Despite over a dozen years of talk, the Soviet and now Russian military has not undergone a true military reform. What did happen was a form of degeneration and disintegration, but not a methodically planned and directed transformation and/or adaptation to new conditions. Consequently, defense policy, in all of its ramifications, has remained essentially unreformed and remains an impediment to Russia's accommodation to today's strategic realities. This study presents an assessment of Russian defense policy as Russia has begun, in late 1997 and 1998, to grapple with the enormous challenges that inhere in the process of military reform. The outcome of what can only be a protracted process will have profound implications, not only for Russia, but for its neighbors and partners, chief among them being the United States. Given the coincidence of this reform process with what many believe to be a revolution in military affairs and the continuing urgency of reducing nuclear threats, the ongoing observation of Russian military policies remains very important for the United States.

The author analyzes the so-called military reform of the former Soviet and now Russian military forces. He assesses Russian defense policy as Russia has begun lately to grapple with the enormous challenges that are inherent in the process of military reform. The outcome of this process will have profound implications, not only for Russia, but the its neighbors and partners, chief among them being the United States. Given the coincidence of this reform process with what many believe to be a revolution in military affairs and the continuing urgency of reducing nuclear threats, the ongoing observation of Russian military policies remains very important for the United States.

This book examines reform of the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. It explores the legacy of the Soviet era, explaining why - at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union - radical reform was long overdue in the wake of changing military technology, new economic and political realities, and the emergence of new threats and challenges. It discusses the problems encountered by Gorbachev in his attempts to promote military reform in the late 1980s, and goes on to analyse in detail the mixed fortunes of the policies of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. It describes how the onset of war in Chechnya in 1994 provided clear evidence of the weaknesses of the Russian military in modern conflicts, and shows that although the Chechnya debacle did provide some impetus for reforms in the armed forces in 1997-98, the momentum was not continued under the Putin government. It argues that Putin’s policies of bolstering central control over all aspects of decision making has left untouched many key problems facing the Russian military, including infighting between different force structures, lack of transparency and independent scrutiny over defence spending, and absence of consensus on the main threats to Russia and optimum force posture. Moreover, it argues that in his attempts to concentrate all means of control to a corrupt and inefficient Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has deprived himself of all alternative channels of independent scrutiny, control and oversight, thus exacerbating the problems that continue to plague the Russian military.

Twelve reports, studies, and documents provide special insight into the Russian military, with detailed discussions of vital topics which are of particular interest during the ongoing crisis involving Russian aggression against Crimea and the Ukraine. Reports in this compendium: Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests * Russia's Emergency Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu - A Bio-Sketch * The Brain of the Russian Army: Futuristic Visions Tethered by the Past * Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry * Russia's Demographic Crisis and the Military: Strategic Impact and Security Implications in the 21st Century * Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends * Russian-American Security Cooperation after St. Petersburg: Challenges and Opportunities * Understanding Security Cooperation: A Comparison of the US and Russian Systems of Security Cooperation * The Bear Facts: Russians Appraise the Stryker Brigade Concept * Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow * Russia's Armed Forces on the Brink of Reform * The United States and Russia into the 21st Century.Russia's armed forces now number less than 1 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in 1986. In the 1990s and much of the 2000s, troop readiness, training, morale, and discipline suffered, and most arms industries became antiquated. Russia's economic growth in recent years has supported greatly increased defense spending to restructure the armed forces and improve their quality. Mismanagement, changes in plans, corruption, manning issues, and economic constraints have complicated this restructuring.If the 'state is the soul writ large,' then Sergey Shoygu serves as an apt metaphor for Russia today. Shoygu was trained as an engineer in the Soviet system and arrived in Moscow just as the USSR began to fall apart. For more than 20 years, as the Minister of Emergency Services, he served as Russia's 'first responder.' In this capacity, Shoygu helped to deal with natural and man-made disasters, gaining an intimate knowledge of the country's domestic challenges and the reputation of a pragmatic and effective leader. As a resourceful minister and politician, he also profited from his proximity to the Kremlin elite, strengthening regional and national ties and developing sharp survival skills to ensure his official longevity.Clearly, the rebuilding of Russian military strength is a high priority of President Vladimir Putin, and one to which he and his subordinates have devoted considerable time and resources. Therefore, inattention to Russian defense policy is unwise and even dangerous because it causes us to overlook potentially major changes not only in Russian policy, but in international affairs more generally. Dr. Irina Isakova's monograph represents an effort to overcome our neglect and provide readers a comprehensive account of the defense reform, or what Moscow calls optimization. It encompasses virtually all aspects of the reform of the forces, their organizational structure, the financing of the military, reform of the defense industrial sector, etc. This topic is both timely and particularly relevant and provides a significant addition to the series.The demographic crisis in Russia limits the policy options available to its political and military leaders and creates havoc for the international community as to how it could and should deal with Russia as a major power on the world stage. The post-September 11th environment requires greater cooperation and alliances among nations to combat a growing number of trans-national and asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, insurgencies, nuclear proliferation, and the trafficking of drugs and people. A strong and stable Russia is a critical component in the on-going efforts of the free world to re-shape the global security landscape to meet the new and emerging threats of the 21St century.

The very title of this monograph is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, only 3 years are left until the 21st century. This is too short a time to forecast or propose any serious change in a huge and complicated organization like the armed forces of a great power. On the other hand, each century lasts 100 years, and without a crystal ball it is impossible to predict the evolution of armed forces over such a long period, least of all at a time of dynamic and revolutionary shifts in the world's technologies, economics, the geopolitical scene, and the relative military balance between nations. Hence, in addressing the prospects for Russia's armed forces, it seems realistic to discuss the future some 10-15 years ahead, to 2010. This is an appropriate timeframe for the fulfillment of large cycles of economic and military development in Russia and in other major states. It allows consideration of the possible realignment of principal international coalitions, and it provides time to implement major weapons programs. Accordingly, with a timeframe of 10-15 years, future trends are sufficiently imbedded in present reality to be discussed without entering the world of science fiction. Present policy choices may tangibly affect developments in 10-15 years. Besides, as presently being considered, the Russian military reform initiative is planned to proceed through its first two stages through the year 2005. What happens in that process will define how the Russian military proceeds from 2005 through 2010, the third stage of the reform initiative. Within this temporal framework, the following monograph discusses Russia's military alternatives appropriate to its new security requirements, projected economic conditions, technological capabilities, and possible changes in the international situation which might affect Russia and its relationship with other major powers. Even at that, many issues relevant to the subject, like industrial and financial projections, problems of defense conversion, possible advances in military technology, demographic considerations, the draft and mobilization, have to be left out or discussed only superficially. All of these issues are part of the comprehensive notion of military reform; something larger than the narrow notion of reforming the armed forces. In this monograph, based strictly on unclassified sources, the latter topic will be the subject of analysis.