This book is a compilation of contributions exploring the impact of the European Treaty provisions regarding state aid on Member States’ legislation and administrative practice in the area of business taxation. Starting from a detailed analysis of the European Courts’ jurisprudence on Art.107 TFEU the authors lay out fundamental issues – e.g. on legal concepts like “advantage”, “selectivity” and “discrimination” – and explore current problems – in particular policy and practice regarding “harmful” tax competition within the European Union. This includes the Member States’ Code of Conduct on business taxation, the limits to anti-avoidance legislation and the options for legislation on patent boxes. The European Commission’s recent findings on preferential “rulings” are discussed as well as the general relationship between international tax law, transfer pricing standards and the European prohibition on selective fiscal aids.

This book provides clear guidance on what constitutes State Aid in the area of tax law. It clearly explains the situations in which beneficial tax provisions for the taxpayer – e.g., lower tax rates for certain industries or for certain economic zones, advantageous depreciation rules, or exemptions – can be declared void by the European Commission. The difficult controlling concept of ‘selectivity’ of an aid is dealt with extensively. Drawing on familiarity with the practice of the Commission, as well as the jurisprudence of the General Court and of the Court of Justice, thirteen knowledgeable contributors present valuable arguments in case the Commission requires the repayment of advantages received. Among the topics and issues covered are the following: how unregulated tax incentive competition between States leads to a ‘win’ by one State and a ‘loss’ by another; the legal uncertainty attached to the Commission’s decision following notification of a proposed tax incentive; the role of the Commission’s Code of Conduct; calculating the amount of recovery of illegal State Aid; application of State Aid rules in the area of indirect taxation (e.g., VAT and excise duties); investment fund regimes; subnational regional aid; ‘patent box’ regimes; foreign source income; and taxpayers’ exclusion from infringement proceedings and subsequent appeals. Complete with case studies and analyses of the latest case law on selectivity, this invaluable resource will be welcomed by practitioners who, although they may be well-versed in tax law, are sure to benefit greatly from the authors’ expert guidance on State Aid provisions and the rules on harmful tax competition.

This book investigates whether the European Commission (EC) has the mandate to legislate on direct taxation in sovereign states and ultimately questions whether the EC’s enforcement action in recent tax ruling cases, in the area of state aid, respects the rule of law.

High profile cases before the European Commission and the EU courts have intensified scrutiny of the link between State aid law and the taxation of multinational enterprises. Certain decisions have raised questions about fiscal sovereignty and the interpretation of the rules on State aid – in particular the notion of selectivity, which have not been addressed in detail by existing research. The combination of the evolution of the notion of selectivity in State aid law, on the one hand, and the need to adapt the rules for the taxation of the profits of multinational enterprises to the modern economy, on the other hand, makes it necessary to assess whether existing as well as alternative rules for the allocation of the corporate tax base might entail a selective treatment. This book responds to the need of research in the area of State aid law applied to the taxation of the income of multinational enterprises, focusing on the crucial concept of selectivity. The analysis proceeds with a detailed investigation of the theoretical issues that arise when applying the selectivity test in State aid law to three methods for the allocation of the corporate tax base between the members of multinational enterprises: – the arm’s length principle; – transfer pricing safe harbours; and – systems of formula apportionment. This research project is conducted at a theoretical level, without considering national provisions or particular tax treaties. The author suggests an analytical framework on the application of the selectivity test to the three allocation methods. It is concluded that these methods are likely to have certain selective features, with varying possibilities to be justified by the inner logic of a corporate income tax system. It is also demonstrated that selectivity occurs for different reasons, due to the different rationales of the three allocation methods. This book is intended at contributing to the academic literature on the impact of State aid law on the principles for the taxation of the income of multinational enterprises. The outcome of this research project is also relevant for lawmakers who need to reconcile the imperatives of State aid law with the design of rules that match their tax policies, as well as for judges or lawyers who apply the rules on State aid to tax provisions.

The intersection between fiscal state aid and taxation has become more topical than ever. Mounting financial crises have left EU Member States scrambling to increase their tax revenue, balance their budgets, and attract capital. Taking advantage of these trends, multinational enterprises have lobbied for favourable tax arrangements, raising questions about the breadth of control the Commission can and should practise. To address egregious instances of favourable taxation, the Commission has tried to simultaneously use soft law and deploy Treaty rules on state aid. Fiscal State Aid Law and Harmful Tax Competition in the EU examines the use of state aid rules against national tax measures. Kyriazis's book presents a targeted investigation of these measures in two parts. The first part addresses Commission decisions and ECJ judgments of the early 2000s, which the author calls the "first wave". The second part consists of all the recent Commission decisions and investigations into tax schemes and individual tax rulings, most notably the Apple, Fiat, Starbucks, and Amazon investigations, which Kyriazis labels the "second wave". The characteristics and common threads of each wave are set out, their similarities and differences dissected, and their nexus to the EU's fight against harmful tax competition explored. Containing a thorough analysis of the legal concept of fiscal state aid under Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, this book will be of interest to scholars of European and International Tax law and practitioners working in the field of European competition law.

Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Law - Tax / Fiscal Law, grade: Sehr gut, Vienna University of Economics and Business (Institut für Österreichisches und Internationales Steuerrecht), course: Tax Law Seminar, language: English, abstract: Since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis harmful tax competition increased and therefore also public concern in regard to aggressive tax planning augmented. Many countries try to attract foreign capital by setting low corporate income taxes. For example in Ireland and in Cyprus there is a tax of 12.5 %. A lot of multinational companies use these tax systems to reduce their overall tax burden and so they choose a low-tax-country for incorporation. To mention the BEPS Action Plan, many actions aim at reducing aggressive tax practises and therefore reducing shifting profits in low-tax-countries. As there will be no way in near future to harmonize tax bases and tax rates within the European Union, the European Commission tries to restrict distorting tax competition by using EU State Aid rules. Therefore it does not focus on tax rates or policies as such, but on tax rulings for specific firms. The Commission stated that: “Under State aid rules, national authorities cannot take selective measures that allow certain companies to pay less in taxes than they should if the tax rules of the country were applied in a fair and non-discriminatory way.”

The sun is setting on the days when multinationals could establish intricate tax systems to drastically reduce their tax bills. Since the 1990s, the OECD and the EU have taken resolute steps to compel their members to eradicate corporate tax elusion and harmful tax competition. These solutions are forward-looking, and aim at averting future issues. Importantly, the European Commission has picked a fight against past tax schemes by targeting tax rulings via State aid, a part of EU competition law. In the most publicized case, Apple was asked to pay $15 billion to Ireland in outstanding taxes. The decision was annulled by the General Court in July 2020, and an appeal before the Court of Justice is currently pending. This paper assesses the value of State aid law as a tool to fight unfair corporate taxation. It does so by scrutinizing the decisional practice of the Commission and the judgments of the General Court. The point of departure is that it is legitimate to resort to State aid rules to monitor tax planning practices. While the Commission faces an uphill struggle to win individual cases, the general principles and strategy delineated by the investigations serve to enhance deterrence and decrease undesirable predictability. Unintendedly, the Commission's losses reinforce the robustness of judicial review, and serve to question the narrative that EU competition law may be strategically applied against US tech giants. Overall, the paper perceives State aid as a useful weapon to combat corporate tax malpractices, but as a complement, not a substitute, of the preferred tax harmonization strategy.