During the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, the British government sought to avoid escalation of the war in Vietnam and to help bring about peace. The thinking that lay behind these endeavours was often insightful and it is hard to argue that the attempt was not worth making, but the British government was able to exert little, if any, influence on a power with which it believed it had, and needed, a special relationship. Drawing on little-used papers in the British archives, Nicholas Tarling describes the making of Britain’s Vietnam policy during a period when any compromise proposed by London was likely to be seen in Washington as suggestive of defeat, and attempts to involve Moscow in the process over-estimated the USSR’s influence on a Hanoi determined on reunification.

British foreign policy towards Vietnam illustrates the evolution of Britain's position within world geopolitics, 1943-1950. It reflects the change of the Anglo-US relationship from equality to dependence, and demonstrates Britain's changing association with its colonies and with the other European imperial spheres within Southeast Asia.

Britain's peacekeeping role in Southeast Asia after World War II was clear enough but the purpose of the Commonwealth in the region later became shadowy. British involvement in the wars fought in Vietnam between 1946 and 1975 has been the subject of a number of books--most of which focus on the sometimes clandestine activities of politicians--and unsubstantiated claims about British support for the United States' war effort have gained acceptance. Drawing on previously undiscovered information from Britain's National Archives, this book discusses the conduct of the wars in Vietnam and the political ramifications of UK involvement, and describes Britain's actual role in these conflicts: supplying troops, weapons and intelligence to the French and U.S. governments while the latter were in combat with Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese.

Some will be shocked to find out that the United States and Ho Chi Minh, our nemesis for much of the Vietnam War, were once allies. Indeed, during the last year of World War II, American spies in Indochina found themselves working closely with Ho Chi Minh and other anti-colonial factions-compelled by circumstances to fight together against the Japanese. Dixee Bartholomew-Feis reveals how this relationship emerged and operated and how it impacted Vietnam's struggle for independence. The men of General William Donovan's newly-formed Office of Strategic Services closely collaborated with communist groups in both Europe and Asia against the Axis enemies. In Vietnam, this meant that OSS officers worked with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, whose ultimate aim was to rid the region of all imperialist powers, not just the Japanese. Ho, for his part, did whatever he could to encourage the OSS's negative view of the French, who were desperate to regain their colony. Revealing details not previously known about their covert operations, Bartholomew-Feis chronicles the exploits of these allies as they developed their network of informants, sabotaged the Japanese occupation's infrastructure, conducted guerrilla operations, and searched for downed American fliers and Allied POWs. Although the OSS did not bring Ho Chi Minh to power, Bartholomew-Feis shows that its apparent support for the Viet Minh played a significant symbolic role in helping them fill the power vacuum left in the wake of Japan's surrender. Her study also hints that, had America continued to champion the anti-colonials and their quest for independence, rather than caving in to the French, we might have been spared our long and very lethal war in Vietnam. Based partly on interviews with surviving OSS agents who served in Vietnam, Bartholomew-Feis's engaging narrative and compelling insights speak to the yearnings of an oppressed people-and remind us that history does indeed make strange bedfellows.

In All the Way with JFK? Peter Busch shatters many a myth about Anglo-American relations and the Vietnam War. Demolishing the scholarly consensus thtat Britain was in constant pursuit of peace in Indochina, he shows that the British government ruled out a negotiated settlement, advised JohnF. Kennedy to conceal the American military build-up, and helped to put the blame for the escalating conflict squarely on the communist regime in Hanoi. Simultaneously, Britain increased its own involvement in the conflict by sending Robert Thompson as the head of a team of counter-insurgencyexperts to South Vietnam. The detailed analysis of the British Advisory Mission disproves the oft-repeated view that Thompson was the brain behind the strategic hamlet programme, in which Kennedy and his administration put so much faith. However, the British experts were convinced of theprogramme's eventual success, and Thompson told Kennedy in 1963 that the South Vietnamese were winning the war.Drawing on newly released documents from archives in Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and East Germany, the compelling story of Britain's involvement in Vietnam is set in the context of the Cold War in South-East Asia. While Britain was en route to getting more deeplyinvolved in Vietnam, Indonesia's confrontation policy re-focused London's attention to the Malayan area in 1963. Britain wanted to demonstrate to the world, and particularly to President Kennedy, the Australians, and the New Zealanders, that it was still willing and able to safeguard Commonwealthinterests in South-East Asia. Indeed, Whitehall's unequivocal defence commitment to Malaysia, coupled with the British military build-up in the area, was completely consistent with Britain's Vietnam policy.All the Way with JFK? proves that the British could not think of a viable alternative to Kennedy's Vietnam policy that might have helped the US avoid the quagmire. Far from playing the role of peacemaker, Britain supported Kennnedy's policy of seeking a decisive military victory in Vietnam.

This book is a study of the circumstances leading to British intervention in Vietnam in 1945, and the course and consequences of this intervention. The first part of the work links French colonialism with the native communist insurgency, while examining British and Foreign Office attitudes towards French Indochina. The study then looks at the key Anglo-American wartime relationship concerning Indochina and its impact. The second half of the book focuses on the local problems faced by the British in Southern Indochina, and whether commanding general Douglas Gracey was guilty (as critics have suggested) of collusion with French colonialism. It also examines the wider problems linked to available military resources, and the controversial issues of the role of the OSS and the use of Japanese troops to preserve law and order. Finally, the book makes a groundbreaking link between British intervention and the outbreak of the French-Vietminh war in 1946. Britain in Vietnam will be of interest to students of British foreign policy, military history and South-East Asian history in general.