The cognitive science of religion is a rapidly growing field whose practitioners apply insights from advances in cognitive science in order to provide a better understanding of religious impulses, beliefs, and behaviors. In this book Ilkka Pyysi?inen shows how this methodology can profitably be used in the comparative study of beliefs about superhuman agents. He begins by developing a theoretical outline of the basic, modular architecture of the human mind and especially the human capacity to understand agency. He then goes on to discuss examples of supernatural agency in detail, arguing that the human ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others forms the basis of conceptions of supernatural agents and of such social cognition in which supernatural agents are postulated as interested parties in social life. Beliefs about supernatural agency are natural, says Pyysi?inen, in the sense that such concepts are used in an intuitive and automatic fashion. Two dots and a straight line below them automatically trigger the idea of a face, for example. Given that the mind consists of a host of such modular mechanisms, certain kinds of beliefs will always have a selective advantage over others. Abstract theological concepts are usually elaborate versions of such simpler and more contagious folk conceptions. Pyysi?inen uses ethnographical and survey materials as well as doctrinal treatises to show that there are certain recurrent patterns in beliefs about supernatural agents both at the level of folk-religion and of formal theology.

The cognitive science of religion is a rapidly growing field whose practitioners apply insights from advances in cognitive science in order to provide a better understanding of religious impulses, beliefs, and behaviors. In this book Ilkka Pyysi?inen shows how this methodology can profitably be used in the comparative study of beliefs about superhuman agents. He begins by developing a theoretical outline of the basic, modular architecture of the human mind and especially the human capacity to understand agency. He then goes on to discuss examples of supernatural agency in detail, arguing that the human ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others forms the basis of conceptions of supernatural agents and of such social cognition in which supernatural agents are postulated as interested parties in social life. Beliefs about supernatural agency are natural, says Pyysi?inen, in the sense that such concepts are used in an intuitive and automatic fashion. Two dots and a straight line below them automatically trigger the idea of a face, for example. Given that the mind consists of a host of such modular mechanisms, certain kinds of beliefs will always have a selective advantage over others. Abstract theological concepts are usually elaborate versions of such simpler and more contagious folk conceptions. Pyysi?inen uses ethnographical and survey materials as well as doctrinal treatises to show that there are certain recurrent patterns in beliefs about supernatural agents both at the level of folk-religion and of formal theology.

Religious Experience and Religious Lives: An Epistemology defends a moderate approach to religious experiences in which they can contribute to the justification of central religious beliefs, most importantly belief in God. Epistemologists of religion disagree about what evidential value religious experiences have. Some argue that religious experiences have no evidential value while others argue that religious experiences constitute proof of God's existence. However, Walter Scott Stepanenko argues that religious experiences can contribute to these justificatory cases in several distinct ways and that several justificatory cases are philosophically viable. This book contends that this joint justificatory viability is best explained by the diversity and development of religious lives: as religious believers grow in a faith tradition, their access to an evidential base can develop and the contributory work religious experiences provide in defense of religious belief can change. This suggests that various epistemologies of religious experience implicitly emphasize different life stages or different prototypical religious believers and that a fully adequate epistemology of religious experience will be expansive, pluralistic, and responsive to the diversity of religious believers and their development in a religious tradition.

Seminar paper from the year 2022 in the subject Ethnology / Cultural Anthropology, grade: 1,0, University of Freiburg (Institut für Ethnologie), language: English, abstract: Based on the topic of human-environment relation, I am going to delve into the question of who is subjectively identified as a ‘supernatural agent’ and what type and scope of agency is attributed. In the context of the seminar that also asks about the connection to COVID-related healing practices, I will then link the concept of supernatural agency with phenomena of health. Thereupon I want to present the methods and findings of my research following the guideline question: How do religious actors in Germany and Indonesia connect their belief with medical action against the Covid-19 pandemic?, focusing on Christian actors in Germany. Toward the end of 2019, a tiny entity given the name SARS-CoV-2, overpowered the world with a relentless ferocity that sharply exposed the vulnerability of modern human civilization. A belief in the superiority of our species, in the progressiveness of modern social systems, in the achievements in technology and medicine, could not save us from the power of “one of nature’s most miniscule members". With the ongoing spread and unpredictable mutation of the COVID-19 virus, a global war has been declared on something biologically not even classified as a living being, and states mobilize all resources to regain control. This ‘invisible agent’ challenges our personal lives and state action just as much as the postulated separation between humanity and ‘nature’. Not only must we acknowledge the virus as a more-than-human global actor in contrast to humans as being the only forceful agents “acting upon a passive world”, its assumed origin in zoonosis also marks a point of fusion between human and non-human realms, and therefore can be seen as a reinforcement of entanglement that transcends nature/culture dichotomy.

This book, a work on human doing, analyses and applies three central aspects of human life – Action, Freedom and Responsibility – in the wide spectrum of the Philosophy of Mind. Reflections on these issues and their interconnections have a significant effect on the Philosophy of Value and application of ethical theories in practical life. This book even reconstructs the conceptual connection between action and freedom, on the one hand, and that between freedom and responsibility, on the other. It also puts the concepts of freedom and determinism to critical test and reinterprets them from different angles and perspectives. The conventional doctrine of karma, based on the teachings of the BhagavadgÁtÀ, is relieved from its usual deterministic presentation and a logically reasonable explanation is offered. Human actions and human agency are central concepts in the philosophy of mind and action. Free will and responsibility constitute the bedrock of the moral life of the human agents and the book pinpoints that freedom is meant to undertake the goal-oriented actions. It is, therefore, focused on the enquiry into the various aspects of philosophy of mind, as well as the philosophy of value.

Explores the question of whether or not concepts and principles involving supernatural intelligent design can occupy any legitimate place within science.

The cognitive science of religion is an inherently heterogeneous subject, incorporating theory and data from anthropology, psychology, sociology, evolutionary biology, and philosophy of mind amongst other subjects. One increasingly influential area of research in this field is concerned specifically with exploring the relationship between the evolution of the human mind, the evolution of culture in general, and the origins and subsequent development of religion. This research has exerted a strong influence on many areas of religious studies over the last twenty years, but, for some, the so-called 'evolutionary cognitive science of religion' remains a deeply problematic enterprise. This book's primary aim is to engage critically and constructively with this complex and diverse body of research from a wide range of perspectives. To these ends, the book brings together authors from a variety of relevant disciplines, in the thorough exploration of many of the key debates in the field. These include, for example: can certain aspects of religion be considered adaptive, or are they evolutionary by-products? Is the evolutionary cognitive science of religion compatible with theism? Is the evolutionary cognitive approach compatible with other, more traditional approaches to the study of religion? To what extent is religion shaped by cultural evolutionary processes? Is the evolutionary account of the mind that underpins the evolutionary cognitive approach the best or only available account? Written in accessible language, with an introductory chapter by Ilkka Pyssiäinen, a leading scholar in the field, this book is a valuable resource for specialists, undergraduate and graduate students, and newcomers to the evolutionary cognitive science of religion.