During most of human history, war was a basic instrument of statecraft, considered, for the most part, a lawful, honorable, ennobling, and even romantic pursuit. By contrast, peacemaking remained a marginal and indeed incongruous interstate activity. A war would end when the belligerents ended it. The experience of the twentieth century’s two world wars has changed, at least, the official view. The introduction of ever more destructive weapons, the drastic escalation of civilian deaths, and the economic and environmental devastation that modern war brought combined to forge an international legal impulse to stop, if not prevent, wars, resolve ongoing conflicts, and build peace. Yet stopping a war, though a useful, if not indispensable, step toward making peace, does not lead ineluctably to peace. Nor does the international community’s interposition of “peacekeepers”; their title notwithstanding, peacekeepers only try to keep a stopped war stopped. Making peace is a separate operation, often applying some parts of the same armamentarium but in very different ways. International efforts at stopping wars and making peace, in the era in which such initiatives have become lawful and virtuous, have proved remarkably unsuccessful. Yet the proliferation of ever more destructive weapons, the growing sense of insecurity and expectation of violence, the increasing difficulty of containing wars within a single arena, the threat of breakdown of order, with the prospect of epidemics and mass migration, all work to intensify the demand to stop wars and to make peace. This volume explores these issues by analyzing the theoretical literature on stopping wars and making peace and its application to a number of concrete cases, including the Falklands, Nagorno Karabakh, Rwanda, Malaya, Thailand, and Mozambique. Each case examines one conflict and the efforts undertaken to stop it and transform it into a peace system. The case studies draw general lessons from the incidents studied, extracting guidelines and principles that might serve those called upon to stop wars and make peace and offering a number of instructive points.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

The international community invests billions annually in thousands of projects designed to overcome poverty, stop violence, spread human rights, fight terrorism and combat global warming. The hope is that these separate projects will 'add up' to lasting societal change in places like Afghanistan. In reality, these initiatives are not adding up to sustainable peace. Making Peace Last offers ways of improving the productivity of peacebuilding. This book defines the theory, analysis and practice needed to create peacebuilding approaches that are as dynamic and adaptive as the societies they are trying to affect. The book is based on a combination of field experience and research into peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This book can also be used as a textbook in courses on peace-building, security and development. Making Peace Last is a comprehensive approach to finding sustainable solutions to the world's most pressing social problems.

A revealing examination looks at the decision-making in four NATO capitals about waging war in Kosovo and Iraq. Written by a combat veteran who also served on the faculty of the Naval War College, Waging War to Make Peace: U.S. Intervention in Global Conflicts is a thought-provoking analysis of the decision to make war in the modern world. The subject is examined through the lens of the decision-making of four NATO nations—Britain, France, Germany, and the United States—in the 1999 Kosovo campaign compared to their decisions in 2003 regarding the Iraq war. What emerges is a picture of how the bitter dispute over Iraq was the result of disagreements about who has the authority to wage war, when it is justified, and whether nations have an obligation to intervene in the case of human rights and humanitarian emergencies. The book shows how those who enthusiastically hailed a new era of warfare based upon human rights and humanitarian values misjudged the significance of the Kosovo decision, and it underscores issues with which leaders must come to grips if NATO allies are to avoid broader disputes in the years ahead.

In the complex process of turning war into peace, international conflict mediators play an increasingly pivotal role. Yet almost nothing is known about these influential individuals. In Kings of Peace, Pawns of War, six of the world's leading mediators talk in detail for the first time about their efforts to secure peace in Iraq, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Iraq and Aceh. Former war correspondent Harriet Martin draws on unparalleled access to top-level mediators at work on the international scene today. Thus she is able to provide for the first time important insights into a profession rarely subjected to public scrutiny. She investigates the tactics they use to keep the two sides talking, and their drive to complete what is often a thankless task. She exposes how the warring parties, and also the international backers of a mediation, will manipulate a peace effort - and the mediator himself - in order to retain the upper hand.

War-stopping techniques in the Falklands / Christina Parajon -- Nagorno Karabakh : a war without peace / Nicholas W. Miller -- War and peace in Rwanda / Tom Dannenbaum -- War-stopping and peacemaking in Mozambique / Caroline Gross.

NAMED ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR BY The New York Times Book Review • The Economist • The Christian Science Monitor • Bloomberg Businessweek • The Globe and Mail From the bestselling and award-winning author of Paris 1919 comes a masterpiece of narrative nonfiction, a fascinating portrait of Europe from 1900 up to the outbreak of World War I. The century since the end of the Napoleonic wars had been the most peaceful era Europe had known since the fall of the Roman Empire. In the first years of the twentieth century, Europe believed it was marching to a golden, happy, and prosperous future. But instead, complex personalities and rivalries, colonialism and ethnic nationalisms, and shifting alliances helped to bring about the failure of the long peace and the outbreak of a war that transformed Europe and the world. The War That Ended Peace brings vividly to life the military leaders, politicians, diplomats, bankers, and the extended, interrelated family of crowned heads across Europe who failed to stop the descent into war: in Germany, the mercurial Kaiser Wilhelm II and the chief of the German general staff, Von Moltke the Younger; in Austria-Hungary, Emperor Franz Joseph, a man who tried, through sheer hard work, to stave off the coming chaos in his empire; in Russia, Tsar Nicholas II and his wife; in Britain, King Edward VII, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, and British admiral Jacky Fisher, the fierce advocate of naval reform who entered into the arms race with Germany that pushed the continent toward confrontation on land and sea. There are the would-be peacemakers as well, among them prophets of the horrors of future wars whose warnings went unheeded: Alfred Nobel, who donated his fortune to the cause of international understanding, and Bertha von Suttner, a writer and activist who was the first woman awarded Nobel’s new Peace Prize. Here too we meet the urbane and cosmopolitan Count Harry Kessler, who noticed many of the early signs that something was stirring in Europe; the young Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty and a rising figure in British politics; Madame Caillaux, who shot a man who might have been a force for peace; and more. With indelible portraits, MacMillan shows how the fateful decisions of a few powerful people changed the course of history. Taut, suspenseful, and impossible to put down, The War That Ended Peace is also a wise cautionary reminder of how wars happen in spite of the near-universal desire to keep the peace. Destined to become a classic in the tradition of Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August, The War That Ended Peace enriches our understanding of one of the defining periods and events of the twentieth century. Praise for The War That Ended Peace “Magnificent . . . The War That Ended Peace will certainly rank among the best books of the centennial crop.”—The Economist “Superb.”—The New York Times Book Review “Masterly . . . marvelous . . . Those looking to understand why World War I happened will have a hard time finding a better place to start.”—The Christian Science Monitor “The debate over the war’s origins has raged for years. Ms. MacMillan’s explanation goes straight to the heart of political fallibility. . . . Elegantly written, with wonderful character sketches of the key players, this is a book to be treasured.”—The Wall Street Journal “A magisterial 600-page panorama.”—Christopher Clark, London Review of Books