Military reform has featured prominently on the agenda of many countries since the end of the Cold War necessitated a re-evaluation of the strategic role of the armed forces, and nowhere more publicly than in Russia. Not since the 1920s have the Russian Armed Forces undergone such fundamental change. President Boris Yeltsin and his successor Vladimir Putin have both grappled with the issue, with varying degrees of success. An international team of experts here consider the essential features of Russian military reform in the decade since the disintegration of the USSR. Fluctuations in the purpose and priorities of the reform process are traced, as well as the many factors influencing change. Chapters analyse the development of Russia's security policy, structural reform of the services, the social impact of military service and experience of military conflict in Chechnya. Critical evaluations of the impact of social change on the Russian Armed Forces' capabilities and expectations complement the analysis of the on-going debate. Russian Military Reform, 1992-2002 will prove invaluable to all those interested in civil-military relationships and international security as well as to students of military theory and practice.

This book examines reform of the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. It explores the legacy of the Soviet era, explaining why - at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union - radical reform was long overdue in the wake of changing military technology, new economic and political realities, and the emergence of new threats and challenges. It discusses the problems encountered by Gorbachev in his attempts to promote military reform in the late 1980s, and goes on to analyse in detail the mixed fortunes of the policies of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. It describes how the onset of war in Chechnya in 1994 provided clear evidence of the weaknesses of the Russian military in modern conflicts, and shows that although the Chechnya debacle did provide some impetus for reforms in the armed forces in 1997-98, the momentum was not continued under the Putin government. It argues that Putin’s policies of bolstering central control over all aspects of decision making has left untouched many key problems facing the Russian military, including infighting between different force structures, lack of transparency and independent scrutiny over defence spending, and absence of consensus on the main threats to Russia and optimum force posture. Moreover, it argues that in his attempts to concentrate all means of control to a corrupt and inefficient Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has deprived himself of all alternative channels of independent scrutiny, control and oversight, thus exacerbating the problems that continue to plague the Russian military.

The very title of this monograph is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, only 3 years are left until the 21st century. This is too short a time to forecast or propose any serious change in a huge and complicated organization like the armed forces of a great power. On the other hand, each century lasts 100 years, and without a crystal ball it is impossible to predict the evolution of armed forces over such a long period, least of all at a time of dynamic and revolutionary shifts in the world's technologies, economics, the geopolitical scene, and the relative military balance between nations. Hence, in addressing the prospects for Russia's armed forces, it seems realistic to discuss the future some 10-15 years ahead, to 2010. This is an appropriate timeframe for the fulfillment of large cycles of economic and military development in Russia and in other major states. It allows consideration of the possible realignment of principal international coalitions, and it provides time to implement major weapons programs. Accordingly, with a timeframe of 10-15 years, future trends are sufficiently imbedded in present reality to be discussed without entering the world of science fiction. Present policy choices may tangibly affect developments in 10-15 years. Besides, as presently being considered, the Russian military reform initiative is planned to proceed through its first two stages through the year 2005. What happens in that process will define how the Russian military proceeds from 2005 through 2010, the third stage of the reform initiative. Within this temporal framework, the following monograph discusses Russia's military alternatives appropriate to its new security requirements, projected economic conditions, technological capabilities, and possible changes in the international situation which might affect Russia and its relationship with other major powers. Even at that, many issues relevant to the subject, like industrial and financial projections, problems of defense conversion, possible advances in military technology, demographic considerations, the draft and mobilization, have to be left out or discussed only superficially. All of these issues are part of the comprehensive notion of military reform; something larger than the narrow notion of reforming the armed forces. In this monograph, based strictly on unclassified sources, the latter topic will be the subject of analysis.

This study of the Russian army and how it has fared in the uncertain transitional period since independence in December 1991 provides the basis for understanding its present and potential future role in the new political developments within Russia. Following an historical overview of Russia′s security agenda and an examination of the Russian/Soviet army′s tradition of involvement in politics, the book then examines Russia′s current security interests and the role of the army in protecting them. Geopolitical perspectives are linked to the security issues of the `Near Abroad′, and to the nuclear dimension of security. Pavel K Baev then considers the question of the feasibility of political control over the Russian army. The problem of the politicization of the army is followed through the interlinked issues of stalled military reform and a drastically reduced military budget. Baev examines the current military role of the army with case studies on conflict management in the Caucasus and the army′s performance in the role of peace-keeper in the Chechen War. Finally, the place of the army in Russia′s peace-keeping activities within a broader European context is examined.

Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: Russia, grade: A-, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna - School of International Studies, course: Seminar: Russia, Ukraine and the CEEC, language: English, abstract: The internal state of the army reveals that far-reaching and profound military reform cannot be achieved by pure arms build-up. It becomes clear that a new military strategy and a meaningful military reform plan are needed in order to improve its state. Sustainable change can only be achieved through numerous multi-facetted reforms that reach the military at its core. It is therefore advisable for these reform plans to not only come from the outside (namely the political administration) but additionally be co-developed within the army itself. Only in such way will it be possible to implement them fully and to minimize inefficiency, corruption, vagueness and violence, archaic structures of hierarchy and an attitude that reminds of vested rights. Finally, it has to be mentioned that the picture painted in the course of this paper is a rather negative one as its purpose is to outline weaknesses. Of course, the debated flaws and deficits are problematic and need to be addressed. Nevertheless, experts are divided when it comes to the measurement of the strength of Russia's military.

Although the role of the military in Russia has changed significantly since Soviet times, it continues to exert great influence on Russian politics, economy and society. This book presents a comprehensive overview of current developments related to Russia’s military sector. It considers recent military reforms, personnel issues, the defence industry and procurement, the defence economy, changes in civil-military relations, and the continuing huge economic significance of Russia’s military-industrial complex. It explores difficulties currently faced by the Russian military, including problems of recruitment and leadership; analyses Russian security policy - including in relation to Europe and more widely; and discusses the lessons learned by the Russian military as a result of the recent war in Georgia. The book argues that reform attempts have often been thwarted by bureaucracy, economy, strategy, manpower, weapon systems and leadership. The book concludes by assessing likely future developments.