Electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railways, and water supply, are often vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies. This results in weak services, especially in developing and transition economies, and for poor people. Common problems include low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and investment shortfalls. Many countries over the past two decades have restructured, privatized and regulated their infrastructure. This report identifies the challenges involved in this massive policy redirection. It also assesses the outcomes of these changes, as well as their distributional consequences for poor households and other disadvantaged groups. It recommends directions for future reforms and research to improve infrastructure performance, identifying pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity, suggesting rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities, and proposing ways to increase poor people's access to these crucial services.

Electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railways, and water supply, are often vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies. This results in weak services, especially in developing and transition economies, and for poor people. Common problems include low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and investment shortfalls. Many countries over the past two decades have restructured, privatized and regulated their infrastructure. This report identifies the challenges involved in this massive policy redirection. It also assesses the outcomes of these changes, as well as their distributional consequences for poor households and other disadvantaged groups. It recommends directions for future reforms and research to improve infrastructure performance, identifying pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity, suggesting rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities, and proposing ways to increase poor people's access to these crucial services.

Editor's description : "During the past two decades, Latin American countries have made pioneering efforts in reforming infrastructure services. The "first generation of reforms" encompassed widespread privatization, deregulation and restructuring of the provision of energy, water, transport and telecommunications services. Second-Generation Reforms in Infrastructure Services evaluates the current challenges, leading to the consolidation of the initial reforms. This volume deals with post-privatization dispute settlement mechanisms, access arrangements in network industries, and inroads to effective competition in the reformed industries. The authors evaluate a set of contractual adjustments resulting from renegotiations and disputes that have taken place since the beginning of the reform process. In an effort to promote competition in the provision of public services, the authors suggest some practical rules for pricing access in network industries. The book presents a dynamic, global vision of second-generation reforms underway in energy markets around the world. - See more at: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/310#sthash.M23WTIKV.dpuf"

This book provides evolutionary and institutional perspectives on the reform of infrastructure industries, tracing the development of this process in a number of sectors and countries. The contributors contend that infrastructure based industries such as telecommunications, public transport, water management and energy have been increasingly exposed to the dynamism of the market since becoming privatized, and have therefore been stimulated into short-term efficiency and long-term innovation. Drawing on institutional economic theory backed up with case studies such as the California energy crisis, the Dutch gas industry, oil and electricity companies in Spain and the privatization of Schipol airport in Amsterdam the book focuses on process, driving forces, and actors' roles to explain how new balances are established between competing institutions. The degree to which the processes of institutional change are predictable and the effects of deliberate strategic interventions of governments or private actors are explored. Specific technical and sector aspects and their influence on institutional change in various infrastructures are also discussed.

Fears of job loss and changes in employment status have often led workers and unions to oppose privatization and to take actions that delay or block reforms. Many developing country governments have been reluctant to undertake reforms because of labor opposition and the political costs involved. Such difficulties are often compounded by concerns about the social impact of reforms, particularly in countries where social safety nets and labor markets are lacking. The objective of the Toolkit, which includes a CD-ROM, is to provide practical tools and information to help policy makers and practitioners deal with these sensitive issues. The Toolkit helps governments identify and select appropriate strategies and approaches, offers guidelines for design and implementation based on best practice and actual experience, and indicates the factors influencing the choice of strategy and options. The Toolkit is illustrated with examples, checklists, and templates that walk decision makers through best practice methodologies.

"Estache, Perelman, and Trujillo review about 80 studies on electricity and gas, water and sanitation, and rail and ports (with a footnote on telecommunications) in developing countries. The main policy lesson is that there is a difference in the relevance of ownership for efficiency between utilities and transport in developing countries. In transport, private operators have tended to perform better than public operators. For utilities, ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country studies find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers. As for the country-specific studies, some do find differences in performance over time but these differences tend to matter much less than a large number of other variables. Across sectors, private operators functioning in a competitive environment or regulated under price caps or hybrid regulatory regimes tend to catch up best practice faster than public operators. There is a very strong case to push regulators in developing and transition economies toward a more systematic reliance on yardstick competition in a sector in which residual monopoly powers tend to be common. This paper--a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network--is part of a larger effort in the network to document the state of the sector"--World Bank web site.

Regulation of public infrastructure has been a topic of interest for more than a century. Providing public goods, securing their financing, maintenance, and improving the efficiency of their delivery, has generated a voluminous literature and series of debates. More recently, these issues have again become a central concern, as new public management approaches have transformed the role of the state in the provision of public goods and the modalities by which the financing of infrastructure and its operation are procured.Yet, despite the proliferation of new modalities of regulating infrastructure little is known about what works and why. Why do certain regulatory regimes fail and others succeed? What regulatory designs and institutional features produce optimal outcomes and how? And why do regulatory forms of governance when transplanted into different institutional contexts produce less than uniform outcomes?This book addresses these questions, exploring the theoretical foundations of regulation as well as a series of case studies drawn from the telecommunications, electricity, and water sectors. It brings together distinguished scholars and expert practitioners to explore the practical problems of regulation, regulatory design, infrastructure operation, and the implications for infrastructure provision.