List of Tables and FiguresPrefaceIntroduction: Race, Redistricting, and Representation in the U.S. House of RepresentativesChapter One: Black Interests, Difference, Commonality, and RepresentationChapter Two: A Legal Primer on Race and RedistrictingChapter Three: The Supply-Side Theory of Racial Redistricting, with Matthew M. Schousen and Patrick J. SellersChapter Four: Race and Representation in the U.S. House of RepresentativesChapter Five: Links to the ConstituencyChapter Six: Black Majority Districts: Failed Experiment or Catalyst for a Politics of Commonality?Appendix A. Data SourcesAppendix B. Procedures for Coding the Newspaper StoriesNotesReferencesIndex Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

Collects the four major papers and three commentaries from the January 1997 conference convened by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies on the prospects for minority representation in the US. Topics include examinations of the present and future politics of majority-minority districts, a number of voting rights/reapportionment issues of particular salience to Hispanics, the legal issues surrounding the creation of districts, and the enduring significance of racially polarized voting on the electoral chances of black candidates. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

In The Paradox of Representation David Lublin offers an unprecedented analysis of a vast range of rigorous, empirical evidence that exposes the central paradox of racial representation: Racial redistricting remains vital to the election of African Americans and Latinos but makes Congress less likely to adopt policies favored by blacks. Lublin's evidence, together with policy recommendations for improving minority representation, will make observers of the political scene reconsider the avenues to fair representation. Using data on all representatives elected to Congress between 1972 and 1994, Lublin examines the link between the racial composition of a congressional district and its representative's race as well as ideology. The author confirms the view that specially drawn districts must exist to ensure the election of African Americans and Latinos. He also shows, however, that a relatively small number of minorities in a district can lead to the election of a representative attentive to their interests. When African Americans and Latinos make up 40 percent of a district, according to Lublin's findings, they have a strong liberalizing influence on representatives of both parties; when they make up 55 percent, the district is almost certain to elect a minority representative. Lublin notes that particularly in the South, the practice of concentrating minority populations into a small number of districts decreases the liberal influence in the remaining areas. Thus, a handful of minority representatives, almost invariably Democrats, win elections, but so do a greater number of conservative Republicans. The author proposes that establishing a balance between majority-minority districts and districts where the minority population would be slightly more dispersed, making up 40 percent of a total district, would allow more African Americans to exercise more influence over their representatives.

Since the creation of minority-dominated congressional districts eight years ago, the Supreme Court has condemned the move as akin to "political apartheid," while many African-American leaders argue that such districts are required for authentic representation. In the most comprehensive treatment of the subject to date, David Canon shows that the unintended consequences of black majority districts actually contradict the common wisdom that whites will not be adequately represented in these areas. Not only do black candidates need white votes to win, but this crucial "swing" vote often decides the race. And, once elected, even the black members who appeal primarily to black voters usually do a better job than white members of walking the racial tightrope, balancing the needs of their diverse constituents. Ultimately, Canon contends, minority districting is good for the country as a whole. These districts not only give African Americans a greater voice in the political process, they promote a politics of commonality—a biracial politics—rather than a politics of difference.

The symbolic importance of Barack Obama's election is without question. But beyond symbolism, does the election of African-American politicians matter? Grose argues that it does and presents a unified theory of representation. Electing African-American legislators yields more federal dollars and congressional attention directed toward African-American voters. However, race and affirmative action gerrymandering have no impact on public policy passed in Congress. Grose is the first to examine a natural experiment and exceptional moment in history in which black legislators – especially in the U.S. South – represented districts with a majority of white constituents. This is the first systematic examination of the effect of a legislator's race above and beyond the effect of constituency racial characteristics. Grose offers policy prescriptions, including the suggestion that voting rights advocates, the courts, and redistricters draw 'black decisive districts', electorally competitive districts that are likely to elect African Americans.

Scholars of American politics have expressed the concern that concentration of minority voters into limited districts in order to promote minority representation induces the partisan "perverse effect" of reducing the number of seats won by Democrats. Our theory explains how the perverse effect can occur and demonstrates that racial redistricting generates a trade-off between the number of minority legislators and the number of Democratic legislators. Our theory suggests that in light of this trade-off, the diversification of districts as well as the concentration of minorities ("second-order diversity") may be essential for the proportional representation of minorities without partisan electoral bias.