"Prepared for the Air Force Special Operations Command"--Title page.

The U.S. Air Force's remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) have played a significant role in current operations in Southwest Asia. As the inventory of RPAs increases and new sensor technologies come online in the coming years, the Air Force has an opportunity to consider additional roles for these aircraft. Thoughtful study into these possibilities will ensure that, when the Air Force employs RPAs, they will help fill capability gaps or augment existing capabilities in moreefficient or more-effective ways. The purpose of this documented briefing is to describe a suite of tools developed by RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) to help the Air Force think through future roles for RPAs. It describes tools to evaluate platform selection and concept of operations (CONOPS) development, sensor performance against various targets, weapon effects, environmental factors, platform survivability, computational processing of data, and exploitation of sensor products. This document also explains how the separate analysis in each of these areas feeds into a mission level analysis, performed with PAF's Systems and CONOPS Operational Effectiveness Model (SCOPEM), and a campaign-level analysis using PAF's Force Structure Effectiveness (FSE) model. Use of these tools and models will help clarify how future RPAs can contribute to U.S. warfighting in cost-effective ways. The tools presented here are also useful for examining the effectiveness of new capabilities more broadly (e.g., directed energy weapons or electronic warfare capabilities); examining the effectiveness of new platforms in the context of the entire intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) force posture; and evaluating the most cost-effective ISR force structure to meet future operational needs.

"The demand for United States Air Force (USAF) remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and weapons-strike operations has led to the necessity of sustaining around-the-clock operations in support of critical missions on the battlefield and around the globe. Because of the novel and unique nature of weapons-bearing RPA operations, there is a wide range of opinions among military and medical leadership as to the sources, levels, and impact of stress among RPA operators (pilots, sensor operators, and mission intelligence coordinators) affecting performance capabilities. The purpose of this study is to (a) identify the main sources of self-reported occupational stress among such operators, (b) use standardized self-report questionnaires to identify rates of clinical distress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), (c) compare findings with local non-RPA operator airmen (logistics and support units from the same geographic locations), and (d) identify demographic and occupational stressors that correlate with (or are predictive of) clinical distress and PTSD among Predator/Reaper operators."--Executive summary, page 1.

Highlights the human components of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, their interactions with the technology and each other, and the implications of human capabilities and limitations for the larger system Considers human factors issues associated with RPAS, but within the context of a very large system of people, other vehicles, policy, safety concerns, and varying applications Chapters have been contributed by world class experts in HSI and those with operational RPAS experience Considers unintended consequences associated with taking a more myopic view of this system Examines implications for practice, policy, and research Considers both civil and military aspects of RPAS

Remotely piloted aircraft are not commonplace in modern warfare. Enlisted intelligence personnel in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) who supported these activities have reported personal accounts of posttraumatic stress and fatigue, possibly due to viewing high-definition, full-motion-video, remote warfare. Rates of mental health diagnoses and counseling are unknown in this population. Incidence rates of 12 specific mental health outcomes were calculated for all enlisted active duty USAF Intelligence Specialists in the 1N1 and 1N- career fields from 1 January 2006 through 31 December 2010, while considering various demographic and military variables. The incidence rates were compared to RPA sensor operators and aircraft armament technicians that have similar initial and subsequent psychiatric medical standards and occupational scheduling demands as enlisted active duty USAF intelligence specialists, but differ in the viewing of high-definition, full-motion-video, remote warfare. Unadjusted incidence rates of posttraumatic stress disorder among RPA intelligence specialists (n=7,988), RPA sensor operators (n=196), and aircraft armament technician (n=11,340) were 3.4 per 1,000 person-years, 2.0 per 1,000 person years, respectively. Incidence rate ratios, adjusted for age, gender, time in service, and number of deployments, for posttraumatic stress disorder were: 1) 1.34, 95% confidence interval = 0.19-9.64, for RPA intelligence specialists compared to RPA sensor operators, 2) 1.83, 95% confidence interval = 1.31-.2.55, for RPA intelligence specialists compared to aircraft armament technicians, and 3) 1.36, 95% confidence interval = 0.19-9.85, for RPA sensor operators compared to aircraft armament technicians. Enlisted RPA intelligence specialists displayed significantly higher incidence rates for substance abuse/dependence, family circumstance problems, and maltreatment related mental health categories, and for all mental health outcomes combined compared to RPA sensor operators after adjusting for differences in the two cohorts. Enlisted RPA intelligence specialists also displayed statistically higher incidence rates for life circumstance problems and posttraumatic stress disorder as compared to aircraft armament technicians after adjusting for differences in the two cohorts. Within the surveillance period, RPA intelligence specialists experienced 1.83 times (p

For all the ink spilled over remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) technology, knowledge of RPA culture remains in its infancy. Continuing the debate about culture, we argue first for the urgency of achieving manned-remote fusion in air warfare. Second, we maintain that the limiting factor in realizing that future is not technological but cultural. That is, until the RPA community finds its voice and place in the larger service, this evolution of airpower remains unlikely. The task at hand does not call for reinventing airpower but rediscovering it. Many of our Air Force greats have much to say about building a culture of technical warriors. We simply need to apply the ideas of Gen Henry "Hap" Arnold and those like him to the enterprise of remote aviation.