall DoD budget, while the Navy and Air Force have received greater than 30 percent. These figures are roughly the same whether looking at the Reagan, Clinton, or either of the Bush Presidencies. Despite the heavy lifting done by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget request had the Army getting about 25 percent while the Navy and Air Force receive slightly less than 30 percent each. The FY2008 request submitted to Congress in February 2007 moved that mark to 27 percent for the Army, 28 percent for the Air Force, 29 percent for the Navy/Marine Corps, and 16 percent for other DoD programs. These overall percentages do not vary by more than 2 percent of the historical average over the last 30 years.

This paper examines the current state of the Army's funding in relation to its needs as well as in relation to its historical proportion of the Defense Departments budget. The Defense Department has traditionally allocated the Army approximately a quarter of the overall DoD budget, while the Navy and Air Force have received greater than 30%. These figures are roughly the same whether looking at the Reagan, Clinton, or either of the Bush Presidencies. Despite the heavy lifting done by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, the FY07 Budget request had the Army getting about 25% while the Navy and Air Force receive slightly less than 30%. The FY2008 request submitted to Congress in February 2007 moved that mark to 27%, for the Army, 28% for the Air Force, 29% for the Navy/Marine Corps and 16% for DoD programs. These overall percentages do not vary by more than 2% of the historical average over the last thirty years. Advocates for increased Defense spending have pointed out that Defense spending, as a proportion of GDP, is at a historical low of 3-4% over the last ten years, while opponents argue that the end of the Cold War and the limited war we are fighting now justify less of an investment in Defense. This year the Army's leadership is attempting to make a stronger argument for additional dollars, while simultaneously refusing to entertain the question of diverting money from Air Force and Navy funding streams. How did the Army get to the point where it is the perennial bronze medal winner in a three man funding race? Are the Army's relations with Congress part of the problem in obtaining sufficient funding? How does DoD determine who gets what and how do they determine how much is enough? After examining the possible Army funding options this paper concludes with recommendations of actions that Army leadership should take to procure additional funding for the Army.