The global financial crisis of 2008/9 is the Great Depression of the 21st century. For many though, the similarities stop at the Wall Street Crash as the current generation of policymakers have acted quickly to avoid the mistakes of the past. Yet the global crisis has made room for mistakes all of its own. While governments have apparently kept to their word on refraining from protectionist measures in the style of 1930s tariffs, there has been a disturbing rise in "murky protectionism." Seemingly benign, these crisis-linked policies are twisted to favour domestic firms, workers and investors. This book, first published as an eBook on VoxEU.org in March 2009, brings together leading trade policy practitioners and experts - including Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo. Initially its aim was to advise policymakers heading in to the G20 meeting in London, but since the threat of murky protectionism persists, so too do their warnings.

This paper investigates how trade flows are being affected by new discriminatory measures implemented during the global financial crisis. We match data on behind-the-border measures (e.g., bailouts and subsidies) and border measures implemented through April 2010 to monthly HS 4-digit bilateral trade data. Our estimation strategy relies on a first-differenced gravity equation and time-varying fixed effects to disentangle the impact of new discriminatory measures. Trade in exporter-importer pairs subject to new measures decreased by 5 to 8 percent relative to trade in the same product among pairs not subject to new measures. These product-level results imply global trade declines at the aggregate level of about 0.2 percent, or $30-35 billion a year. These aggregate figures would be higher, if one third of measures had not been excluded due to incomplete data. The paper then goes on to dissect protectionism’s trade impact by disaggregating measures by type, advanced/developing countries, regions, sectors, and time. Behind-the-border measures are found to have been more harmful than border measures at the product level. Among border measures, impacts tend to be higher for less transparent measures. Advanced countries are found to be responsible for 2/3 of the trade decline due to crisis protectionism, but their exports also absorbed 2/3 of this decline. When breaking down measures in a time dimension, we find that those taken in the first nine months after the Lehman collapse were most harmful and likely continue to constitute a drag on trade.

This paper focuses on the sluggish growth of world trade relative to income growth in recent years. The analysis uses an empirical strategy based on an error correction model to assess whether the global trade slowdown is structural or cyclical. An estimate of the relationship between trade and income in the past four decades reveals that the long-term trade elasticity rose sharply in the 1990s, but declined significantly in the 2000s even before the global financial crisis. These results suggest that trade is growing slowly not only because of slow growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but also because of a structural change in the trade-GDP relationship in recent years. The available evidence suggests that the explanation may lie in the slowing pace of international vertical specialization rather than increasing protection or the changing composition of trade and GDP.

The global financial crisis triggered a broad reassessment of economic integration policies in developed and developing countries worldwide. The crisis-induced collapse in trade was the sharpest ever since World War II, affecting all countries and all product categories. A huge shock to the trading system, combined with severe macroeconomic instability, makes it natural for policymakers to call into question the basic underlying assumptions of trade liberalization and openness. In particular, outward-oriented or export-led growth strategies are being reassessed as openness is increasingly associated with greater volatility. However, it is crucial not to lose sight of the dynamic benefits that openness can offer. Examples include technology transfer, increased competitive pressure that reduces markups and improves efficiency, and economies of scale. The real question is how to manage outward-oriented strategies so as to maximize the benefits of openness while minimizing risks. This book aims to contribute to this important and ongoing policy debate, bringing together recent empirical work on the trade collapse, its causes and consequences, and the broader trade policy agenda in the post-crisis environment. It addresses critical policy issues revolving around the topic of outward-oriented growth strategy, including policy instruments that help manage risks associated with outward-orientation, lessons learned from the crisis for particular countries and regions, and how emerging trade policy issues such as climate change, commodities, global production networking, and migration affect the prospects for recovery and outward-oriented growth.