This excellent study was commissioned by the U.S. Marine Corps from the distinguished academic and military historian Russel Stolfi. This groundbreaking work is more than just a Divisional history. The whole basis of Rommel's exceptional handling is summed up in Stolfi's masterful conclusion 'Rommel had a bias for action.' The book traces the actions of the 7th 'Ghost' division in France during 1940 and the early part of the campaign in Russia during 1941. This powerful work brilliantly illustrates Stolfi's commanding insight into the genius of Rommel as a Divisional commander. Long out of print, this new edition brings back into circulation a classic piece of military history writing for a new audience.

Examines vehicles, armor quality, manpower, and leadership and includes a comprehensive index of individuals, units, battles, and campaigns First guide to chronicle the history of each division from its inception to its destruction Includes a career sketch of every panzer divisional commander Hitler's tank divisions were his most lethal weapons during World War II. From success to failure, in victory and defeat, each division played a role in Hitler's campaign against the Allies.

It destroyed the French 1st Armored Division and the 4th North African Division, punched through the Maginot Line extension near Sivry, and checked the largest Allied counteroffensive of the campaign at Arras. When France surrendered, the Ghost Division was within 200 miles of the Spanish border. No doubt about it - Rommel had proven himself a great military leader who was capable of greater things. His next command, in fact, would be the Afrika Korps, where the legend of the Desert Fox was born." "Rommel had a great deal of help in France - much more than his published papers suggest. His staff officers and company, battalion, and regimental commanders were an extremely capable collection of military leaders that included 12 future generals (two of them SS), and two colonels who briefly commanded panzer divisions but never reached general rank. They also included Karl Hanke, a Nazi gauleiter who later succeeded Heinrich Himmler as the last Reichsfuehrer-SS."

In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.

First major treatment of the 3rd Panzer Division in English Covers the division's formation and its battles in Poland in 1939, France in 1940, and the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942 The division had nearly 50 Knight's Cross winners by the end of the warContains numerous photos of soldiers and their tanks Based on the daily logs of the division and recollections of its commanders and soldiers

This thesis describes how German doctrine and command and control evolved in World War II with respect to supporting arms. Structured knowledge of a subject, based on empirical data and experience, contributes to successful practice and future development. The German experience of the Second World War is used to discern the applicable lessons of command and control for understanding the development of modern warfare as it relates to supporting arms.