Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

Many policymakers and scholars contend that nuclear weapons remain inaccessible to terrorists, and that nuclear means are inconsistent with or disproportionate to their goals. Nevertheless, the historical pattern of nuclear proliferation suggests a trend toward nonstate actor acquisition, a notion supported by recent developments in the black market. Additional evidence suggests that some specific groups have expressed an interest in nuclear weapons. This thesis proposes that there is a terrorist demand for nuclear weapons. Further, its findings suggest that the possibility of terrorist acquisition has grown; and that these nonstate adversaries will enjoy significant advantage over states during nuclear crisis. Terrorists, like states, pursue political objectives and have similar concerns regarding power and security. Lacking state resources, terrorists employ instrumental targeting in pursuit of those objectives, while remaining relatively invulnerable to retaliation. This dynamic will encourage terrorists to acquire and exploit nuclear potential, thereby overturning traditional theories of deterrence. Wishful thinking about nuclear terrorism has discouraged thoughtful analysis of this dilemma. The prospect is sufficiently dire, that a preventive campaign must be launched to stop terrorist acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Policymakers must also prepare for the possible failure of preventive efforts, and search for options that may mitigate nuclear terrorism.

For more than 30 years Jenkins has been advising the military, government, and prestigious think tanks on the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Now he goes beyond what the experts know to examine how terrorists themselves think about such weapons.

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.