This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size – two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.

"Empirical evidence shows that many markets are characterized by a few large firms that behave strategically, while cohabiting with a competitive fringe of small firms. Thus, there is a need to consider general equilibrium settings that account explicitly for strategic interactions among big firms. In this short but deep book, d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira provide several solutions that can reconcile "old" and "new" approaches to market competition through a series of nested frameworks. What makes this book unique is that the authors recognize explicitly the key role played by the labor market for the product market outcome. Their work is, therefore, a fundamental contribution that will allow us to understand better how markets work. Readers will also find a wide range of tools that can be used in different applications." - Jacques-François Thisse, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain. "Oligopoly in general equilibrium has proved an elusive goal in theory for decades, with Claude d'Aspremont and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira among the small group of scholars that have taken it seriously. In recent years, the big data revolution has revealed just how important very large firms are, especially in international trade, and has encouraged more work breaking away from the perfectly and monopolistically competitive paradigms. This book could not be more timely therefore, and should be required reading for anyone working in this important field." - Peter Neary, Georgetown University Qatar and Merton College, University of Oxford. This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size - two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. It aims to offer an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics and quantitative economics.

This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools.Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is ""the theory of the core of the market,"" and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality.Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

What is Collusion The term "collusion" refers to a dishonest agreement or covert collaboration between two or more parties with the intention of restricting open competition by deceiving, misleading, or committing fraud against certain individuals or organizations. Not all instances of collusion are regarded to be criminal. By way of example, by engaging in fraudulent activity or acquiring an unfair edge in the market, it is possible to accomplish goals that are prohibited by law. An agreement between companies or individuals to split a market, establish prices, restrict production, or restrict opportunities is referred to as a market division.It may involve activities such as "unions, wage fixing, kickbacks, or misrepresenting the independence of the relationship between the colluding parties" . In the eyes of the law, any and all actions caused by cooperation are regarded as invalid. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Collusion Chapter 2: Duopoly Chapter 3: Monopoly Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Cartel Chapter 7: Price fixing Chapter 8: Cross elasticity of demand Chapter 9: Anti-competitive practices Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Decartelization Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Bertrand competition Chapter 15: Cournot competition Chapter 16: Market structure Chapter 17: Market concentration Chapter 18: Competition (economics) Chapter 19: Tacit collusion Chapter 20: Economic law Chapter 21: Profit (economics) (II) Answering the public top questions about collusion. (III) Real world examples for the usage of collusion in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Collusion.

By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced achievements of economic analysis. The book contains a suggested approach to collusion, in ex ante and ex post perspectives. By moving from the analysis of the state of art, in terms of law, case law, and scholarship, Marilena Filippelli analyses inconsistencies and failures in the current antitrust enforcement toward collusion and develops a workable parameter for the issue of collective dominance. The most innovative part of this work goes beyond the analysis itself of collective dominance and involves the interference of arts. 101 and 102. The conclusion is a re-definition of the relationship between those rulesÑfrom dichotomy to redundancy. Finally, the book highlights the antitrust significance of semi-collusion, as a strategy made of collusion and competition. The author considers economic models equaling, as for the effects, collusion and semi-collusion and the case law supporting the qualification of semi-collusion as a species of collusion. The analysis involves both US and EU systems, under the highly topical economic-oriented approach. It also contains an original view of European antitrust prohibitions. Because of its contents and its approach, this book will be attractive to every academic interested in antitrust law. Moreover, the well-documented research on parallelism, involving law, case law and scholarship, makes this book interesting also for competition authorities and antitrust lawyers.

Adam Smith warned of the prevalence of corporate conspiracies more than two hundred years ago. Since then, interest in cartels has sometimes intensified (during the Great Depression, for example) and sometimes diminished, but the need for control has always remained on the antitrust agenda. This well-documented book reviews the economic case against corporate collusion, as well as the arguments made for a more permissive attitude. A survey of recent empirical research reveals not only the prevalence of a wide range of international cartels but also the size of the inefficiencies and costs that they impose on customers and consumers. The antitrust reaction has therefore intensified with greatly increased fines being imposed by the US, the EU and other authorities. At the same time, they have developed sophisticated leniency polices with the aim of destabilizing the illegal conspiracies. After reviewing these measures, the author concludes with the hope that this toughened approach is not modified or reversed during periods of recession.