This book explains why the European Union (EU) Member States – in response to the euro crisis – agreed to establish banking union, despite previous objections, and why they chose its hybrid institutional design. Analysing its establishment from 2012 to 2020, the book offers a comprehensive view of the preferences of the Member States and EU institutions, as well as of the negotiation dynamics and latest developments in the three pillars of banking union, namely, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the common backstop, and the European deposit insurance scheme. Furthermore, empirically, the book looks beyond the usual focus of the northern and southern coalition of states to underline the influence of powerful smaller Member States in the intergovernmental bargaining process. Adopting a range of theoretical perspectives, it questions the solidity of the northern versus southern camps and reveals distinctive and particular positioning from individual countries during the process. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of European financial market regulation, European economic governance, EU institutions, European integration theory and EU politics more broadly.

The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.

The European Banking Union and the Role of Law offers a comprehensive and unique examination of the European Banking Union’s (EBU) impact on existing legal disciplines and assesses the role of law in shaping the EBU framework.

This book examines the politics of Banking Union and EMU reform in the EU, and draws lessons for what it means for international politics, both in Europe, and for international relations more broadly. It demonstrates that most of the reforms in Europe to break free of the Eurozone and banking crises in which Europe continues to find itself focus on building up the capacities of national authorities rather than European ones. The result is that national authorities remain largely in control of the decisions and funds that are to be deployed to prevent economic disaster if a single EU bank fails. The likely outcome is an accelerated balkanization of the European market for the foreseeable future. The book also contends that power politics, and realism in particular, is a defining feature of European politics with coercion and enforced national responsibility at the demand of Germany; the dominant form of institution-building that established the responsible sovereignty model, and shut down the possibility of alternatives. In making this case, the book demonstrates that the dominant view in international relations, that power politics best explains the behaviour of states, also apply to the EU. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of the Eurozone crisis, EU politics, economic policy, and more broadly to political economy, public policy and international relations.

This is the first book to offer a profound, practical analysis of the framework for the judicial and pre-judicial protection of rights under the supranational banking supervision and resolution powers in the European Banking Union (EBU). It is also unique in its in-depth commentary on the developing case law from the European Court of Justice in this new field of EU litigation.

The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union examines the political, legal and economic issues surrounding the lacunae and design faults of European Banking Union and its problematic operation. The volume brings together the work of sixteen scholars focused on the diverse debates surrounding the construction and operation of Banking Union (BU), and its necessary reform. BU represents one of the most important developments in European integration since the launch of Monetary Union. Furthermore, the design of the BU agreed between 2012 and 2014 was a messy compromise among EU member states. It is not surprising then that BU has sparked a lively academic debate and triggered an ever-growing number of publications from different disciplinary backgrounds. The first wave of academic work on BU focuses upon the economic rationale underpinning the supranationalisation of control over banking -- regulation, supervision, support and resolution -- and the political dynamics and legal issues that shaped the design of the Union agreed. This volume is located at the intersection of this first phase of academic research and a second stage which analyses the functioning of the different elements of BU. New research questions are triggered by the albeit limited empirical evidence on BU's implementation and operation. Contributions to this second wave of research attempt to identify potentially dangerous lacunae and contribute to on-going reform debates. The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union will be of great interest to scholars of the European Union, Banking, Economic Governance, and Political Economy. Most of the chapters were originally published as three special issues in the Journal of Economic Policy Reform.

This handbook analyses the European Banking Union legal framework focusing on legislative acts (regulations and directives), case law and the resolution procedures. In addition, it will pay attention to the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the national authorities, with special attention to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). To give a more complete picture, the book will also cover the implementation of European Deposit Insurance Scheme (so called third pillar) still under construction, and appeal to academics, researchers and students of banking and financial law.