This text is designed for use in a course on the economics of crime in a variety of settings. Assuming only a previous course in basic microeconomics, this innovative book is strongly linked to the new theoretical and empirical journal literature. Showing the power of microeconomics in action, Yezer covers a wide array of topics. There are chapters on the following topics: benefit-cost and the imprisonment decision, enforcement games, juvenile crime, private enforcement, economics of 3 strikes law, broken windows strategies, police profiling, and crime in developing countries. There are also separate chapters on guns, drugs, and capital punishment. Timely boxed examples are found throughout. Problems at the end of each chapter allow students to reinforce their microeconomics skills and to gain insight into the way they can be applied to case examples.

Economics of Crime presents the basic model of criminal behavior and law enforcement. The authors start by reviewing the economics of criminal behavior. Models of criminal behavior applying the model of individual rational behavior are presented. Empirical studies surveyed use regression analyses and employ data from states and police regions down to individuals. These studies tend to support the hypothesis that the probability of punishment and the severity of punishment have a deterrent effect on crime. Methodological problems relating to the assumption of rationality, statistical identification of equations, measurement errors, and operationalization of theoretical variables are discussed. Economics of Crime also review the theory of public enforcement including probability and severity, fines and imprisonment, repeat offenders, incentives of enforcers, enforcement costs and enforcement errors. Economics of Crime is intended for economists and lawyers, practitioners, scholars and students in the field of law and economics, microeconomics, and criminology who wish to learn the basics of the economics of crime, criminal behavior, and law enforcement.

Jeremy Bentham and Gary Becker established the tradition of analyzing criminal law in utilitarian and economic terms. This seminal book continues that tradition with specially commissioned, original papers that span the philosophical foundations of the use of economics in criminal law, both traditional economic perspectives and behavioral and experimental approaches to the discipline. The contributors examine and evaluate the optimal design of criminal law norms as well as the ideal structure of law enforcement institutions. They delineate what wrongs ought to be criminalized, identify the boundaries between criminal law and tort, and determine the optimal size of sanctions given the differential vulnerability of victims. They also analyze the special considerations that apply to the regulation of corporate crime, the effects of technology on crime, and the effects of the distribution of wealth on sentencing. This essential Handbook provides students and scholars of criminal law and law and economics the opportunity to explore the diversity of contemporary approaches to the economics of crime. Criminologists, sociologists and policymakers will also find it a valuable addition to their collections.

When a giant invades the peaceful kingdom of the Tatrajanni and takes the different-looking girl prisoner, it takes the combined efforts of the wise woman of the mountain, the Prince, and the girl herself to rid the kingdom of the intruder.