This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors are some of the leading authors in these fields and include discussions of philosophy from the Middle Ages to the present day, from Aquinas to Wittgenstein.

Screens are ubiquitous today. They display information; present image worlds; are portable; connect to mobile networks; mesmerize. However, contemporary screen media also seek to eliminate the presence of the screen and the visibilities of its boundaries. As what is image becomes increasingly indistinguishable against the viewer's actual surroundings, this unsettling prompts re-examination about not only what is the screen, but also how the screen demarcates and what it stands for in relation to our understanding of our realities in, outside and against images. Through case studies drawn from three media technologies - Virtual Reality; holograms; and light projections - this book develops new theories of the surfaces on and spaces in which images are displayed today, interrogating critical lines between art and life; virtuality and actuality; truth and lies. What we have today is not just the contestation of the real against illusion or the unreal, but the disappearance itself of difference and a gluttony of the unreal which both connect up to current politics of distorted truth values and corrupted terms of information. The Post-Screen Through Virtual Reality, Holograms and Light Projections: Where Screen Boundaries Lie is thus about not only where the image's borders and demarcations are established, but also the screen boundary as the instrumentation of today's intense virtualizations that do not tell the truth. In all this, a new imagination for images emerges, with a new space for cultures of presence and absence, definitions of object and representation, and understandings of dis- and re-placement - the post-screen.

Vols. for 1969- include a section of abstracts.

A major feature of human intelligence is that it allows us to contemplate mental life. Such an understanding is vital in enabling us to function effectively in social groups. This book examines the origins of this aspect of human intelligence. The five sections attempt firstly, to place human development within an evolutionary context, focusing on the possibility of innate components of understanding. The second aim of the book is to examine the roles of early perception, pretence and communication as precursor skills in the development of a grasp of mental states. Thirdly, attention is given to the possibility that children know a good deal more about the mind than is apparent from many studies designed to probe their abilities. Taken together, the chapters in this book mark a new focus within a 'theory of mind' movement, examining a group of skills in infancy and early childhood which culminate towards the end of the preschool period in a more mature understanding of one's and others' mental states. Drawing together researchers from diverse theoretical positions, the aim is to work towards a coherent and unified account of this fundamental human abiity. This book will be of central relevance to psychologists and those in related disciplines, particularly education and philosophy.

This book traces a deep misunderstanding about the relation of concepts and reality in the history of philosophy. It exposes the influence of the mistake in the thought of Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Nietzche and Bradley, and suggests that the solution can be found in Hegelian thought. Ellis argues that the treatment proposed exemplifies Hegel's dialectical method. This is an important contribution to this area of philosophy.

On cinema and illusion.

Pragmatism is the view that our philosophical concepts must be connected to our practices - philosophy must stay connected to first order inquiry, to real examples, to real-life expertise. The classical pragmatists, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, put forward views of truth, rationality, and morality that they took to be connected to, and good for, our practices of inquiry and deliberation. When Richard Rorty, the best-known contemporary pragmatist, looks at our practices, he finds that we don't aim at truth or objectivity, but only at solidarity, or agreement within a community, or what our peers will let us get away with saying. There is, however, a revisionist movement amongst contemporary philosophers who are interested in pragmatism. When these new pragmatists examine our practices, they find that the trail of the human serpent is over everything, as James said, but this does not toss us into the sea of post-modern arbitrariness, where truth varies from person to person and culture to culture. The fact that our standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time does not detract from their objectivity. As Peirce and Dewey stressed, we are always immersed in a context of inquiry, where the decision to be made is a decision about what to believe from here, not what to believe were we able to start from scratch - from certain infallible foundations. But we do not go forward arbitrarily. That is, these new pragmatists provide accounts of inquiry that are both recognizably pragmatic in orientation and hospitable to the cognitive aspiration to get one's subject matter right. The best of Peirce, James, and Dewey has thus resurfaced in deep, interesting, and fruitful ways, explored in this volume by David Bakhurst, Arthur Fine, Ian Hacking, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Cheryl Misak, Terry Pinkard, Huw Price, and Jeffrey Stout.