The definition of Street Ignorance: What You Know, What You Think You Know, and What You Don’t Know About the Streets By: Terry T. Ruffin When we hear of someone being called ignorant, it doesn't necessarily mean that the person is stupid; it may mean that the person is unaware or lacks the comprehension of the subject or things that are being specified. The definition of Street Ignorance is a compilation of writings on the reality checks of street life and the ignorant behavior that one may present while out in the streets, living lawless and displaying unconscious rational thinking errors through drug dealing, drug addiction, ignoring the true dangers of street life and the consequences that one will suffer if faced with street ignorance and unknown federal laws. Not only is The definition of Street Ignorance an eye-opening read, but it’s necessary. This book not only brings awareness but it also advocates a genuine interest in the lives of those who are exposed to negative lifestyles such as drug dealing, drug using, possessing firearms, gangs, and violence.

Unsparing and important. . . . An informative, clearheaded and sobering book.—Jonathan Yardley, Washington Post (1999 Critic's Choice) Inner-city black America is often stereotyped as a place of random violence, but in fact, violence in the inner city is regulated through an informal but well-known code of the street. This unwritten set of rules—based largely on an individual's ability to command respect—is a powerful and pervasive form of etiquette, governing the way in which people learn to negotiate public spaces. Elijah Anderson's incisive book delineates the code and examines it as a response to the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, to the stigma of race, to rampant drug use, to alienation and lack of hope.

This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically. The author grounds his position in an underlying theory of moral and criminal responsibility according to which blameworthiness consists in a defective response to the moral reasons one has. Since persons cannot be faulted for failing to respond to reasons for criminal liability they do not believe they have, then ignorance should almost always excuse. But persons are somewhat responsible for their wrongs when their mistakes of law are reckless, that is, when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their conduct might be wrong. This book illustrates this with examples and critiques the arguments to the contrary offered by criminal theorists and moral philosophers. It assesses the real-world implications for the U.S. system of criminal justice. The author describes connections between the problem of ignorance of law and other topics in moral and legal theory.

Issues for include section: Bituminous roads and streets.