Recent conflicts such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom highlight the logistics difficulties the United States faces by relying on foreign access and infrastructure and large supply stockpiles ashore to support expeditionary operations. The Navy's transformational vision for the future, Sea Power 21, involves Seabasing as a way to address these difficulties by projecting and sustaining joint forces globally from the sea. This study analyzes logistics flow to, within and from a Sea Base to an objective, and the architectures and systems needed to rapidly deploy and sustain a brigade-size force. Utilizing the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), this study incorporates a systems engineering framework to examine current systems, programs of record and proposed systems out to the year 2025. Several capability gaps that hamper a brigade-size force from seizing the initiative anywhere in the world within a 10-day period point to a need for dedicated lift assets, such as high-speed surface ships or lighter-than-air ships, to facilitate the rapid formation of the Sea Base. Additionally, the study identifies the need for large-payload/high-speed or load-once/direct-to- objective connector capabilities to minimize the number of at-sea transfers required to employ such a force from the Sea Base in 10 hrs. With these gaps addressed, the Joint Expeditionary Brigade is supportable from the Sea Base.

Recent conflicts such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom highlight the logistics difficulties the United States faces by relying on foreign access and infrastructure and large supply stockpiles ashore to support expeditionary operations. The Navy's transformational vision for the future, Sea Power 21, involves Seabasing as a way to address these difficulties by projecting and sustaining joint forces globally from the sea. This study analyzes logistics flow to, within and from a Sea Base to an objective, and the architectures and systems needed to rapidly deploy and sustain a brigade-size force. Utilizing the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), this study incorporates a systems engineering framework to examine current systems, programs of record and proposed systems out to the year 2025. Several capability gaps that hamper a brigade-size force from seizing the initiative anywhere in the world within a 10-day period point to a need for dedicated lift assets, such as high-speed surface ships or lighter-than-air ships, to facilitate the rapid formation of the Sea Base. Additionally, the study identifies the need for large-payload/high-speed or load-once/direct-to- objective connector capabilities to minimize the number of at-sea transfers required to employ such a force from the Sea Base in 10 hrs. With these gaps addressed, the Joint Expeditionary Brigade is supportable from the Sea Base.

At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council (NRC) conducted a study to determine the technological requirements, operational changes, and combat service support structure necessary to land and support forces ashore under the newly evolving Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. The Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, operating under the auspices of the NRC's Naval Studies Board, was appointed to (1) evaluate the packaging, sealift, and distribution network and identify critical nodes and operations that affect timely insertion of fuels, ammunition, water, medical supplies, food, vehicles, and maintenance parts and tool blocks; (2) determine specific changes required to relieve these critical nodes and support forces ashore, from assault through follow-on echelonment; and (3) present implementable changes to existing support systems, and suggest the development of innovative new systems and technologies to land and sustain dispersed units from the shoreline to 200 miles inland. In the course of its study, the committee soon learned that development of OMFTS is not yet at a stage to allow, directly, detailed answers to many of these questions. As a result, the committee addressed the questions in terms of the major logistics functions of force deployment, force sustainment, and force medical support, and the fundamental logistics issues related to each of these functions.

The initial finding of this study was that, under the conditions used for the MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives, the sea base has little sustainment capability beyond that needed for the portion of a MEB that is projected ashore for operations."--BOOK JACKET.

Sea Basing, a fundamental concept in Sea Power 21, the Navy's operational vision for the 21st century, is designed to help joint force commanders accelerate deployment and employment of naval power and to enhance seaborne positioning of joint assets. It will do so by minimizing the need to build up a logistics stockpile ashore, reducing the operational demand for sealift and airlift assets, and permitting forward positioning of joint forces for immediate employment. The cornerstone of sea-based logistics on the brigade scale is the Maritime Pre-positioning Force and its future version, the MPF(F). The Maritime Pre-positioning Force currently consists of three forward deployed squadrons of maritime pre-positioning ships, each with five or six vessels with weapons, supplies, and equipment sufficient to support a force about the size of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for up to 30 days. The MPF(F) will be composed of multiple ship types designed to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade and provide functions not currently provided by the MPF, such as at-sea arrival, assembly, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of Expeditionary Forces, as well as Expeditionary Strike Group interoperability. Current plans call for an MPF(F) squadron comprising three large-deck amphibious ships, three Mobile Landing Platform transport ships, and eight cargo ships.

The availability of land bases from which to launch and maintain military, diplomatic, and humanitarian relief operations is becoming increasingly uncertain because of physical or political constraints. The ability to operate from a sea base, therefore, is likely to become more and more important. The Defense Science Board recently concluded that Sea Basing will be a critical future joint military capability and that DOD should proceed to develop such capability. Following the DSB report, the Navy requested that the National Research Council (NRC) convene a workshop to assess the science and technology base, both inside and outside the Navy, for developing Sea Basing and to identify R&D for supporting future concepts. This report of the workshop includes an examination of Sea Basing operational concepts; ship and aircraft technology available to make Sea Basing work; and issues involved in creating the sea base as a joint system of systems.