What has been the role of rising powers in the Arab–Israeli conflict? What does this tell us about rising powers and conflict management as well as rising powers’ behavior in the world more generally? This book studies the way that five rising powers—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the BRICS countries—have approached the conflict since it first became internationalized in 1947. Conflict management consists of different methods, from peacekeeping to mediation and the use of economic incentives and sanctions and (non)enforcement of international legal decisions. What distinguishes them is whether they are active or passive: active measures seek to transform a conflict and resolve it; passive measures seek to ameliorate its worst effects, but do not change their underlying causes. Since 1947 rising powers’ active or passive use of these methods has coincided with their rise and fall and rise again in the international system. Those rises and falls are tied to global changes, including the Cold War, the emergence of the Third World, economic and ideological retrenchment of the 1980s and 1990s and the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity after 2000. In summary, rising powers’ management of the Arab–Israeli conflict has shifted from active to more passive methods since 1947. Their actions have occurred alongside two key changes within the conflict. One is the shift from a primarily state-based conflict between Israel and the Arabs to one that is more ethnic and territorial in scope, between Israel and the Palestinians. The other the emergence of the Oslo framework which has frozen power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians since 1993. By pursuing the Oslo process, rising powers have separated conflict management from developing ‘normal’ diplomatic and economic exchanges with Israel and the Palestinians. In adopting this more passive conflict management approach, rising powers are disregarding both emerging alternatives that may potentially transform the conflict’s dynamics (including involvement with civil society actors like the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement) and undertaking more active efforts at conflict resolution—and presenting themselves as global powers.

By studying the actions of the rising powers in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1947, this book identifies active and passive approaches to conflict management. Through them, this book examines the extent to which these actions help or hinder aspirations to greater global influence.

How do aspiring and established rising global powers respond to conflict? Using China, the book studies its response to wars and rivalries in the Middle East from the Cold War to the present. Since the People’s Republic was established in 1949, China has long been involved in the Middle East and its conflicts, from exploiting or avoiding them to their management, containment or resolution. Using a conflict and peace studies angle, Burton adopts a broad perspective on Chinese engagement by looking at its involvement in the region’s conflicts including Israel/Palestine, Iraq before and after 2003, Sudan and the Darfur crisis, the Iranian nuclear deal, the Gulf crisis and the wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The book reveals how a rising global and non-Western power handles the challenges associated with both violent and nonviolent conflict and the differences between limiting and reducing violence alongside other ways to eliminate the causes of conflict and grievance. Contributing to the wider discipline of International Relations and peace and conflict studies, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of peace and conflict studies, Chinese foreign policy and the politics and international relations of the Middle East.

Israel's relations with each of the superpowers was determined by global factors. The dilemma facing Israel was how to reconcile its interests with those of the United States, having failed to do so with the Soviet Union. Moreover, throughout the cold war the United States considered Israel a burden rather than an asset and had to accommodate support for Israel with keeping the Arab states within the western orbit. Partisan policy could have dealt a mortal blow to the fundamental assumption of American global strategy. Namely that the Middle East should not be allowed to become a cold war arena. The book shows how the fledgling state of Israel had to manoeuvre between the superpowers to survive.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the most intense and intractable international conflicts of modern times. This book is about the historical roots of that conflict. It re-examines the history of 1948, the war in which the newly-born state of Israel defeated the Palestinians and the regular Arab armies of the neighbouring states so decisively. The book includes chapters on all the principal participants, on the reasons for the Palestinian exodus, and on the political and moral consequences of the war. The chapters are written by leading Arab, Israeli and western scholars who draw on primary sources in all relevant languages to offer alternative interpretations and new insights into this defining moment in Middle East history. The result is a major contribution to the literature on the 1948 war. It will command a wide audience from among students and general readers with an interest in the region.