This book fills the normative gap arising from the absence of a multilateral mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring.

This book provides a fresh perspective on resolving sovereign debt disputes within the investor-state mediation framework. In response to the limitations of traditional approaches to adjudicating public debt issues and the resulting gaps in international law concerning sovereign defaults, creditors have increasingly turned to investor-state treaty arbitrations to recover unpaid debts. However, this shift has raised numerous criticisms and concerns. Accordingly, this book explores the uncharted territory of utilizing mediation as a means to settle sovereign debt claims. It sheds light on the distinctive characteristics of mediation as a process, setting it apart from judicial litigation and private arbitration, and emphasizing the unique outcomes it can generate. The central argument of this book is that mediation should be seriously considered as a viable option for resolving sovereign debt disputes. Not only does it offer a more cost-effective and expeditious approach, but it also has the potential to facilitate economic recovery and sustain continued investment.

International law on sovereign defaults is underdeveloped because States have largely refrained from adjudicating disputes arising out of public debt. The looming new wave of sovereign defaults is likely to shift dispute resolution away from national courts to international tribunals and transform the current regime for restructuring sovereign debt. Michael Waibel assesses how international tribunals balance creditor claims and sovereign capacity to pay across time. The history of adjudicating sovereign defaults internationally over the last 150 years offers a rich repository of experience for future cases: US state defaults, quasi-receiverships in the Dominican Republic and Ottoman Empire, the Venezuela Preferential Case, the Soviet repudiation in 1917, the League of Nations, the World War Foreign Debt Commission, Germany's 30-year restructuring after 1918 and ICSID arbitration on Argentina's default in 2001. The remarkable continuity in international practice and jurisprudence suggests avenues for building durable institutions capable of resolving future sovereign defaults.

This book outlines how odious debts are not legally binding under international or domestic law, contrary to widely held legal opinion.

The book sheds light on the perhaps most important legal conundrum in the context of sovereign debt restructuring: the holdout creditor problem. Absent an international bankruptcy regime for sovereigns, holdout creditors may delay or even thwart the efficient resolution of sovereign debt crises by leveraging contractual provisions and, in an increasing number of cases, by seeking to enforce a debt claim against the sovereign in courts or international tribunals. Following an introduction to sovereign debt and its restructuring, the book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the holdout creditor problem in the context of the two largest sovereign debt restructuring operations in history: the Argentine restructurings of 2005 and 2010 and the 2012 Greek private sector involvement. By reviewing numerous lawsuits and arbitral proceedings initiated against Argentina and Greece across a dozen different jurisdictions, it distils the organizing principles for ongoing and future cases of sovereign debt restructuring and litigation. It highlights the different approaches judges and arbitrators have adopted when dealing with holdout creditors, ranging from the denial of their contractual right to repayment on human rights grounds to leveraging the international financial infrastructure to coerce governments into meeting holdouts’ demands. To this end, it zooms in on the role the governing law plays in sovereign debt restructurings, revisits the contemporary view on sovereign immunity from suit and enforcement in the international debt context, and examines how creditor rights are balanced with the sovereign’s interest in achieving debt sustainability. Finally, it advances a new genealogy of holdouts, distinguishing between official and private sector holdouts and discussing how the proliferation of new types of uncooperative creditors may affect the sovereign debt architecture going forward. While the book is aimed at practitioners and scholars dealing with sovereign debt and its restructuring, it should also provide the general reader with the understanding of the key legal issues facing countries in debt distress. Moreover, by weaving economic, financial, and political considerations into its analysis of holdout creditor litigation and arbitration, the book also speaks to policymakers without a legal background engaged in the field of international finance and economics.

The regulation of sovereign financing is a highly topical and significant issue, in the light of continuing global financial turmoil. This book assesses the role of international law in sovereign financing, addressing this issue from both legal and economic standpoints. It takes as a starting point the recent report 'Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing' by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This report was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in its December 2011 Resolution on Debt, which emphasized the need for creditors and debtors to share responsibility for preventing unsustainable debt situations and encouraged all stakeholders to pursue the ongoing discussions within the framework of the UNCTAD Initiative. Investigating the legal and economic basis for the principles which were articulated in the report, the book develops a detailed and nuanced analysis of the controversial and complex issues they raise, including those concerning finance and credit rating agencies, contingent liabilities, debt management, corruption, fiduciary relations and duties, Collective Action Clauses, and the role of the EU and UN. Ultimately, it argues that the principles elaborated in the report correspond with general principles of international law, which provide a strong, pre-existing foundation upon which to build responsible principles for sovereign financing.