After years of strong performance, Korea’s economy entered a crisis in 1997, owing largely to structural problems in its financial and corporate sectors. These problems emerged in the second half of that year, when the capital inflows that had helped finance Korea’s growth were reversed, as foreign investors—reeling from losses in other Southeast Asian economies—decided to reduce their exposure to Korea. This paper focuses on the sources of the crisis that originated in the financial sector, the measures taken to deal with it, and the evolution of key banking and financial variables in its aftermath.

After years of strong performance, Korea`s economy entered a crisis in 1997, owing largely to structural problems in its financial and corporate sectors. These problems emerged in the second half of that year, when the capital inflows that had helped finance Korea`s growth were reversed, as foreign investors - reeling from losses in other Southeast Asian economies - decided to reduce their exposure to Korea. This paper focuses on the sources of the crisis that originated in the financial sector, the measures taken to deal with it, and the evolution of key banking and financial variables in its aftermath.

This title was first published in 2001. In 1997 the author was told, by an official at the Korean embassy in Washington DC, that the most serious economic problem facing Korea was the need for reform of the financial sector. This proved to be true, as a financial crisis hit Korea in November 1997. Though problems arising before November 1997 indicate that Korea's economic problems were not solely financial. This study covers earlier reform efforts, the 1997 crisis and the measures taken by Korea since then to deal with the country's economic problems. It attempts to analyze the problems and offer suggestions as to how problems might corrected or resolved.

The 1997 South Korean financial crisis not only shook the country itself but also sent shock waves through the financial world at large. This impressive book critically assesses the conventional wisdom surrounding the Korean crisis and the performance of the IMF-sponsored reform programme.Looking first at the strengths and weaknesses of 'Korea Inc.

Edited by David T. Coe and Se-Jik Kim, this volume contains papers presented at a May 2001 conference in Seoul sponsored by the IMF and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy on the Korean Crisis and Recovery. The papers examine the response to the 1997 crisis, its long-term impact on growth, and the state of financial and corporate sector reforms. Authors include academics, Korean policymakers, and IMF and World Bank staff involved in the Korean program.

World Bank Discussion Paper No. 292. Examines the anatomy of the Republic of Korea's financial reform policy since 1979 in order to place the nation's financial reform plan of 1993 in a proper context. Financial deregulation in the Republic of Korea, initiated in 1979, coincided with similar programs in South America and East Asia. The reforms were successful in spite of a mild form of financial repression and a deregulation policy that ran an erratic course. The republic moved decisively in 1993 toward a conventional type of financial liberalization by announcing a blueprint of reforms to be implemented over a five-year period ending in 1997. This paper examines the anatomy of the Korean financial reform policy since 1979 in order to place its financial reform plan of 1993 in the proper context. The report presents a conceptual framework of the Korean financial system and policies, examines interest rate reforms on various levels, and discusses changes in the credit allocation system that were undertaken in earlier phases of the reforms. The book goes on to review the rationale of the final financial reform phase, the sequencing of its various elements, and the assessment. Broad conclusions are presented.

This book provides an unparalleled insider's look at the factors leading up to the 1997-98 crisis in South Korea and how the crisis unfolded over the next two years. Written by former finance minister Kyu-Sung Lee, this book traces the evolving situation across the key sectors and the series of policy and institutional measures the government deployed throughout the crisis. This book is a must-read for policymakers, scholars, students, and any reader interested in understanding the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1997-98 crisis, the policies undertaken at the time, and what the experience implies for preventing future crises.