The fateful days of the great stock market crash entered modem history almost 50 years ago to this day. The cyclic turning point of the U. S. economy oc curred, however, around June 1929, and economic activity receded substantial ly over the subsequent months. The onset of an economic downswing thus became clearly visible before the famous crash. But the October event stays in the public's mind as the symbol of the Great Depression. For nearly four years, until the spring of 1933, the U. S. economy plunged into a deep reces sion. Activity declined, prices fell, and there emerged a massive unemploy ment problem. The economy ultimately overcame this shock in 1933. Prices rose rapidly in spite of substantial margins of unusual resources. Activity ex panded, but occasionally at a somewhat hesitant rate. The expansion, however, was interrupted by another recession of major proportions during 1937-38. The tragic sequence of events shaped public consciousness and influenced new approaches and views in economic policymaking. The activist approach to "stabilization policy" and a wide range of regulatory policies were essentially justified in terms of this experience. These policies were crucially influenced by our understanding and interpretation of the Great Depression. The view of a radically unstable economic process perennially on the edge of serious collapse gained wide popularity and became a central element of the Keynesian tradi- 2 INTRODUCTION tion. It encouraged, with supplementary interpretations, an interventionist and expanding role of the government in our economic affairs.

For a quarter of a century the industrial Western world has been living in the euphoria of continuous improvements in welfare, based on economic programming, increasing integration and terms of trade which favor indus trial countries and discriminate against agricultural regions. It is true that recessions have periodically recurred during these years : time and again, however, government intervention succeeded in reducing them to mere "in ventory cycles". In contrast with the twenties and thirties, when economic policy in the West focused on fighting unemployment and stimulating investment, the postwar period has been characterized by a permanent concern to curb inflationary pressure, which was partly due to full-employ ment. The present welfare economy has given rise to a growth of the pro pensity to consume such that public policy has often been constrained to limit consumption and stimulate saving. In this new framework it has perhaps been forgotten that today's welfare owes much to the lessons from the past. The bitter world crisis experience of the thirties in particular has exerted a fruitful and decisive influence upon the search for means to prevent, eliminate or soften the cyclical fluctuations which the process of economic growth involves. Forty years after the out break of the greatest economic crisis ever, it seems useful to draw up the balancesheet of the lessons learned from it. There exists a large literature about the depression of the thirties.

In 1932, at age four, Alice moved with her family of five in the dilapidated house on the hill, above the creek bed where hobos, weary of riding the rails looking for work, often camped. The front yard had not a blade of grass and was riddled with gopher holes like the top of a salt or pepper shaker. In the upcoming years, the United States teetered on whether to enter the war already begun in Europe. Alice chronicles the vicissitudes of The Great Depression and perilous war years, while she and her family coped with the challenges of living their ordinary lives. The author brings warmth and humor as she relates wildly off-beat and entertaining incidents that lift the spirit with the joys of living, no matter the clouds of history.

Just as economists struggle today to justify the free market after the global economic crisis, an earlier generation revisited their worldview after the Great Depression. In this intellectual history of that project, Burgin traces the evolution of postwar economic thought in order to reconsider the most basic assumptions of a market-centered world.

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.