"Published in the United Kingdom in 2013 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd"--Title page verso.

The Cold War may be over, but the United States is still practicing Cold War foreign policies. From the Persian Gulf to El Salvador, from Bosnia to Somalia, U.S. policymakers continue to rely on force, threats, arms, and military aid. A fundamental redefinition of national security–beyond war and militarization, beyond bilateralism, beyond sovereign states–is long overdue. In Security Without War, a dynamic author team lays out new principles and policies for the United States to adopt in a post-Cold War world. Shuman and Harvey encourage Americans to take account of all threats (not just military ones), to emphasize preventing conflicts over winning wars, to enhance every nation's security (including that of its enemies), to favour multilateral approaches over bilateral ones, and to promote greater citizen participation in foreign policy. Throughout, they show how military, political, economic, and environmental security interests are all linked–and how emphasizing one over the others can undermine the nation's safety. Security Without War brings together for the first time the major elements of post-Cold War security thought. The authors show how a new framework for U.S. international relations can enhance U.S.–and indeed, global–security at a substantially lower cost.

This innovative argument shows the consequences of increased aversion to international war for foreign and military policy.

In the name of international and domestic security, billions of dollars are wasted on unproductive military spending in both developed and developing countries, when millions are starving and living without basic human needs. This book contains articles relating to military spending, military industrial establishments, and peace keeping.

A former Deputy Attorney General of the United States argues that we must preserve our civil liberties and democratic values while fighting terrorism. On September 11, 2001, the United States began to consider the terrorist threat in a new light. Terrorism was no longer something that happened in other countries on other continents but became a pressing domestic concern for the US government and American citizens. The nation suddenly faced a protracted struggle. In Terrorism, Freedom, and Security, Philip Heymann continues the discussion of responses to terrorism that he began in his widely read Terrorism and America. He argues that diplomacy, intelligence, and international law should play a larger role than military action in our counterterrorism policy; instead of waging "war" against terrorism, the United States needs a broader range of policies. Heymann believes that many of the policies adopted since September 11--including trials before military tribunals, secret detentions, and the subcontracting of interrogation to countries where torture is routine--are at odds with American political and legal traditions and create disturbing precedents. Americans should not be expected to accept apparently indefinite infringements on civil liberties and the abandonment of such constitutional principles as separation of powers and the rule of law. Heymann believes that the United States can guard against the continuing threat of terrorism while keeping its traditional democratic values in place.

In Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, author Micah Zenko presents a new concept to capture and illuminate the phenomenon: "Discrete Military Operations."

The United States has used military force short of war as an instrument of diplomacy on many occasions and in many areas of the world in the years since the Second World War. This book describes and analyzes the circumstances accompanying 215 shows of force and examines how effective these actions were in helping to attain U.S. foreign policy objectives. Which type of force (air, ground, naval) was most often used? What did the forces do and how effective were they? Of what significance was Soviet involvement when U.S. military power was called upon to influence events? Was the threat presented by the alerting or deployment of strategic nuclear forces or by very large conventional forces especially telling? How clear is it that a desired effect was in fact caused by the demonstration of force? Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan explore these and other questions, examining also such elements as a President's domestic popularity and personal diplomacy preceding or during crises that led to U.S. military demonstrations. Complementing their analysis are five sets of case studies describing ten instances of the use of American military power to influence events in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean. The case studies—by David K. Hall, William B. Quandt, Jerome N. Slater, Robert M. Slusser, and Philip Windsor—focus on the reasons for U.S. action and the methods adopted, on the behavior of other parties, and on the relation between the use of force and the resolution of the crisis. The book's main conclusion is that the demonstrative use of U.S. armed forces has often stabilized a deteriorating situation enough to avoid further deterioration, relieved domestic and international pressure for more drastic and possibly self-defeating action, and gained time for diplomacy to achieve a more lasting remedy.