This Element documents the diversity and dissensus of scholarship on the political resource curse, diagnoses its sources, and directs scholarly attention towards what the authors believe will be more fruitful avenues of future research. In the scholarship to date, there is substantial regional heterogeneity and substantial evidence denying the existence of a political resource curse. This dissensus is located in theory, measure, and research design, especially regarding measurement error and endogenous selection. The work then turns to strategies for reconnecting research on resource politics to the broader literature on democratic development. Finally, the results of the authors' own research is presented, showing that a set of historically contingent events in the Middle East and North Africa are at the root of what has been mistaken for a global political resource curse.

This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each represents a significant departure from the conventional resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their respective developmental trajectories since independence demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent fiscal regimes.

Modernization theory : does economic development cause democratization? / Jose Antonio Cheibub and James Raymond Vreeland -- Dependency theory / James Mahoney and Diana Rodriguez-Franco -- Structuralism / Elliott Green -- Political development / Robert H. Bates -- The Washington Consensus and the new political economy of economic reform / Kevin Morrison -- Penury traps and prosperity tales : why some countries escape poverty while others do not / M. Steven Fish -- Culture, politics and development / Michael Woolcock -- Religion, politics and economic development : synergies and disconnects / Katherine Marshall -- Does inequality harm economic development and democracy? : accounting for missing values, noncomparable observations, and endogeneity / Christian Houle -- Ethnicity and development / Nic Cheeseman -- Civil conflict and development / Håvard Hegre -- The politics of the resource curse : a review / Michael L. Ross -- Taxation and development / Mick Moore -- How do governments build capabilities to do great things? : ten cases, two competing explanations, one large research agenda / Matt Andrews -- Leadership and the politics of development / Adrian Leftwich and Heather Lyne De Ver -- Colonialism and development in africa / Leander Heldring and James A. Robinson -- Investment and debt / Layna Mosley -- The role of the state in harnessing trade-and-investment for development purposes / Theodore H. Moran -- International financial institutions and market liberalization in the developing world / Stephen C. Nelson -- Foreign aid and democratization in developing countries / Danielle Resnick -- Organizing for prosperity : collective action, political parties, and the political economy of development / Philip Keefer -- Missing links in the institutional chain / Anirudh Krishna -- The comparative politics of service delivery in developing countries / Evan S. Lieberman -- Party systems and the politics of development / Allen Hicken -- Populism and political representation / Kenneth M. Roberts -- Africa's political economy in the contemporary era / Peter M. Lewis -- The politics of development in Latin America and East Asia / James W. McGuire -- Development and underdevelopment in the Middle East and North Africa / Melani Cammett -- Rethinking the institutional foundations of china's hypergrowth : official incentives, institutional constraints, and local developmentalism / Fubing Su, Ran Tao, and Dali L. Yang -- The politics of growth in South Korea : miracle, crisis, and the new market economy / Stephan Haggard and Myung-Koo Kang

Countries that are rich in petroleum have less democracy, less economic stability, and more frequent civil wars than countries without oil. What explains this oil curse? And can it be fixed? In this groundbreaking analysis, Michael L. Ross looks at how developing nations are shaped by their mineral wealth--and how they can turn oil from a curse into a blessing. Ross traces the oil curse to the upheaval of the 1970s, when oil prices soared and governments across the developing world seized control of their countries' oil industries. Before nationalization, the oil-rich countries looked much like the rest of the world; today, they are 50 percent more likely to be ruled by autocrats--and twice as likely to descend into civil war--than countries without oil. The Oil Curse shows why oil wealth typically creates less economic growth than it should; why it produces jobs for men but not women; and why it creates more problems in poor states than in rich ones. It also warns that the global thirst for petroleum is causing companies to drill in increasingly poor nations, which could further spread the oil curse. This landmark book explains why good geology often leads to bad governance, and how this can be changed.

Since the discovery of abundant oil resources in the 1920s, Venezuela has had an economically privileged position among the nations of Latin America, which has led to its being treated by economic and political analysts as an exceptional case. In her well-known study of Venezuela’s political economy, The Paradox of Plenty (1997), Stanford political scientist Terry Karl argued that this oil wealth induced extraordinary corruption, rent-seeking, and centralized intervention that resulted in restricting productivity and growth. What this and other studies of Venezuela’s economy fail to explain, however, is how such conditions have accompanied both growth and stagnation at different periods of Venezuela’s history and why countries experiencing similar levels of corruption and rent-seeking produce divergent developmental outcomes. By investigating the record of economic development in Venezuela from 1920 to the present, Jonathan Di John shows that the key to explaining why the economy performed much better between 1920 and 1980 than in the post-1980 period is to understand how political strategies interacted with economic strategies—specifically, how politics determined state capacity at any given time and how the stage of development and development strategies affected the nature of political conflicts. In emphasizing the importance of an approach that looks at the political economy, not just at the economy alone, Di John advances the field methodologically while he contributes to a long-needed history of Venezuela’s economic performance in the twentieth century.

This book explores whether any theory alone is sufficiently capable of resolving the complexity of global justice, arguing that a combination of statism and cosmopolitanism is needed. In current times, xenophobia, nationalism and populism have amplified othering in both domestic and international politics. In global justice, the dichotomy between the ‘polis’ and the ‘cosmopolis’ separates statism from cosmopolitanism. Using resource curse as a complex case of global justice, the author demonstrates how neither statism nor cosmopolitanism alone are sufficient but goes on to argue that a combination of the two theories is simultaneously necessary and sufficient to resolve the complexity of global justice. He demonstrates how statism is primarily applied to the institutional dimensions of resource curse and only secondarily applied to the interactional dimensions, while cosmopolitanism is applied to the interactional dimensions but only secondarily applied to the institutional dimensions, and therefore a combination of both theories is needed to resolve the problem of resource curse – using the strength of the former to compensate for the weakness of the latter, and vice versa. Global justice is widely taught and researched as one of the most important areas in political philosophy and political theory. This book will be of great interest to students and researchers, philosophers and political scientists of African politics, political theory, political philosophy, international relations and international development.

The wealth derived from natural resources can have a tremendous impact on the economics and politics of producing countries. In the last quarter century, we have seen the surprising and sobering consequences of this wealth, producing what is now known as the "resource curse." Countries with large endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas, often do worse than their poorer neighbors. Their resource wealth frequently leads to lower growth rates, greater volatility, more corruption, and, in extreme cases, devastating civil wars. In this volume, leading economists, lawyers, and political scientists address the fundamental channels generated by this wealth and examine the major decisions a country must make when faced with an abundance of a natural resource. They identify such problems as asymmetric bargaining power, limited access to information, the failure to engage in long-term planning, weak institutional structures, and missing mechanisms of accountability. They also provide a series of solutions, including recommendations for contracting with oil companies and allocating revenue; guidelines for negotiators; models for optimal auctions; and strategies to strengthen state-society linkages and public accountability. The contributors show that solutions to the resource curse do exist; yet, institutional innovations are necessary to align the incentives of key domestic and international actors, and this requires fundamental political changes and much greater levels of transparency than currently exist. It is becoming increasingly clear that past policies have not provided the benefits they promised. Escaping the Resource Curse lays out a path for radically improving the management of the world's natural resources.