Detroit was to be a workers' paradise, a symbol of Progressive success. Instead, it has become a symbol of Big Government failure, corruption, violence and decay. In 2013, after a great withdrawal of more than a million productive residents, once-great 'Debtroit' became the largest American city ever to declare bankruptcy.The Great Withdrawal explores why Detroit failed, why other liberal cities may soon follow, and how this could drag America into insolvency and prolonged Depression.It explores the bizarre Nanny Statist Progressive movement that took power in America in 1913 and has driven America on a "100-Year Detour" away from the ideals of our nation's Founders and towards the stagnation of Euro-socialist welfare states.Smith and Ponte, in this their fourth book, look at how Progressivism has used addiction to welfare and easy money, as well as psychological manipulation politics from "crisis-ocracy" and "the herd inside our heads" to the sinister brain science techniques known as "nudge" to win elections, manufacture consent, impose invisible taxes, and control us.Progressives now feel their power slipping away as Americans are withdrawing from a century of hypnotic control. This, argue Smith and Ponte, is why a desperate Left is turning to naked force--"financial repression," rule by decree, "regulution," crony capitalism, seizures and wealth redistribution, and politicized government agencies including the IRS and NSA to keep their hold on government power.These power grabs will fail, predict monetary expert Smith and former think tank futurist Ponte, because Progressives are obsessed with obsolete centralization and expansion of government power. Progressives are doomed, even if they cling to power, to rule a nation that their policies have put into an economic death spiral towards a new Dark Age.The path back to the Framers' prosperous Constitutional Republic, Smith and Ponte write, will decentralize and return Power to the People via the Internet, 3-D printing, decentralized energy, honest money, small government and individual self-reliance. They offer a road map back to the ideals Americans held before the very alien European ideology of collectivist Progressivism steered our nation off course exactly 100 years ago.

Chronicles the Soviet Union's nine-year struggle to extricate itself from Afghanistan in the 1980s and compares it to the challenges the United States may face in withdrawing from the region.

A "better war." Over the last two decades, this term has become synonymous with US strategy during the Vietnam War's final years. The narrative is enticingly simple, appealing to many audiences. After the disastrous results of the 1968 Tet offensive, in which Hanoi's forces demonstrated the failures of American strategy, popular history tells of a new American military commander who emerged in South Vietnam and with inspired leadership and a new approach turned around a long stalemated conflict. In fact, so successful was General Creighton Abrams in commanding US forces that, according to the "better war" myth, the United States had actually achieved victory by mid-1970. A new general with a new strategy had delivered, only to see his victory abandoned by weak-kneed politicians in Washington, DC who turned their backs on the US armed forces and their South Vietnamese allies. In a bold new interpretation of America's final years in Vietnam, acclaimed historian Gregory A. Daddis disproves these longstanding myths. Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' long Vietnamese civil war. In a riveting sequel to his celebrated Westmoreland's War, Daddis demonstrates he is one of the nation's leading scholars on the Vietnam War. Withdrawal will be a standard work for years to come.

Zinn's compelling case against the Vietnam War, now with a new introduction. Of the many books that challenged the Vietnam War, Howard Zinn's stands out as one of the best--and most influential. It helped sparked national debate on the war. It includes a powerful speech written by Zinn that President Johnson should have given to lay out the case for ending the war.

A major revision of our understanding of JFK’s commitment to Vietnam, revealing that his administration’s plan to withdraw was a political device, the effect of which was to manage public opinion while preserving US military assistance. In October 1963, the White House publicly proposed the removal of US troops from Vietnam, earning President Kennedy an enduring reputation as a skeptic on the war. In fact, Kennedy was ambivalent about withdrawal and was largely detached from its planning. Drawing on secret presidential tapes, Marc J. Selverstone reveals that the withdrawal statement gave Kennedy political cover, allowing him to sustain support for US military assistance. Its details were the handiwork of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, whose ownership of the plan distanced it from the president. Selverstone’s use of the presidential tapes, alongside declassified documents, memoirs, and oral histories, lifts the veil on this legend of Camelot. Withdrawal planning was never just about Vietnam as it evolved over the course of fifteen months. For McNamara, it injected greater discipline into the US assistance program. For others, it was a form of leverage over South Vietnam. For the military, it was largely an unwelcome exercise. And for JFK, it allowed him to preserve the US commitment while ostensibly limiting it. The Kennedy Withdrawal offers an inside look at presidential decisionmaking in this liminal period of the Vietnam War and makes clear that portrayals of Kennedy as a dove are overdrawn. His proposed withdrawal was in fact a cagey strategy for keeping the United States involved in the fight—a strategy the country adopted decades later in Afghanistan.

The United Nations mediator for the Afghanistan conflict and a foreign policy analyst provide their own interpretations of the negotiations that helped to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They describe how the ideological hard line taken by the Reagan administration prolonged the conflict.

Book 2 in the Withdrawal series