This second volume in the Journal of the History of Philosophy book series (JHP Books) is devoted to the resurgence of skepticism in the Renaissance and after. It contains eight original essays by historians of early modern philosophy from Europe and North and South America, with concluding remarks by Richard H. Popkin, who reviews fifty years of scholarship on the history of early modern skepticism and evaluates its present stage. The essays uncover new material relevant to the history of skepticism in the period and propose new interpretations of the nature, role, and influence of skepticism from Montaigne to Berkeley. The contributors discuss such important figures as Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Bayle, Henry More, René Descartes, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Pierre Gassendi, and George Berkeley. By indicating a number of new problems brought about by the early modern philosophers’ engagement with and reaction to skepticism, the authors of the important essays in this volume make a major contribution to our understanding of ancient and modern skepticism.

Chapter I: Montaigne -- chapter II: Peter Ramus -- chapter III: Charron -- chapter IV: Sanchez -- chapter V: La Mothe-Le-Vayer -- chapter VI: Pascal -- Index to literary references -- Index to subjects

Even if specific pieces of research (on the sources or on individual authors, such as Pico, Agrippa, Erasmus, Montaigne, Sanches etc.) have given and are still producing significant results on Renaissance scepticism, an overall synthesis comprising the entire period has not been achieved yet. No predetermined idea of that complex historical subject that is Renaissance scepticism underlies this book, and we want to sacrifice the complexity of movements, personalities, tendencies and interpretations to any sort of a priori unity of theme even less. We acknowledge unhesitatingly that we had always thought of “scepticisms” in the plural, and believe that the different contexts (philosophical, religious, cultural) in which these forms grew up must also be taken into account. Furthermore, given the transversal nature and provocative character of the sceptical challenge, this book contains essays also on philosophers who, without being sceptics and sometimes engaged in fighting scepticism, nevertheless took up its challenge. The main authors considered in this book are: Vives, Castellio, Agrippa, Pedro de Valencia, Pico, Sanchez, Montaigne, Charron, Bruno, Bacon, and Campanella. The various essays in the book show the relevance of the philosophical thought of authors little known by the general public and put in new perspective important aspects of the thought of some of the great thinkers of the Renaissance.

This book offers a detailed and scholarly historical and philosophical examination of French scepticism from Descartes to the beginning of the Enlightenment by examining the views of Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630–1721). It shows the crucial role played by Huet in the modification of the early modern sceptical tradition: from a practical perspective closer to ancient scepticism, mostly presented by Montaigne and Charron, to an epistemological and metaphysical perspective strongly influenced by Descartes’s doubt. The book examines and gives original interpretations of the various sceptical (and semi-sceptical) views held in the period and their connections to Huet’s own scepticism. Besides known philosophers such as Descartes, Gassendi, Pascal and Bayle, the book also accesses sceptical views held by secondary figures such as La Mothe Le Vayer and Simon Foucher and others who have not thus far been connected to the sceptical tradition such as Jean-Baptiste du Hamel and Madeleine de Scudéry. The book is useful for scholars in the field of early modern ideas: philosophical, religious and scientific.

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron’s influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron’s Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi’s first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes’ philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron’s wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes’ relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron’s Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron’s wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal’s view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron’s Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion.