Russian Negotiating Strategy Analytic Case Studies From Salt & Start

Whether bargaining for strategic arms reductions, rights to drill Siberian oil fields, or an apartment in Moscow, Americans are faced across the table by a distinct Russian negotiating style. What are its chief characteristics, and how can U.S. diplomats and businesspeople best deal with it as they pursue their own objectives? Jerrold Schecter explores these questions with a wealth of personal experience as a former government official, journalist, and corporate executive. His insights, deepened by his working knowledge of the Russian language, also draw on the testimony of U.S. and former Soviet diplomats and negotiators. As he examines the historical and cultural underpinnings of contemporary Russian negotiating behavior, Schecter finds that the Bolshevik legacy remains largely intact despite the Soviet Union's demise. A step-by-step examination of the negotiating process, based on unique inside accounts from retired Soviet officials, exposes the areas of greatest continuity in Russian interests and style, as well as areas of change. Russian Negotiating Behavior also identifies counterstrategies that western negotiators can use to protect their interests, and it outlines the requirements for doing business in Russia's nascent market economy.

Contributing Authors Include John R. Deane, John N. Hazard, Sidney S. Alderman, And Many Others.

Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties. This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R.H. Burn) and has received much praise, including: “As advances in technology usher in a new age of weaponry, future negotiators would benefit from reading Rose Gottemoeller’s memoir of the process leading to the most significant arms control agreement of recent decades.” —Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State “Rose Gottemoeller’s book on the New START negotiations is the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia. These treaties played a key role in keeping the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union from breaking out into a civilization-ending war. But her story of the New START negotiation is no dry academic treatise. She tells with wit and charm the human story of the negotiators, as well as the critical issues involved. Rose’s book is an important and well-told story about the last nuclear treaty negotiated between the US and Russia.” —William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense “This book is important, but not just because it tells you about a very significant past, but also because it helps you understand the future.” — George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State

Pt. 1. International negotiations. -- Pt. 2. Negotiation techniques used around the world. -- Pt. 3. Negotiate right in any of 50 countries.

Negotiating is something that we all do, whether at work or at home. But what if we come across someone who just won’t give in? How can we defend ourselves against manipulation? And how do we say ‘no’ without compromising a deal? Legend has it that the Kremlin school of negotiation was born in Russia in the 1920s, under the rule of Joseph Stalin, and it still has its followers and advocates to this day. Using the official Kremlin method and years of business experience, Igor Ryzov guides us through the most effective techniques in negotiating terms that satisfy both parties. From knowing how to get the most information about a potential deal, to how to read your counterpart, and advice on defusing tension, this comprehensive handbook ensures a mutually acceptable resolution that leaves you walking away successful. With practical examples, and exercises to hone your negotiating skills, The Kremlin School of Negotiation will offer the tools you need to master any deal.

Since the signing of the New START Treaty in 2010, U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control has gone backwards rather than forwards, despite multiple efforts and differing approaches by successive U.S administrations. If arms control is to remain a tool of national security policymaking, the end of a largely lost decade seems appropriate for some degree of self-reflection and self-criticism on the U.S. side as to why no progress has been made. Primary blame for the backsliding can be placed squarely at the feet of the Russian side. It laid out tough positions, ones which have only grown more entrenched over time as its list of grievances against the United States lengthened, and failed to respond to repeated U.S. overtures. But a tough negotiating partner is nothing new, and blame should also fall at the feet of the U.S. side for failing to understand and adapt to the signals coming from the other side of the negotiating table. This is particularly true regarding the mindset of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his views on nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control. None of these signals were hidden. The Soviet-Russian negotiating style, specifically with regards to arms control, has been well studied over the past five decades. Putin's views on the bilateral relationship, perceived slights, and impediments to further progress are all well-reported. A greater understanding of the Russian side does not necessarily make forward progress easier for the United States, but it should suggest ways for future negotiators to avoid the pitfalls of the past 10 years, to get their own house in order to better prepare for a future negotiation, and to revitalize and improve the U.S. arms control bureaucracy.