Linda Matar examines Syria's failure to promote employment-generating investment prior to the uprising. Tackling the thorny issue of the inapplicability of modern investment theory to a developing country, she situates the analysis of investment in Syria in its historical context and examines the socioeconomic structure and political preconditions that set the course of capital accumulation. Matar argues that the class in charge of development, which oversaw the allocation of resources during the Hafiz and Bashar Assad regimes, precipitated a crisis of capital accumulation. Difficult-to-access data and information compiled from fieldwork reveal how neoliberal reforms failed to build productive capacity and instead enriched a few through short-term speculative and mercantile ventures. Productive investment in Syria prior to the uprising lurched downward, and the key related socio-economic variables followed. These deteriorating conditions contributed to the social explosion in 2011. Exploring the poor quality and quantity of investment, this study probes how the cant of the free market served as a veneer behind which the institutional decisions distorted income distribution in a way that would inevitably lead to collapse.

Syria under Asad has been one of the key regional powers of the Middle East. Though its political development has been a much-debated subject, there has been no comprehensive study in English of the country's political economy and its evolution since 1970 to the present day. Beginning with an account of economic development and of changing development strategies, Perthes discusses the factors which in the late 1980s precipitated a change in direction from the socialist orientation of the earlier Ba'thist years to ""infitah"" and a larger role for the private sector. He pays particular attention to class structure and class-state relations and examines the nature of the state, the political structure and the mechanisms and dynamics of political decision-making. Addressing the issue of the interplay between economic transformation and political change, Perthes argues that, although a shift in the power structure will not occur under Asad, his regime has created the institutions which will allow a reasonably smooth succession and a creation of a less personalized and more participatory political order.

This edited collection aims to analytically reconceptualise the Syrian crisis by examining how and why the country has moved from a stable to a war-torn society. It is written by scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, all of whom make no attempt to speculate on the future trajectory of the conflict, but aim instead to examine the historical background that has laid the objective conditions for Syria’s descent to its current situation. Their work represents an attempt to dissect the multi-layered foundation of the Syrian conflict and to make understanding its complex inner workings accessible to a broader readership. The book is divided into four parts, each of which elaborates on the origins and dynamics of today’s crisis from the perspective of a different discipline. When put together, the four parts provide a holistic picture of Syria’s developmental trajectory from the early twentieth century through to the present day. Themes addressed include Syria’s postcolonial development efforts, its leap into socialism and then into neoliberalism in the late twentieth century, its politics within the resistance front, and finally its food and health security concerns.

Syria has been at the center of world news since 2011, following the beginnings of a popular uprising in the country and its subsequent violent and murderous repression by the Assad regime. Eight years on, Joseph Daher analyzes the resilience of the regime and the failings of the uprising, while also taking a closer look at the counter revolutionary processes that have been undermining the uprising from without and within. Joseph Daher is the author of Hezbollah: The Political Economy of the Party of God, and founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever.

Collusion between business communities and the state can lead to a measure of security for those in power, but this kind of interaction often limits new development. In Syria, state-business involvement through informal networks has contributed to an erratic economy. With unique access to private businessmen and select state officials during a critical period of transition, this book examines Syria's political economy from 1970 to 2005 to explain the nation's pattern of state intervention and prolonged economic stagnation. As state income from oil sales and aid declined, collusion was a bid for political security by an embattled regime. To achieve a modicum of economic growth, the Syrian regime would develop ties with select members of the business community, reserving the right to reverse their inclusion in the future. Haddad ultimately reveals that this practice paved the way for forms of economic agency that maintained the security of the regime but diminished the development potential of the state and the private sector.

When Bashar al-Asad smoothly assumed power in July 2000, just seven days after the death of his father, observers were divided on what this would mean for the country’s foreign and domestic politics. On the one hand, it seemed everything would stay the same: an Asad on top of a political system controlled by secret services and Baathist one-party rule. On the other hand, it looked like everything would be different: a young president with exposure to Western education who, in his inaugural speech, emphasized his determination to modernize Syria. This volume explores the ways in which Asad’s domestic and foreign policy strategies during his first decade in power safeguarded his rule and adapted Syria to the age of globalization. The volume’s contributors examine multiple aspects of Asad’s rule in the 2000s, from power consolidation within the party and control of the opposition to economic reform, co-opting new private charities, and coping with Iraqi refugees. The Syrian regime temporarily succeeded in reproducing its power and legitimacy, in reconstructing its social base, and in managing regional and international challenges. At the same time, contributors clearly detail the shortcomings, inconsistencies, and risks these policies entailed, illustrating why Syria’s tenuous stability came to an abrupt end during the Arab Spring of 2011. This volume presents the work of an international group of scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds. Based on extensive fieldwork and on intimate knowledge of a country whose dynamics often seem complicated and obscure to outside observers, these scholars’ insightful snapshots of Bashar al-Asad’s decade of authoritarian upgrading provide an indispensable resource for understanding the current crisis and its disastrous consequences.

This volume explores the development of Syria's political economy under the Ba'th, particularly the role of the state in facilitating or obstructing economic development. Raymond Hinnebusch provides a brief overview of the literature and debates on the issue. His examination of Syria's political economy under populism (1963-2000) is followed by Soren Schmidt's analysis of the post-populist period since 2000.