The story of the British Eastern Fleet, which operated in the Indian Ocean against Japan, has rarely been told. Although it was the largest fleet deployed by the Royal Navy prior to 1945 and played a vital part in the theater it was sent to protect, it has no place in the popular consciousness of the naval history of the Second World War. So Charles Stephenson’s deeply researched and absorbing narrative gives this forgotten fleet the recognition it deserves. British prewar naval planning for the Far East is part of the story, as is the disastrous loss of the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse in 1941, but the body of the book focuses on the new fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir James Somerville, and its operations against the Japanese navy and aircraft as well as Japanese and German submarines. Later in the war, once the fleet had been reinforced with an American aircraft carrier, it was strong enough to take more aggressive actions against the Japanese, and these are described in vivid detail. Charles Stephenson’s authoritative study should appeal to readers who have a special interest in the war with Japan, in naval history more generally and Royal Navy in particular.

An detailed illustrated exploration of the Japanese raid into the Indian Ocean in April 1942 – one of the largest operations conducted by the Imperial Navy during the war. In the wake of Japan's conquest of Burma in early 1942, plans were formed by the Imperial high command to capture Ceylon (modern Sri Lanka) to consolidate Japan's defensive perimeter and disrupt British shipping lanes to India, Australia, and the Middle East. The Imperial Japanese Army, however, could not release sufficient troops for an invasion, and so in response the Japanese Navy developed Operation C, an aggressive raid by the Combined Fleet into the Indian Ocean. The key objective was to destroy the British Eastern Fleet in port. Expert naval historian Mark Stille documents the high point of Japanese naval air power as its carriers struck Ceylon – the heart of British naval power in the East – sinking several Allied ships. He describes the Allied air attempts to destroy Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's force, and the Japanese attacks against British shipping and the cities along the Indian coast. Specially commissioned battlescenes bring to life the sinking of British carrier Hermes, the Bristol Blenheim attacks on the Japanese carrier force, and a Zero vs Hurricane dogfight over Colombo on 5 April. Easy to follow maps and diagrams reveal the strategic situation at the start and end of the campaign, and track the movements of the Japanese carrier task force and the British Eastern Fleet throughout. Details of weaponry, equipment, personnel and the events of the fascinating battles that took place are revealed in over 60 photographs, many of which are from Japanese sources.

A study of the British Royal Navy’s activities in the Indian Ocean during World War II, led by Admiral Sir James Somerville. The story of the British Eastern Fleet, which operated in the Indian Ocean against Japan, has rarely been told. Although it was the largest fleet deployed by the Royal Navy prior to 1945 and played a vital part in the theatre it was sent to protect, it has no place in the popular consciousness of the naval history of the Second World War. So Charles Stephenson’s deeply researched and absorbing narrative gives this forgotten fleet the recognition it deserves. British pre-war naval planning for the Far East is part of the story, as is the disastrous loss of the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse in 1941, but the body of the book focuses on the new fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir James Somerville, and its operations against the Japanese navy and aircraft as well as Japanese and German submarines. Later in the war, once the fleet had been reinforced with an American aircraft carrier, it was strong enough to take more aggressive actions against the Japanese, and these are described in vivid detail. Charles Stephenson’s authoritative study should appeal to readers who have a special interest in the war with Japan, in naval history more generally and Royal Navy in particular. Praise forThe Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942–1944 “This meticulously researched, outstandingly clear, well written and absorbing account is long overdue and will most likely become a standard work. The text is most helpfully supported by over 80 pages of detailed end notes referenced to each chapter and a detailed index. This is not only a book for naval historians but also for anyone with an interest in the War in the Indian Ocean region. Highly recommended.” —Military Historical Society “I enjoyed this book – it gives us an account of an often neglected part of the war at sea, and of the achievements of Admiral Somerville, who kept his fleet intact in the face of a potentially overwhelming opponent, then was willing to acknowledge that his fleet needed to improve massively before it could take on the Japanese.” —Dr John Rickard, author and webmaster of the ‘Military History Encyclopedia on the Web’

In early April 1942, a little-known episode of World War II took place, said by Sir Winston Churchill to be Òthe most dangerous moment of the war,Ó when the Japanese made their only major offensive westwards into the Indian Ocean. Historian Sir Arthur Bryant said, ÒA Japanese naval victory in April 1942 would have given Japan total control of the Indian Ocean, isolated the Middle East and brought down the Churchill government.Ó War in the Far East had erupted with the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, followed in succession by Japanese drives on the Philippines, Indochina, the Java Sea and Singapore. Seemingly unstoppable, the Japanese now had a vast new empire, and having crippled the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, turned their sights on the British Eastern Fleet based at Ceylon. Occupation of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) would not only provide the Japanese a springboard into India but control of the essential convoy routes to Europe and the Western Desert. And aside from the British Eastern Fleet, the Indian Ocean lay undefended. So far the Japanese had suffered no significant losses and the question on everyoneÕs lips was how soon the enemy would appear off India. In April 1942 a Japanese fleet led by six aircraft carriers, four battleships and 30 other ships sailed into the Bay of Bengal. After the war Churchill said that potential disaster was averted by the actions of one pilot, Squadron Leader L.J. Birchall, who in his Catalina flying boat spotted the Japanese warships massing some 350 miles from Ceylon. He was shot down by a Japanese Zero but not before sending a brief radio message back to his base. This gave the islandÕs defense forces time to prepare. In the ferocious battles that followed, the British lost a carrier, two heavy cruisers and many other ships; however, the Japanese eventually turned back, never to sail against India again. John Clancy, whose father survived the sinking of HMS Cornwall during the battle, tells the story of this dramatic but little known campaign in which a major Allied catastrophe was only narrowly averted.

This book presents the Japanese navy offensive in the Indian Ocean area in March-April 1942. Its main goal was to destroy the Royal Navy in the Far East and achieve domination on the Eastern flank of the Pacific War on the eve of the battle of Midway.

How British naval power in the Indian Ocean played a critical early role in WWII: “Commands the reader's attention. . . . a history game-changer.” —Warship, Naval Books of the Year This new work tells the compelling story of how the Royal Navy secured the strategic space from Egypt in the west to Australasia in the East through the first half of the Second World War—and explains why this contribution, made while Russia’s fate remained in the balance and before American economic power took effect, was so critical. Without it, the war would certainly have lasted longer and decisive victory might have proved impossible. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was surely the Royal Navy’s finest achievement, the linchpin of victory. The book moves authoritatively between grand strategy, intelligence, accounts of specific operations, and technical assessment of ships and weapons. It challenges established perceptions of Royal Navy capability and will change the way we think about Britain’s role and contribution in the first half of the war. The Navy of 1939 was stronger than usually suggested and British intelligence did not fail against Japan. Nor was the Royal Navy outmatched by Japan, coming very close to a British Midway off Ceylon in 1942. And it was the Admiralty, demonstrating a reckless disregard for risks, that caused the loss of Force Z in 1941. The book also lays stress on the key part played by the American relationship in Britain’s Eastern naval strategy. Superbly researched and elegantly written, it adds a hugely important dimension to our understanding of the war in the East.