Central banks are among the most powerful government economic institutions in the world. This volume explores the economic and political contours of the struggle for influence over the policies of central banks such as the Federal Reserve, and the implications of this struggle for economic performance and the distribution of wealth and power in society.

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.

Since the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, research on central banking has gained momentum due to unusual levels of central bank activism and unconventional monetary policy measures in many countries. While these policies drew significant attention to advanced economy central banks, there has been much less academic focus on central banking in emerging economies. This book extends the research on the political economy of central banking by focusing on the emerging economies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the European periphery. Central banks are at the heart of economic policymaking, and their decisions have a significant impact on the social and economic well-being of citizens. Adopting an interdisciplinary political economy perspective, the contributions in this book explore the reciprocal relations between politics, economics, and central banks, and how the global and domestic political economy contexts influence central bank practices. The chapters employ diverse theoretical perspectives such as institutional and organizational theory, developmental state resource dependency, and gender studies, drawing on disciplines ranging from politics, international relations, public policy, management, finance, and sociology. This book will appeal to academics and students of central banking, political economy, and emerging economies, as well as professionals and policymakers engaged with central banks, monetary policy, and economic development.

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.

Thirteen contributions examine the control which central banks have over financial markets, focusing on the implications of the current trend towards the granting of "independence" to central banks and challenging economic conservatives' arguments for increased central bank independence. Other topics include the meaning of, and possibilities for, monetary policy in an endogenous money framework; central banking in G7 and other countries; the instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in recent years; and cautionary words concerning the proposed European Central Bank. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.