Publisher Description

Time and again, in recent years, the charge has been made that sitting presidents have behaved “imperially,” employing authorities that break the bounds of law and the Constitution. It is now an epithet used to describe presidencies of both parties. The Imperial Presidency and the Constitution examines this critical issue from a variety of perspectives: analyzing the president’s role in the administrative state, as commander-in-chief, as occupant of the modern “Bully Pulpit,” and, in separate essays, addressing recent presidents’ relationship with Congress and the Supreme Court. The volume also deepens the discussion by taking a look back at Abraham Lincoln’s expansive use of executive power during the Civil War where the tension between law and necessity were at their most extreme, calling into question the “rule of law” itself. The volume concludes with an examination of how the Constitution’s provision of both “powers and duties” for the president can provide a roadmap for assessing the propriety of executive behavior.

Has the imperial presidency returned? "Well written and, while indispensable for college courses, should appeal beyond academic audiences to anyone interested in how well we govern ourselves. . . . I cannot help regarding it as a grand sequel for my own The Imperial Presidency." ---Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Has the imperial presidency returned? This question has been on the minds of many contemporary political observers, as recent American administrations have aimed to consolidate power. In The New Imperial Presidency, Andrew Rudalevige suggests that the congressional framework meant to advise and constrain presidential conduct since Watergate has slowly eroded. Rudalevige describes the evolution of executive power in our separated system of governance. He discusses the abuse of power that prompted what he calls the "resurgence regime" against the imperial presidency and inquires as to how and why---over the three decades that followed Watergate---presidents have regained their standing. Chief executives have always sought to interpret constitutional powers broadly. The ambitious president can choose from an array of strategies for pushing against congressional authority; finding scant resistance, he will attempt to expand executive control. Rudalevige's important and timely work reminds us that the freedoms secured by our system of checks and balances do not proceed automatically but depend on the exertions of public servants and the citizens they serve. His story confirms the importance of the "living Constitution," a tradition of historical experiences overlaying the text of the Constitution itself.

This book examines a fundamental question in the development of the American empire: What constraints does the Constitution place on our territorial expansion, military intervention, occupation of foreign countries, and on the power the president may exercise over American foreign policy? Worried about the dangers of unchecked executive power, the Founding Fathers deliberately assigned Congress the sole authority to make war. But the last time Congress declared war was on December 8, 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Since then, every president from Harry Truman to George W. Bush has used military force in pursuit of imperial objectives, while Congress and the Supreme Court have virtually abdicated their responsibilities to check presidential power. Legal historian Irons recounts this story of subversion from above, tracing presidents' increasing willingness to ignore congressional authority and even suspend civil liberties.--From publisher description.

This book explores how American presidents--especially those of the past three decades--have increased the power of the presidency at the expense of democracy.

Extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to war powers has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Stephen M. Griffin shows unexpected connections between the imperial presidency and constitutional crises, and argues for accountability by restoring Congress to a meaningful role in decisions for war.

This thesis examines the exponential increase in the power of the presidency during wartime from the time of the Founding Fathers up until the beginning of the Obama administration. It focuses on the ways in which our Nation's wartime presidents have marginalized the role of Congress and the judiciary during foreign conflicts. The first half of this work analyzes the actions of wartime presidents from a historical context, which is supplemented in the second half by an in-depth comparative discussion of the actions taken by the Bush administration during the War on Terror. This work concludes by recommending detailed courses of action to be pursued by future presidents in order to restore the fundamental maxim of checks and balances.