An investigation of the ways in which the strength of international courts affects dispute settlement, compliance, and the stability of the international economic and political system

As all manner of commerce becomes increasingly global, states must establish laws to protect property rights, human rights, and national security. In many cases, states delegate authority to resolve disputes regarding these laws to an independent court, whose power depends upon its ability to enforce its rulings. Examining detailed case studies of the International Court of Justice and the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization, Leslie Johns finds that a court’s design has nuanced and mixed effects on international cooperation. A strong court is ideal when laws are precise and the court is nested within a political structure like the European Union. Strong courts encourage litigation but make states more likely to comply with agreements when compliance is easy and withdraw from agreements when it is difficult. A weak court is optimal when law is imprecise and states can easily exit agreements with minimal political or economic repercussions. Johns concludes the book with recommendations for promoting cooperation by creating more precise international laws and increasing both delegation and obligation to international courts.

Strengthening the Validity of International Criminal Tribunals provides multi-disciplinary perspectives concerning ways in which international criminal tribunals can be made more valid and effective in a time of uncertainty for the field of international criminal justice.

"The effective implementation of treaties is essential. This book examines the advantages of non-compliance mechanisms (NCMs) versus that of international courts and tribunals to support treaty fulfilment. It brings together globally-recognised names in international law, human rights law, environmental and climate change law, and trade law"--

A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.

Identifies the major weaknesses in the current United Nations system and proposes fundamental reforms to address each. This title is also available as Open Access.