This study examines the banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden, which took place in the early 1990s, and draws some policy conclusions from their experiences. One key conclusion is that factors in addition to business cycle effects explain the Nordic countries financial problems. Although the timing of the deregulation in all three countries coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum, the main reasons for the banking crises were the delayed policy responses, the structural characteristics of the financial systems, and the banks inadequate internal risk-management controls.

This study examines the banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden, which took place in the early 1990s, and draws some policy conclusions from their experiences. One key conclusion is that factors in addition to business cycle effects explain the Nordic countries' financial problems. Although the timing of the deregulation in all three countries coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum, the main reasons for the banking crises were the delayed policy responses, the structural characteristics of the financial systems, and the banks' inadequate internal risk-management controls.

This paper examines the recent banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden in an attempt to draw some policy conclusions from their experiences. In all three countries, the timing of deregulation coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum. Delayed policy responses, as well as structural characteristics of the financial systems, and banks` inadequate internal risk management controls were important determinants of the consequences of the transition from tightly regulated to more or less competitive financial systems. In the absence of strengthened prudential banking supervision, these incentives coupled with expectations of government intervention in the event of a crisis prompted many Nordic banks to increase their lending excessively.

The Nordic financial crisis had it all: a botched liberalization, a huge boom followed by an even bigger bust, massive taxpayer-financed bailouts and, finally, deep long-run gains. The first-class team of scholars mobilized in this book convincingly tell a story that should be carefully studied by economists, bankers and policymakers. After this book, no one should be able to say: If we only knew ! Charles Wyplosz, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland The financial crisis in Scandinavia in the early 1990s was a forerunner of the later world-wide crisis in 2007/8. Although the initial causation was different, the impact on their banks, though more localised, was just as severe. So we can benefit, and already policymakers have done so, from learning the lessons in this book on how to restore shattered banking systems to health. For this we owe a debt of gratitude to the editors, who have put together a series of key papers that emerged from a much larger exercise on the crisis that was earlier reported in four volumes in Swedish and Finnish. Amongst the many studies on current and past financial crises, this is a classic must-read . Charles A.E. Goodhart, London School of Economics, UK The Nordic experience with financial crisis resolution could not be more timely. Everyone cites it as an example of how it should be done , but rarely does one find careful and detailed analysis. Now policymakers and others searching for guidance will know where to look. Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley, US Following World War II, Nordic countries were commonly regarded as successful and stable economies. This perception was, however, shattered in the early 1990s when Finland and Sweden encountered severe financial crises. Here, the authors explore the symptoms of financial crisis decreasing real income, soaring unemployment and exploding public deficits and their devastating effects. The book compares and contrasts the experiences of Finland and Sweden, then adopts an international perspective, encompassing the experiences of Asia, Latin America, Denmark and Norway. Lessons from the 1990s crisis are drawn, and possible solutions prescribed. The conclusion is that long-term effects of financial crises financial liberalization and integration are not as dramatic as the short-term effects, but may prove to be of greater importance over time. Only the future will show whether these long-term benefits will balance or even outweigh the enormous short-term costs of the crises. Highly relevant to the current international financial crisis currently afflicting the world economy, this timely book will prove invaluable to economists and other social scientists with a general interest in financial crises, and to those with a more specific interest in the evolution and models of Scandinavian economies.

A study of 53 countries during 1980-95 finds that financial liberalization increases the probability of a banking crisis, but less so where the institutional environment is strong. In particular, respect for the rule of law, a low level of corruption, and good contract enforcement are relevant institutional characteristics. the data also show that, after liberalization, financially repressed countries tend to have improved financial development even if they experience a banking crisis. This is not true for financially restrained countries. This paper’s results support a cautious approach to financial liberalization where institutions are weak, even if macroeconomic stabilization has been achieved.

"Lack of transparency increases the probability of a banking crisis following financial liberalization. In a country where government policy is not transparent, banks may tend to increase credit above the optimal level"--Cover.