In the depths of the Cold War and in the wake of Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971, Britain was faced with the stark reality of a Marxist rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. 'State Building and Counter Insurgency in Oman' offers an exploration of the attempts by officials and politicians in Whitehall and the Gulf to reconcile attempts to protect national interests and create an effective, centralised Omani administration and security bodies, whilst maintaining the image of strategic withdrawal and the sovereign independence of Oman. This book thus provides vital information and analysis for students and researchers of Middle East History and Politics, the decline and end of empire and the policymaking processes at the heart of an imperial and military withdrawal.

Introduction -- 1. Between the Pax Britannica and the World -- 2. Events and Policy Surrounding Britain's Increasing Involvement in Oman -- 3. The Conservative Ascendancy: Getting the Troops In -- 4. Britain and Oman's Internal//External Legitimacy Dilemma -- 5. The Search for International Recognition: Britain's Role in Securing Legitimacy -- 6. British Policy, Whitehall Debates and External Aid, 1972-74 -- 7. Continuity and Change: The Labour Government and Defence Reviews -- Conclusion: Themes and Implications.

In the depths of the Cold War and in the wake of Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971, Britain was faced with the stark reality of a Marxist rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. This rebellion, whose explicit aim was to 'liberate' the oil-rich Gulf region, confronted the British with the challenge of securing a political order in Oman conducive to protecting Britain's remaining interests in the midst of its military withdrawal from the region. 'State Building and Counter Insurgency in Oman' offers a nuanced picture of Britain's response to the challenges posed by this withdrawal, through an examination the complex Anglo-Omani relationship at this vital juncture in Middle East and Imperial History. James Worrall offers an examination of how officials in London and the Gulf defined British interests in Oman, and the debates that raged throughout Whitehall, under the successive governments led by Wilson and Heath, about how to best tackle the growing insurgency in Oman. The means by which this challenge was to be met (including the extent of both overt and covert support for the Sultan) in the post-Suez era, posed a number of challenges for decision-makers in Whitehall. The military, economic and diplomatic assistance given to the Omani government to re-establish Sultanate control and crush the rebellion in Dhofar is thus analysed within the context of a complex balancing act, as British politicians and officials tried to reconcile their attempts to create effective and centralised Omani administration and security bodies whilst maintaining the image of strategic withdrawal and the sovereign independence of Oman. Drawing extensively from newly released archival records and interviews with former officials and high-ranking officers, this book provides a systematic re-examination of the Anglo-Omani relationship during the critical years of Oman's transformation into a modern state. It will therefore provide vital information and analysis for students and researchers of Middle East History and Politics, the decline and end of empire and the policymaking processes at the heart of an imperial and military withdrawal.

Oman today is a rapidly modernizing and peaceful country on the fringes of a region in turmoil. It does, however, have a long history of internal strife. In the twentieth century, this strife took the form of two internal conflicts. The Northern Oman or al-Jabal al-Akhdar War of the 1950s was a struggle between the forces of the old tribally based Imamate and the newer Sultanate in the northern part of the country. In the Dhufar War of the 1960s-70s an anti-Sultanate - and later Marxist - front sought secession in the south. J. E. Peterson takes a detailed look at these two wars in the context of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. He surveys Oman's transition from a strictly traditional regime controlling only parts of the country to a modern, inclusive state, particularly in terms of security concerns. Peterson analyses the development of the Sultanate's successful responses to security challenges, especially in the creation and evolution of modern armed forces. 'John Peterson provides the nearest we will perhaps ever see of an official history.' David Benest, The British Army Review 'Peterson does an excellent job of developing the thesis that victory in these counter-insurgencies resulted from the two factors of establishing political legitimacy by meeting the local demands of the population and military efforts, which succeeded largely through British support.' Calvin H. Allen Jr., Middle East Journal

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed—and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency.

In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites. Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions—the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War—to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success—and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.