This work presents a comprehensive history and evaluation of the role of the 100 percent reserve plan in the banking legislation of the New Deal reform era from its inception in 1933 to its re-emergence in the current financial reform debate in the US.

During the 1930s, there were numerous proposals put forth to modify the financial system. The "Chicago Plan," submitted in 1933 by economists at the University of Chicago, recommended abolition of the fractional reserve system and imposition of 100% reserves on demand deposits. Despite the radical nature of this proposal, Phillips argues that it played an important, and hitherto neglected, role in the banking legislation passed during the New Deal. The paper addresses the question of whether our present financial problems might have been avoided had the - "Chicago Plan" been fully implemented during the New Deal. Phillips provides a historical analysis of banking reform during that era, and explores the reasons why the Chicago Plan was not adopted. On the surface, it appears to have been defeated as a matter of pure political expediency. The Banking Act of 1935, by institutionalizing Federal deposit insurance and the separation of commercial and investment banking, successfully restored the public's confidence in the banking system. Moreover, Roosevelt was satisfied since the act permitted enhanced control over monetary policy by a reconstituted Federal Reserve. The Chicago Plan ultimately succumbed to alternative (and less stringent) measures embodied in the Banking Act of 1935, but its principles (e.g. restricting bank assets and limiting taxpayers' liability from Federal deposit insurance) have reemerged in the contemporary debate over banking reform in this country: after all, there has been a rejuvenation of the 100% reserve plan via "narrow banking" or "core banking" proposals. Though the early New Deal legislation must be considered a success since it remained relatively unchanged for almost fifty years, a formidable challenge is posed in devising a financial system that will last well into the twenty-first century.

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.

The Great Depression and the New Deal. For generations, the collective American consciousness has believed that the former ruined the country and the latter saved it. Endless praise has been heaped upon President Franklin Delano Roosevelt for masterfully reining in the Depression’s destructive effects and propping up the country on his New Deal platform. In fact, FDR has achieved mythical status in American history and is considered to be, along with Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, one of the greatest presidents of all time. But would the Great Depression have been so catastrophic had the New Deal never been implemented? In FDR’s Folly, historian Jim Powell argues that it was in fact the New Deal itself, with its shortsighted programs, that deepened the Great Depression, swelled the federal government, and prevented the country from turning around quickly. You’ll discover in alarming detail how FDR’s federal programs hurt America more than helped it, with effects we still feel today, including: • How Social Security actually increased unemployment • How higher taxes undermined good businesses • How new labor laws threw people out of work • And much more This groundbreaking book pulls back the shroud of awe and the cloak of time enveloping FDR to prove convincingly how flawed his economic policies actually were, despite his good intentions and the astounding intellect of his circle of advisers. In today’s turbulent domestic and global environment, eerily similar to that of the 1930s, it’s more important than ever before to uncover and understand the truth of our history, lest we be doomed to repeat it.

An “engaging and well-researched study [of] ordinary people who joined together to challenge financial institutions” (Choice). Banks and bankers are hardly the most beloved institutions and people in this country. With its corruptive influence on politics and stranglehold on the American economy, Wall Street is held in high regard by few outside the financial sector. But the pitchforks raised against this behemoth are largely rhetorical: We rarely see riots in the streets or public demands for an equitable and democratic banking system that result in serious national changes. Yet the situation was vastly different a century ago, as Christopher W. Shaw shows. This book upends the conventional thinking that financial policy in the early twentieth century was set primarily by the needs and demands of bankers. Shaw shows that banking and politics were directly shaped by the literal and symbolic investments of the grassroots. This engagement remade financial institutions and the national economy, through populist pressure and the establishment of federal regulatory programs and agencies like the Farm Credit System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Shaw reveals the surprising groundswell behind seemingly arcane legislation, as well as the power of the people to demand serious political repercussions for the banks that caused the Great Depression. One result of this sustained interest and pressure was legislation and regulation that brought on a long period of relative financial stability, with a reduced frequency of economic booms and busts. Ironically, this stability led to the decline of the very banking politics that brought it about. Giving voice to a broad swath of American figures, including workers, farmers, politicians, and bankers alike, Money, Power, and the People recasts our understanding of what might be possible in balancing the needs of the people with those of their financial institutions.

Russell provides a groundbreaking critique of the orthodox position on the nature of New Deal reforms as well as an innovative analysis of the unraveling of those reforms. Russell argues that the success of the New Deal banking reforms in the post-war period initially produced a "pax financus" in which the competitive struggles amongst financial ca