In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?" In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, and Money has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

In this book, it is explained that despite a current drop in the number of deaths, terrorism should still be considered a serious and widespread problem. However, the responses to this phenomenon are often more problematic from a long-term perspective. With the human rights framework under serious pressure, this edited volume offers a timely, important and critical in-depth analysis of human dignity and human security challenges in the lead-up, and in the responses, to current forms of terrorism. It aims to map how human dignity and human security can be secured and how law can constitute a source of trust at a time when Europe and the rest of the world continue to be plagued by terrorism. The authors are both established names and upcoming talent in this fastchanging and exciting field of law. They thoroughly analyse a variety of topical subjects, in more conceptual chapters—for example calling for the humanisation of the security discourse—and in highly practical contributions, in which for instance the Kafkaesque situation in which rendition and torture victim Abu Zubaydah still finds himself today is considered. This book, which focuses on, but is not limited to the situation in Western countries, aims to inspire not only academics—through further theorisation on the sometimes elusive but important concepts of human dignity and human security—but also practitioners working in the field of countering terrorism. It will hopefully convince them (even more) that following a human rights approach will be indispensable in securing human dignity and human security for all. Even—or in fact: especially—in times of terrorism. Christophe Paulussen is a Senior Researcher in the Research Department of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in The Hague, The Netherlands and Martin Scheinin is Professor of International Law and Human Rights in the Department of Law of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in international politics, representing a new type of threat that could not easily be anticipated or prevented through state-based structures of security alone. Opening up interdisciplinary conversations between strategic, economic, ethical and legal approaches to global terrorism, this edited book recognises a fundamental issue: while major crises initially tend to reinforce old thinking and behavioural patterns, they also allow societies to challenge and overcome entrenched habits, thereby creating the foundations for a new and perhaps more peaceful future. This volume addresses the issues that are at stake in this dual process of political closure, and therefore rethinks how states can respond to terrorist threats. The contributors range from leading conceptual theorists to policy-oriented analysts, from senior academics to junior researchers. The book explores how terrorism has had a profound impact on how security is being understood and implemented, and uses a range of hitherto neglected sources of insight, such as those between political, economic, legal and ethical factors, to examine the nature and meaning of security in a rapidly changing world.

When in 1492 Christopher Columbus set out for Asia but instead happened upon the Bahamas, Cuba, and Hispaniola, his error inaugurated a specifically colonial modernity. This is, Security and Terror contends, the colonial modernity within which we still live. And its enduring features are especially vivid in the current American century, a moment marked by a permanent War on Terror and pervasive capitalist dispossession. Resisting the assumption that September 11, 2001, constituted a historical rupture, Eli Jelly-Schapiro traces the political and philosophic genealogies of security and terror—from the settler-colonization of the New World to the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. A history of the present crisis, Security and Terror also examines how that history has been registered and reckoned with in significant works of contemporary fiction and theory—in novels by Teju Cole, Mohsin Hamid, Junot Díaz, and Roberto Bolaño, and in the critical interventions of Jean Baudrillard, Giorgio Agamben, Judith Butler, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and others. In this richly interdisciplinary inquiry, Jelly-Schapiro reveals how the erasure of colonial pasts enables the perpetual reproduction of colonial culture.

Tracing the history of government intrusions on Constitutional rights in response to threats from abroad, Cole and Dempsey warn that a society in which civil liberties are sacrificed in the name of national security is in fact less secure than one in which they are upheld. A new chapter includes a discussion of domestic spying, preventive detention, the many court challenges to post-9/11 abuses, implementation of the PATRIOT ACT, and efforts to reestablish the checks and balances left behind in the rush to strengthen governmental powers.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?" In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, and Money has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.