In this article, I explain the inadequacy of our current state of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of antitrust policy towards mergers. I then discuss the types of data that one must collect in order to be able to perform an analysis of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. There are two types of data one requires in order to perform such an analysis. One is data on the relevant market pre and post merger. The second is data on the specific predictions of the government agencies about the market post-merger. A key point of this article is to stress how weak an analysis of only the first type of data is. The frequent call for retrospective studies typically envisions relying on just this type of data, but the limitations on the analysis are not well understood. As I explain below, retrospective studies that ask whether prices went up post merger are surprisingly poor guides for analyzing merger policy. It is only when the second type of data is combined with the first type that a reliable analysis of antitrust policy can be carried out. There is a need both to collect the necessary data and to analyze it correctly.

Abstract: "We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals." (author's abstract)

A comprehensive analysis of merger outcomes based on all empirical studies, with an assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy toward mergers. In recent decades, antitrust investigations and cases targeting mergers—including those involving Google, Ticketmaster, and much of the domestic airline industry—have reshaped industries and changed business practices profoundly. And yet there has been a relative dearth of detailed evaluations of the effects of mergers and the effectiveness of merger policy. In this book, John Kwoka, a noted authority on industrial organization, examines all reliable empirical studies of the effect of specific mergers and develops entirely new information about the policies and remedies of antitrust agencies regarding these mergers. Combined with data on outcomes, this policy information enables analysis of, and creates new insights into, mergers, merger policies, and the effectiveness of remedies in preventing anticompetitive outcomes. After an overview of mergers, merger policy, and a common approach to merger analysis, Kwoka offers a detailed analysis of the studied mergers, relevant policies, and chosen remedies. Kwoka finds, first and foremost, that most of the studied mergers resulted in competitive harm, usually in the form of higher product prices but also with respect to various non-price outcomes. Other important findings include the fact that joint ventures and code sharing arrangements do not result in such harm and that policies intended to remedy mergers—especially conduct remedies—are not generally effective in restraining price increases. The book's uniquely comprehensive analysis advances our understanding of merger decisions and policies, suggests policy improvements for competition agencies and remedies, and points the way to future research.

This text offers modern coverage of modern industrial organizations, including strategic behaviour and game theory. It uses a unified structure to analyse theories and empirical evidence about the organization of firms and indutries.

Every year, top-level market regulators, academics and legal and economic practitioners contribute to the Annual Competition Workshop organised at the European University Institute in Florence. The Co-Directors of the Workshop are Philip Lowe, Mel Marquis and Giorgio Monti. Workshop participants address and critically analyse a particular set of topical issues in the field of competition law and policy. The proceedings are published in Hart's European Competition Law Annual series. This is the fifteenth in the ECLA series. It encompasses numerous chapters that examine the field of merger control from a variety of perspectives. In these chapters the contributors discuss legal and economic issues of substantive analysis, procedure, comity and best practices, as well as matters relating to the litigation of merger cases, particularly before the European Courts. The discussion also benefits from the perspectives of policy makers and experts from Canada, China, Japan, Korea, the United States and other jurisdictions and regions. Authors contributing to this book include: John Boyce Calvin Goldman Andreas Mundt Rachel Brandenburger Klaus Gugler Lars-Hendrik Röller Jochen Burrichter Barry Hawk Tadashi Shiraishi Maher Dabbah Scott Hemphill Irwin Stelzer Thomas Deisenhofer Seonghoon Jeon James Venit Götz Drauz William Kovacic Sven Völcker Kirsten Edwards Mel Marquis Vanessa Yanhua Zhang Adam Fanaki Abel Mateus Xinzhu Zhang