Previously published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly, this volume seeks to analyze to what extent the controversial US policy of democratizing the Middle East with pre-emptive invasions was justified or effective. Post 9/11 the US developed a policy of War on Terror, taking the decision to democratize the Middle East with pre-emptive in

Previously published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly, this volume seeks to analyze to what extent the controversial US policy of democratizing the Middle East with pre-emptive invasions was justified or effective. Post 9/11 the US developed a policy of War on Terror, taking the decision to democratize the Middle East with pre-emptive invasions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As Barakat puts it "Iraq was deliberately de-constructed in order to be reconstructed in a new model." Looking not only at the evidence of democracy post-invasion, the author also considers the global, regional and internal politics leading up to the decision to invade. The effect is an insightful and vital volume that fulfils an urgent need and seeks to answer the questions most troubling the international community since the invasion of Iraq. Were the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan an exploitation of military supremacy to secure a favourable balance of power for the US? Is it possible to build a stable democracy after a pre-emptive invasion? What is the current outlook for a stable democracy in Iraq? Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq is vital reading for all those interested in international politics and the future in Iraq.

This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.

Analyzes how American & coalition forces can best address the requirements that will follow victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives were to determine & analyze missions for mil. forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine assoc. challenges; & formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian org., mitigating local animosity, & facilitating mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. This final report includes: a discussion of historical insights from 20th cent. postwar occupations & post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges that Iraq will present for an occupying power; & a mission matrix listing 135 specific tasks that must be performed to build & sustain a state.