This is the story of an air campaign in which each bomb could dramatically influence the course of the war. In January 1942, the powerful German battleship Tirpitz sailed into her new base in a Norwegian fjord, within easy reach of the Arctic Convoys. Her destruction suddenly became a top Allied priority. But sinking a modern and formidably armed battleship was no easy task, especially when she lay secure in a remote, mountainous fjord, protected by anti-torpedo nets, radar, flak guns and smoke generators. This book charts the full, complex story of the air war against Tirpitz, from the Fleet Air Arm's failed torpedo attack at sea, the RAF's early Halifax raids, and the carrier-borne Barracuda airstrikes of Operations Mascot, Tungsten and Goodwood, to the three Tallboy attacks that finally crippled and sank her. With detailed maps and diagrams, it explains the aircraft and ordnance the British had to work with, the evolving strategic situation, and why the task was so difficult.

This is the story of an air campaign in which each bomb could dramatically influence the course of the war. In January 1942, the powerful German battleship Tirpitz sailed into her new base in a Norwegian fjord, within easy reach of the Arctic Convoys. Her destruction suddenly became a top Allied priority. But sinking a modern and formidably armed battleship was no easy task, especially when she lay secure in a remote, mountainous fjord, protected by anti-torpedo nets, radar, flak guns and smoke generators. This book charts the full, complex story of the air war against Tirpitz, from the Fleet Air Arm's failed torpedo attack at sea, the RAF's early Halifax raids, and the carrier-borne Barracuda airstrikes of Operations Mascot, Tungsten and Goodwood, to the three Tallboy attacks that finally crippled and sank her. With detailed maps and diagrams, it explains the aircraft and ordnance the British had to work with, the evolving strategic situation, and why the task was so difficult.

This illustrated study explores, in detail, the climactic events of the Battle of the Atlantic, and how air power proved to be the Allies' most important submarine-killer in one of the most bitterly fought naval campaigns of World War II. As 1942 opened, both Nazi Germany and the Allies were ready for the climactic battles of the Atlantic to begin. Germany had 91 operational U-boats, and over 150 in training or trials. Production for 1942–44 was planned to exceed 200 boats annually. Karl Dönitz, running the Kriegsmarine's U-boat arm, would finally have the numbers needed to run the tonnage war he wanted against the Allies. Meanwhile, the British had, at last, assembled the solution to the U-boat peril. Its weapons and detection systems had improved to the stage that maritime patrol aircraft could launch deadly attacks on U-boats day and night. Airborne radar, Leigh lights, Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) and the Fido homing torpedo all turned the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft into a submarine-killer, while shore and ship-based technologies such as high-frequency direction finding and signals intelligence could now help aircraft find enemy U-boats. Following its entry into the war in 1941, the United States had also thrown its industrial muscle behind the campaign, supplying VLR Liberator bombers to the RAF and escort carriers to the Royal Navy. The US Navy also operated anti-submarine patrol blimps and VLR aircraft in the southern and western Atlantic, and sent its own escort carriers to guard convoys. This book, the second of two volumes, explores the climactic events of the Battle of the Atlantic, and reveals how air power – both maritime patrol aircraft and carrier aircraft – ultimately proved to be the Allies' most important weapon in one of the most bitterly fought naval campaigns of World War II.

A new history of the most crucial few months of the Arctic Convoys, when Germany's air power forced the Allies to retreat to the cover of winter. Between spring and autumn 1942, Germany was winning the battle of the Arctic Convoys. Half of PQ-15 was sunk in May, PQ-17 was virtually obliterated in July, and in September 30 percent of PQ-18 was sunk. The Allies were forced to suspend the convoys until December, when the long Arctic nights would shield them. Mark Lardas argues that in 1942, it was Luftwaffe air power that made the difference. With convoys sailing in endless daylight, German strike aircraft now equipped and trained for torpedo attacks, and bases in northern Norway available, the Luftwaffe could wreak havoc. Three-quarters of the losses of PQ-18 were due to air attacks. But in November, the Luftwaffe was redeployed south to challenge the Allied landings in North Africa, and the advantage was lost. Despite that, the Allies never again sailed an Arctic convoy in the summer months. Fully illustrated with archive photos, striking new artwork, maps and diagrams, this is the remarkable history of the Luftwaffe's last strategic victory of World War II.

The story of the battleship Tirpitz--Bismarck's sister ship--and the desperate Allied efforts to destroy it . . . After the Royal Navy's bloody high seas campaign to kill the mighty Bismarck, the Allies were left with an uncomfortable truth--the German behemoth had a twin sister. Slightly larger than her sibling, the Tirpitz was equally capable of destroying any other battleship afloat, as well as wreak havoc on Allied troop and supply convoys. For the next three and a half years the Allies launched a variety of attacks to remove Germany's last serious surface threat. The Germans, for their part, had learned not to pit their super battleships against the strength of the entire Home Fleet outside the range of protecting aircraft. Thus they kept Tirpitz hidden within fjords along the Norwegian coast, like a Damocles Sword hanging over the Allies' maritime jugular, forcing the British to assume the offensive. This strategy paid dividends in July 1942 when the Tirpitz merely stirred from its berth, compelling the Royal Navy to abandon a Murmansk-bound convoy called PQ-17 in order to confront the leviathan. The convoy was then ripped apart by the Luftwaffe and U-boats, while the Tirpitz returned to its fjord. In 1943, the British launched a flotilla of midget submarines against the Tirpitz, losing all six of the subs while only lightly damaging the battleship. Aircraft attacked repeatedly, from carriers and both British and Soviet bases, suffering losses--including an escort carrier--while proving unable to completely knock out the mighty warship. Trying an indirect approach, the British launched one of the war's most daring commando raids--at St. Nazaire--in order to knock out the last drydock in Europe capable of servicing the Tirpitz. Of over 600 commandos and sailors in the raid, more than half were lost during an all-night battle that succeeded, at least, in knocking out the drydock. It was not until November 1944 that the Tirpitz finally succumbed to British aircraft armed with 10,000-lb Tallboy bombs, the ship capsizing at last with the loss of 1,000 sailors. In this book military historians Niklas Zetterling and Michael Tamelander, authors of Bismarck: The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship, illuminate the strategic implications and dramatic battles surrounding the Tirpitz, a ship that may have had greater influence on the course of World War II than her more famous sister.

A history and analysis of one of the most dramatic moments in both air power and naval history. With the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse, no battleship was safe on the open ocean, and the aircraft took its crown as the most powerful maritime weapon In late 1941, war was looming with Japan, and Britain's empire in southeast Asia was at risk. The British government decided to send Force Z, which included the state-of-the-art battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse, to bolster the naval defences of Singapore, and provide a mighty naval deterrent to Japanese aggression. These two powerful ships arrived in Singapore on 2 December - five days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But crucially, they lacked air cover. On 9 December Japanese scout planes detected Force Z's approach in the Gulf of Thailand. Unlike at Pearl Harbor, battleships at sea could manoeuvre, and their anti-aircraft defences were ready. But it did no good. The Japanese dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers were the most advanced in the world, and the battle was one-sided. Strategically, the loss of Force Z was a colossal disaster for the British, and one that effectively marked the end of its empire in the East. But even more importantly, the sinking marked the last time that battleships were considered to be the masters of the ocean. From that day on, air power rather than big guns would be the deciding factor in naval warfare.